A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
Study optimal investment-reinsurance strategies in equity-linked insurance products using Stackelberg game theory.
problem Optimizing investment and reinsurance strategies in equity-linked insurance products with capital guarantees.
method Modelled as a Stackelberg game where reinsurer acts as leader and insurer as follower, with general utility functions and power utility functions analyzed.
result Derive Stackelberg equilibrium for general utility functions and calculate it explicitly for power utility functions, finding reinsurer optimizes premium to incentivize maximal reinsurance purchase.
Study on local convergence of min-max algorithms to differential equilibria on Riemannian manifolds.
problem Solving zero-sum differential games on Riemannian manifolds.
method Analysis of two simultaneous min-max algorithms, τ-GDA and τ-SGA, to differential Stackelberg and Nash equilibria, with conditions for linear convergence and asymptotic approximation.
result Established sufficient conditions for linear convergence of τ-GDA and demonstrated faster convergence of τ-SGA in some cases.
Study of insurance market equilibria with risk-averse policyholders.
problem Analyzing optimal insurance contracts in a monopoly market with risk-averse policyholders.
method Modeling Stackelberg equilibria with a profit-maximizing insurer and a risk-averse policyholder.
result Equilibrium contracts exhibit a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over pessimistic loss layers and no coverage over optimistic ones.
This paper investigates a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game between one reinsurer and two insurers, including a stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame and a non-zero-sum stochastic differential subgame. The reinsurer, as the leader of the Stackelberg game, can price reinsurance premium…
The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.
problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.
We study the problem of alleviating the instability issue in the GAN training procedure via new architecture design. The discrepancy between the minimax and maximin objective values could serve as a proxy for the difficulties that the alternating gradient descent encounters in the optimization of GANs. In this work, we…
The paper analyzes reinsurance strategies in a competitive multi-agent system.
problem Strategic interactions and competitive behavior in multi-layer reinsurance chains.
method Stochastic differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies.
result Intensified competition reduces safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.
Study on optimal trading in a finite population with market frictions and asymmetric information.
problem Optimal trading in a finite population with market frictions and asymmetric information.
method Investigates stochastic differential games with asymmetric information and market frictions, proving existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg-Nash equilibria.
result Existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in both unconstrained and constrained trading scenarios.
SLHF uses sequential game theory to optimize preferences from human feedback.
problem Optimizing preferences from human feedback in sequential settings.
method SLHF frames the problem as a sequential-move game between Leader and Follower, decomposing the optimization into refinement and adversarial optimization.
result SLHF achieves strong alignment across diverse preference datasets and scales to large models.
For an investor with constant absolute risk aversion and a long horizon, who trades in a market with constant investment opportunities and small proportional transaction costs, we obtain explicitly the optimal investment policy, its implied welfare, liquidity premium, and trading volume. We identify these quantities as…
We consider a stochastic game between a trader and a central bank in a target zone market with a lower currency peg. This currency peg is maintained by the central bank through the generation of permanent price impact, thereby aggregating an ever increasing risky position in foreign reserves. We describe this situation…
Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, intervening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and low dimensional. In AML, decisions are made by algorit…
We consider a market model that consists of financial investors and producers of a commodity. Producers optionally store some production for future sale and go short on forward contracts to hedge the uncertainty of the future commodity price. Financial investors take positions in these contracts in order to diversify t…
This paper introduces Schur-constant equilibrium distribution models of dimension n for arithmetic non-negative random variables. Such a model is defined through the (several orders) equilibrium distributions of a univariate survival function. First, the bivariate case is considered and analyzed in depth, stressing the…
We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic aspect is captured through a reduced-form price-impact model for the CO_2 allowance…
Correlations and other collective phenomena in a schematic model of heterogeneous binary agents (individual spin-glass samples) are considered on the complete graph and also on 2d and 3d regular lattices. The system's stochastic dynamics is studied by numerical simulations. The dynamics is so slow that one can meaningf…