A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. F…
We investigate the effects of the social interactions of a finite set of agents on an equilibrium pricing mechanism. A derivative written on non-tradable underlyings is introduced to the market and priced in an equilibrium framework by agents who assess risk using convex dynamic risk measures expressed by Backward Stoc…
We prove the global existence of an incomplete, continuous-time finite-agent Radner equilibrium in which exponential agents optimize their expected utility over both running consumption and terminal wealth. The market consists of a traded annuity, and, along with unspanned income, the market is incomplete. Set in a Bro…
Financial markets are often driven by latent factors which traders cannot observe. Here, we address an algorithmic trading problem with collections of heterogeneous agents who aim to perform optimal execution or statistical arbitrage, where all agents filter the latent states of the world, and their trading actions hav…
Modeling price formation in intraday electricity markets with renewable generation.
problem Price formation and optimal trading strategies in intraday electricity markets with intermittent renewable generation.
method Developed a tractable equilibrium model using stochastic control theory to identify optimal strategies and exhibit Nash equilibrium.
result Identified optimal trading strategies and exhibited Nash equilibrium in closed form for a finite number of agents and in the asymptotic framework of mean field games.
We consider a class of generalized capital asset pricing models in continuous time with a finite number of agents and tradable securities. The securities may not be sufficient to span all sources of uncertainty. If the agents have exponential utility functions and the individual endowments are spanned by the securities…
We consider a financial market model which consists of a financial asset and a large number of interacting agents classified into many types. Different types of agents are heterogeneous in their price expectations. Each agent can change its type based on the current empirical distribution of the types and the equilibri…
In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations using a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type stemming from Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle. Although the same cost functions as well…
We propose an analytically tractable variation of the minority game in which rational agents use probabilistic strategies. In our model, N agents choose between two alternatives repeatedly, and those who are in the minority get a pay-off 1, others zero. The agents optimize the expectation value of their discounted fu…
We study the formation of derivative prices in equilibrium between risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs about the dynamics of the underlying. Under the condition that the derivative cannot be shorted, we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium price and show that it incorporates the speculative value of p…
Some general features of kinetic multi-agent models are reviewed, with particular attention to the relation between the agent saving propensities and the form of the equilibrium wealth distribution. The effect of a finite cutoff of the saving propensity distribution on the corresponding wealth distribution is studied. …
We discuss a natural game of competition and solve the corresponding mean field game with \emph{common noise} when agents' rewards are \emph{rank dependent}. We use this solution to provide an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite player game and obtain the rate of convergence.
We consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions f…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading actions. The market has latent factors that drive prices, and agents account for th…
Study on stock price formation on trees with multi-population and non-rational agents.
problem Equilibrium price formation for risky stock with multi-population and non-rational agents.
method Combining mean-field game theory with binomial tree framework, proving existence of unique equilibrium, deriving explicit formula for transition probabilities.
result Existence of unique mean-field market-clearing equilibrium with explicit analytic formula for stock price transition probabilities.
In his lectures at College de France, P.L. Lions introduced the concept of Master equation, see [5] for Mean Field Games. It is introduced in a heuristic fashion, from the system of partial differential equations, associated to a Nash equilibrium for a large, but finite, number of players. The method, also explained in…
This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model where agents exhibit a strong form of belief heterogeneity: they disagree about zero probability events. It is shown that, somewhat surprisingly, equilibrium exists in this setting, and that the disagreement about nullsets naturally leads to equilibrium asset pricing bubb…
We consider a simple model of a closed economic system where the total money is conserved and the number of economic agents is fixed. In analogy to statistical systems in equilibrium, money and the average money per economic agent are equivalent to energy and temperature, respectively. We investigate the effect of the …
We analyze a family of portfolio management problems under relative performance criteria, for fund managers having CARA or CRRA utilities and trading in a common investment horizon in log-normal markets. We construct explicit constant equilibrium strategies for both the finite population games and the corresponding mea…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a reinforcement learning (adaptive filtering) algorithm that facilitates learning…
Study equilibrium consumption habits in a large population using mean field games.
problem Equilibrium consumption under external habit formation in a large population.
method Formulated and solved mean field games for linear and multiplicative habit formation preferences, constructed approximate Nash equilibria for large n-player games.
result Characterized mean field equilibrium strategies and derived financial implications.