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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,742 papers · 148 categories

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316293124 · Jun 202019922001200920172026
48 results for correlated Stackelberg equilibrium

We introduce CSE for MLSF games and devise online learning algorithms for achieving no-external Stackelberg-regret.

problem Learning equilibrium in leader-follower games with noisy bandit feedback.
method Proposed Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium (CSE) and online learning algorithms balancing exploration and exploitation.
result Achieves no-external Stackelberg-regret, converging to approximate CSE.

This paper tackles learning Stackelberg equilibrium in asymmetric games efficiently from noisy samples.

problem Learning Stackelberg equilibrium in asymmetric, general-sum games efficiently from noisy samples.
method The paper initiates the theoretical study of sample-efficient learning of the Stackelberg equilibrium in bandit feedback setting.
result Sharp positive results on sample-efficient learning of Stackelberg equilibrium with value optimal up to a fundamental gap identified.

Study optimal investment-reinsurance strategies in equity-linked insurance products using Stackelberg game theory.

problem Optimizing investment and reinsurance strategies in equity-linked insurance products with capital guarantees.
method Modelled as a Stackelberg game where reinsurer acts as leader and insurer as follower, with general utility functions and power utility functions analyzed.
result Derive Stackelberg equilibrium for general utility functions and calculate it explicitly for power utility functions, finding reinsurer optimizes premium to incentivize maximal reinsurance purchase.

Study on local convergence of min-max algorithms to differential equilibria on Riemannian manifolds.

problem Solving zero-sum differential games on Riemannian manifolds.
method Analysis of two simultaneous min-max algorithms, ττ-GDA and ττ-SGA, to differential Stackelberg and Nash equilibria, with conditions for linear convergence and asymptotic approximation.
result Established sufficient conditions for linear convergence of ττ-GDA and demonstrated faster convergence of ττ-SGA in some cases.

This paper analyzes a game between insurer and reinsurer under ambiguity and risk aversion, optimizing reinsurance and investment strategies.

problem Optimizing reinsurance and investment strategies in a game between insurer and reinsurer under ambiguity and risk aversion.
method Stackelberg game, α\alpha-maxmin mean-variance criterion, Heston's stochastic volatility, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, Riccati differential equations.
result Excess-of-loss reinsurance is optimal for the insurer, and the equilibrium strategies are determined by specific equations.

Two-layer model studies reinsurance contracts and competition between insurer and reinsurers.

problem Modeling and analyzing reinsurance contracts and competition between insurer and reinsurers.
method Two-layer stochastic game model with insurer negotiating with reinsurers, and reinsurers competing for business.
result Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies for the insurer and reinsurers, characterized in semiclosed form.

An informed broker optimizes trading strategies in a market influenced by many traders.

problem Optimizing trading strategies for an informed broker in a market with many traders.
method Developed a mean-field game approach to derive equilibrium strategies for both the broker and traders.
result The broker's optimal strategy involves a Stackelberg equilibrium, leading and traders following.

Study of insurance market equilibria with risk-averse policyholders.

problem Analyzing optimal insurance contracts in a monopoly market with risk-averse policyholders.
method Modeling Stackelberg equilibria with a profit-maximizing insurer and a risk-averse policyholder.
result Equilibrium contracts exhibit a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over pessimistic loss layers and no coverage over optimistic ones.

Investors with asymmetric information play a game to optimize their portfolios.

problem Two investors with different information levels compete in portfolio selection.
method Modelled as a Stackelberg game with entropy-regularized mean-variance objectives.
result Equilibria exist where follower's strategy depends on leader's actions.

New RL algorithms find SNE in Markov games with myopic followers.

problem Finding SNE in Markov games with myopic followers.
method Optimistic and pessimistic variants of least-squares value iteration, incorporating function approximation.
result First provably efficient RL algorithms for SNEs in general-sum Markov games with myopic followers.

Brokers and an informed trader compete for liquidity, affecting trading costs and inventory risk.

problem How brokers and an informed trader manage liquidity and trading costs.
method Sequential Stackelberg game, solving for trading strategies, numerical solutions.
result Equilibrium strategies and liquidity prices determined, not Pareto efficient.

The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.

problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.

New RL algorithms learn QSE from strategic feedbacks with sample efficiency.

problem Learning QSE in Markov games with strategic feedbacks.
method Proposes sample-efficient algorithms for online and offline settings, combining quantal response model learning and RL.
result Achieves sublinear regret bounds and quantifies model uncertainty.

Study of 2imes22 imes 2 zero-sum games with noisy observations and commitments.

problem Analyzing 2imes22 imes 2 zero-sum games with noisy observations and commitments.
method Modeling a 2imes22 imes 2 zero-sum game with a leader committing to a strategy and a follower observing a noisy version of the leader's action.
result Observing the leader's action is either beneficial or immaterial for the follower, and the equilibrium payoff is bounded.

Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.

problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.

Paper analyzes convergence of GDA for nonconvex-nonconcave minimax problems.

problem Understanding convergence of GDA for nonconvex-nonconcave minimax problems.
method Local convergence analysis of GDA with stepsize ratio Θ(κ).
result Stepsize ratio of Θ(κ) is necessary and sufficient for local convergence of GDA to a Stackelberg Equilibrium.

The paper introduces Robust Correlated Equilibrium for games with time-varying costs and proposes an algorithm to achieve it.

problem Games with time-varying costs and disturbances.
method Proposes Robust Correlated Equilibrium and a decentralized algorithm to learn optimal strategies.
result The algorithm converges to the Robust Correlated Equilibrium, showing no regret for each controller.

The paper analyzes reinsurance strategies in a competitive multi-agent system.

problem Strategic interactions and competitive behavior in multi-layer reinsurance chains.
method Stochastic differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies.
result Intensified competition reduces safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.

Optimal dynamic allocation of carbon allowances reduces emissions efficiently.

problem Reducing carbon emissions from firms over time with dynamic allocation and trading.
method Variational approach to solve the Stackelberg game between regulator and firms.
result Optimal policies lead to constant abatement effort and allowance price, outperforming static allocations.

Study on optimal trading in a finite population with market frictions and asymmetric information.

problem Optimal trading in a finite population with market frictions and asymmetric information.
method Investigates stochastic differential games with asymmetric information and market frictions, proving existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg-Nash equilibria.
result Existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in both unconstrained and constrained trading scenarios.

Paper proposes a new method to optimize robot body structure and control policy.

problem Optimizing robot body structure and control policy in a coupled manner.
method Revisits co-design problem as a Stackelberg game, incorporating control adaptation dynamics.
result Stackelberg PPO outperforms standard PPO in stability and performance.

Study insurance pricing under correlation ambiguity without increasing prices or reducing utility.

problem Understanding the dependence structure between insurance and financial risks.
method Dynamic equilibrium analysis of insurance pricing with worst-case beliefs.
result Correlation ambiguity does not necessarily increase insurance prices or reduce insurers' utility.

SLHF uses sequential game theory to optimize preferences from human feedback.

problem Optimizing preferences from human feedback in sequential settings.
method SLHF frames the problem as a sequential-move game between Leader and Follower, decomposing the optimization into refinement and adversarial optimization.
result SLHF achieves strong alignment across diverse preference datasets and scales to large models.

For an investor with constant absolute risk aversion and a long horizon, who trades in a market with constant investment opportunities and small proportional transaction costs, we obtain explicitly the optimal investment policy, its implied welfare, liquidity premium, and trading volume. We identify these quantities as…

2011-10-06abs ↗pdf ↗

We consider a stochastic game between a trader and a central bank in a target zone market with a lower currency peg. This currency peg is maintained by the central bank through the generation of permanent price impact, thereby aggregating an ever increasing risky position in foreign reserves. We describe this situation…

2018-01-23abs ↗pdf ↗

Study on reinsurance decisions using mean-variance criterion with irreversible contracts.

problem Optimizing reinsurance premiums and contracts in a Stackelberg game with irreversible contracts.
method Unified singular control framework applied to both discrete and continuous time reinsurance contracts.
result A single once-for-all reinsurance contract is preferred over multiple contracts, and the signing time is crucial.

MAXMINLCB optimizes unknown target functions with preference feedback using a Stackelberg game approach.

problem Optimizing unknown target functions with pairwise comparisons and human feedback.
method MAXMINLCB, a zero-sum Stackelberg game, balances exploration and exploitation.
result MAXMINLCB consistently outperforms existing algorithms with a rate-optimal regret guarantee.

Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, intervening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and low dimensional. In AML, decisions are made by algorit…

2019-08-19abs ↗pdf ↗

DREAM learns optimal strategies in imperfect games without needing a simulator.

problem Learning optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents.
method DREAM is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that converges to Nash Equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria.
result DREAM achieves state-of-the-art performance in benchmark games and is competitive with simulator-based algorithms.

We consider a market model that consists of financial investors and producers of a commodity. Producers optionally store some production for future sale and go short on forward contracts to hedge the uncertainty of the future commodity price. Financial investors take positions in these contracts in order to diversify t…

2015-02-02abs ↗pdf ↗

Path-independent equilibrium models improve network performance on harder problems.

problem Improving network performance on harder problem instances.
method Investigated path-independent equilibrium models and their impact on network performance.
result Path independence correlates with better performance on harder problem instances.

This paper improves sample efficiency for learning equilibria in multi-player games.

problem Sample-efficient learning of equilibria in games with many players.
method Designs algorithms for learning CCE and CE with polynomial sample complexity in the number of players.
result First to show polynomial sample complexity for learning CCE and CE in multi-player games.

This paper introduces Schur-constant equilibrium distribution models of dimension n for arithmetic non-negative random variables. Such a model is defined through the (several orders) equilibrium distributions of a univariate survival function. First, the bivariate case is considered and analyzed in depth, stressing the…

2017-09-28abs ↗pdf ↗

Modeling DEX liquidity with heterogeneous LPs and MEV bots.

problem Understanding and predicting the dynamics of decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges.
method Mean-field game approach to model liquidity providers' optimal strategies and interactions.
result Calibrated model produces consistent pool exchange rate dynamics and liquidity evolution.

Correlations and other collective phenomena in a schematic model of heterogeneous binary agents (individual spin-glass samples) are considered on the complete graph and also on 2d and 3d regular lattices. The system's stochastic dynamics is studied by numerical simulations. The dynamics is so slow that one can meaningf…

2012-10-11abs ↗pdf ↗

Study efficient offline RL in Markov games with general models.

problem Learn approximate equilibria from offline data in Markov games.
method Use Bellman-consistent pessimism for interval estimation and optimize gap relaxation.
result First framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games, handling all equilibria.

Optimal algorithm for two-player zero-sum games with linear parameterization.

problem Finding Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum Markov games with linear transition.
method Nash-UCRL algorithm, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, Optimism-in-Face-of-Uncertainty.
result Proves ildeO(dHT) ilde{O}(dH\sqrt{T}) regret bound, matching lower bound up to logarithmic factors.