A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
Just as war is sometimes fallaciously represented as a zero sum game -- when in fact war is a negative sum game - stock market trading, a positive sum game over time, is often erroneously represented as a zero sum game. This is called the "zero sum fallacy" -- the erroneous belief that one trader in a stock market exch…
We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave saddle-point problem in the policy space. Specifically, we show that despite its nonconve…
We consider the problem of two-player zero-sum games. This problem is formulated as a min-max Markov game in the literature. The solution of this game, which is the min-max payoff, starting from a given state is called the min-max value of the state. In this work, we compute the solution of the two-player zero-sum game…
This work finds mixed equilibria in zero-sum games using interacting particle dynamics.
problem Finding mixed equilibrium points in continuous minmax games.
method A method based on entropic regularisation of two-layer zero-sum games with interacting particle dynamics.
result The sequence of empirical measures of the particle system satisfies a large deviation principle as the number of particles grows to infinity, implying convergence of the empirical measure and the Nikaidô-Isoda error.
Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of agents of increasing strength. However, nontransitive games, such as rock-paper-scissors, can ex…
We study a wide class of non-convex non-concave min-max games that generalizes over standard bilinear zero-sum games. In this class, players control the inputs of a smooth function whose output is being applied to a bilinear zero-sum game. This class of games is motivated by the indirect nature of the competition in Ge…
In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincaré recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect information games and other sequential game settings. We then investigate how adapting th…
Paper studies zero-sum games with noisy observations and identifies equilibrium conditions.
problem Zero-sum games with noisy observations of the leader's actions.
method Analyzes the equilibrium of games with noisy action observability, identifies necessary conditions for uniqueness, and investigates the cardinality of best responses.
result The noisy observations significantly impact the cardinality of the follower's set of best responses, and under certain conditions, this set becomes a singleton almost surely.
We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to the other player's action. In the first part of the paper, we consider the game wh…
Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent systems capable of generating intelligent innovations: Darwinian evolution, the ma…
We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) represent a zero-sum game between two machine players, a generator and a discriminator, designed to learn the distribution of data. While GANs have achieved state-of-the-art performance in several benchmark learning tasks, GAN minimax optimization still poses great theoretical and…
This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bi-dimensional diffusion (X,Y). Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum game is core to many problems in statistics, optimization, and economics, and fo…
A geometric approach to differential game theory is illustrated. The parallel pursuit is considered as a two-player zero-sum differential game. The optimal strategies of each player is designed based on Riemann-Finsler geometry. Our approach incorporates a closed loop optimal control and the presentation is familiar wi…
Min-max formulations have attracted great attention in the ML community due to the rise of deep generative models and adversarial methods, while understanding the dynamics of gradient algorithms for solving such formulations has remained a grand challenge. As a first step, we restrict to bilinear zero-sum games and giv…
We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical systems theory. For both general-sum and potential games, we characterize a non…
Game-theoretic models of learning are a powerful set of models that optimize multi-objective architectures. Among these models are zero-sum architectures that have inspired adversarial learning frameworks. An important shortcoming of these zeros-sum architectures is that gradient-based training leads to weak convergenc…
The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.
problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.