Symmetric game analysis shows Nash equilibria in three strategic states.
problem Analyzing Nash equilibria in a symmetric multi-player zero-sum game with two strategic variables.
method Using the minimax theorem by Sion to show equivalence of Nash equilibria.
result Nash equilibria are equivalent in three strategic states.
New games model strategic interactions in incomplete information settings.
problem Modeling strategic interactions in incomplete information settings.
method Introduced new games that map input to private player types, aggregate strategies, and converge to near-Nash equilibria.
result Games can recover meaningful strategic interactions from real data.
Models analyze strategic risk-taking in continuous action games.
problem Strategic risk-taking dynamics in continuous action games.
method Normal form game, multi-player scenarios, regret minimization algorithms, numerical algorithm for calculation.
result Nash equilibrium also serves as a correlated equilibrium in continuous games.
New method for identifying best action in strategic games.
problem Identifying the best action in a game with random outcomes.
method Two strategies: Maximin-LUCB and Maximin-Racing.
result Both methods achieve good sample complexity and performance.
The paper analyzes trading strategies in a competitive market with incomplete information.
problem Strategic trading under uncertainty when firms lack full knowledge of competitors' strategies.
method Bayesian games framework to incorporate uncertainty and derive optimal trading strategies.
result Uncertainty significantly impacts trading strategies compared to complete information scenarios.
Strategic behaviour is one of the main explanations for cost overruns. It can theoretically be supported by agency theory, in which strategic behaviour is the result of asymmetric information between the principal and agent. This paper gives a formal account of this relation by a signalling game. This is a game with in…
New findings show strategic interactions can undermine model expressiveness in machine learning.
problem How strategic interactions affect model performance in machine learning.
method Analyzing model expressiveness and strategic interactions in various machine learning settings.
result Optimizing over less expressive model classes can lead to better equilibrium outcomes in strategic environments.
The paper analyzes how mutable blockchain protocols affect miner behavior and strategic stability.
problem The mutability of blockchain protocols undermines long-term planning and cooperative equilibria.
method Integrates Austrian capital theory with repeated game theory to examine miner behavior under different institutional conditions.
result Effective time preference increases when protocol rules are mutable, leading to political rent-seeking and undermining strategic coherence.
Game-theoretic flow allocation models network dynamics.
problem Maximizing flow through a network with strategic node allocations.
method Game-theoretic analysis of flow allocation strategies in a network.
result Existence and computational complexity of Nash and strong equilibria.
Model strategic interactions between market makers and traders to optimize execution.
problem Optimizing execution in markets with strategic interactions.
method Stochastic game modeling with FBSDEs and decoupling approach.
result Established Nash equilibria and global well-posedness for specific models.
The paper solves a differential game to find optimal extraction and taxation of strategic natural resources.
problem Optimal extraction and taxation of nonrenewable natural resources under fluctuating market values.
method Formulated as a differential game with two players: mining company and government agency. Proved Nash equilibrium existence and solved Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations.
result Closed-form solutions for value functions, optimal extraction and taxation rates.
New framework shows strategic behavior is actually a form of causal modeling.
problem Designing classifiers that incentivize strategic behavior to improve quality.
method Developed a causal framework to distinguish between gaming and improvement.
result Proved any procedure for designing incentive classifiers must solve a causal inference problem.
Study explores optimal strategies in games with multiple players and mean-field interactions.
problem Optimal strategies in games with multiple players and mean-field interactions.
method Exploration of three different notions of optimality, including mean-field control solution, mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, and mean-field Nash equilibria.
result Approximation of cooperative and competitive equilibria in large N N N -player games by mean-field control and mean-field equilibria. Analyzes gaming in federated learning systems and provides design principles.
problem Gaming and cooperation in federated learning systems under partial observability.
method Developed an analytical framework to separate welfare-improving behavior from metric gaming.
result Derived threshold conditions for deterring harmful gaming and preserving cooperation.
Defends against strategic data manipulation in machine learning.
problem Adversaries can tamper with datasets to influence learning outcomes.
method Uses multiple learners and strategic activation to counteract attacks.
result Demonstrates effectiveness of a game-theoretic approach to defense.
Study examines strategic exit timing in uncertain competition.
problem Timing of strategic exit decisions in competitive markets with uncertainty.
method Constructs a stochastic game equilibrium for exit strategies involving state variable and posterior belief process.
result Unique equilibrium found for symmetric Bayesian players.
Market-maker optimizes quotes based on strategic market-takers' behavior.
problem Optimizing market-making strategies in a strategic trading environment.
method Mean-field game approach to model strategic market-takers and derive optimal controls.
result Derivation of optimal controls for market-maker and market-taker.
Two strategic agents track their portfolios, influencing each other's trading targets.
problem Strategic competition in portfolio tracking with price impact.
method Stochastic linear quadratic differential game with terminal state constraints.
result Unique open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies emerge based on price impact types.
Game-theoretic analysis of mining gaps in blockchain systems.
problem Strategic mining behavior and its impact on blockchain stability.
method Game-theoretic model and Nash equilibrium analysis.
result Mining gaps can destabilize blockchain systems, especially with decreasing block rewards.
The paper analyzes strategic behavior in reinsurance transactions leading to Nash equilibria.
problem Strategic behavior in reinsurance transactions affecting risk aversion and welfare gains.
method Identifying Nash equilibria within a class of risk measures.
result At strictly beneficial Nash equilibria, agents appear homogeneous in risk preferences.
DefogGAN predicts hidden RTS game information to aid strategic decision-making.
problem Predicting hidden information in real-time strategy games like StarCraft.
method Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with pyramidal reconstruction loss.
result DefogGAN predicts enemy buildings and combat units as accurately as professional players.
New game theory approach to bond market liquidity and participant behavior.
problem Uncertainty in market maker types and regulatory structure.
method Liquidity Game theory applied to UK bond market interactions.
result Strategies and structures for market makers and regulators.
The game theory techniques are used to find the equilibrium of a market. Game theory refers to the ways in which strategic interactions among economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents. Th…
New approach reduces simulator exploitation by improving strategic robustness.
problem Simulator exploitation leading to reality gap between simulation and real-world performance.
method Formulated as a zero-sum minimax game, providing theoretical guarantees and a convergent active data selection algorithm.
result Proves convergence and reduces prediction error in strategically important regions by 1.5-2.2 times.
The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.
problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.
Models show strategic agents can influence classifier outcomes by investing effort.
problem How strategic agents can influence classifier outcomes.
method Developed a model to characterize strategic effort investment.
result Simple linear mechanisms can incentivize strategic effort effectively.
New algorithms optimize decision rules in strategic scenarios, minimizing prediction risk and incentivizing better outcomes.
problem Strategic agents manipulate features to improve outcomes, complicating decision-making models.
method Efficient algorithms for learning decision rules that minimize prediction risk, incentivize better outcomes, and estimate true model coefficients.
result Optimal decision rules can be learned through testing and observing agent responses, circumventing hardness results.
Study strategic competition in commodity markets using impulse-switching controls.
problem Strategic competition between upstream and downstream firms in commodity markets.
method Non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls.
result Multiple Nash equilibria found, depending on the number of switches by the downstream firm.
Paper learns network games from player actions.
problem Learning network games from observed actions.
method Solves joint optimization for graph structure and marginal benefits.
result Effective in synthetic and real-world experiments.
User strategization undermines algorithmic trustworthiness.
problem User strategic behavior corrupts algorithmic data and trust.
method Modeling user-platform interactions as a game, analyzing strategic behavior's short-term benefits and long-term harms.
result User strategization can initially benefit platforms but ultimately harms their ability to make accurate decisions.
New methods analyze continuous strategic games, overcoming typical assumptions.
problem Analyzing rich, naturalistic behavioral data.
method Inverse reinforcement learning, machine learning models.
result Successfully generated rich, varied trajectories without mode collapse.
Two firms compete in a financial market, choosing dividend strategies to avoid default and maximize profits.
problem Strategic interaction between two financially constrained firms in a market with default risk.
method Construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control.
result Explicit identification of optimal strategies and equilibrium payoffs for different initial conditions.
Game theory models storage investment to balance market competition and profits.
problem Strategic storage investment impacts electricity market prices and revenues.
method Formulated a non-cooperative game between investors to model strategic storage decisions.
result Increasing storage capacity reduces individual profits but increases total investment.
New approach reduces simulator exploitation by learning robust models.
problem Simulator exploitation leading to reality gap in reinforcement learning.
method Formulated as a zero-sum minimax game between model player and policy player, providing theoretical guarantees and a convergent active data selection algorithm.
result Reduces prediction error in strategically important regions by 1.5-2.2 times and enables near-optimal real-world performance.
AlphaZero assesses new chess variants for balance and dynamics.
problem Designing engaging and balanced game rules, especially for chess variants.
method Used AlphaZero to learn near-optimal strategies for nine chess variants.
result AlphaZero reveals novel strategic and tactical patterns in chess variants.
Modeling incentives for content creators on algorithm-curated platforms.
problem Maximizing exposure for content creators on algorithmic platforms.
method Formalized exposure game model, proving effects of algorithmic choices on equilibria, proposing tools for finding equilibria.
result Algorithmic choices significantly affect content exposure and creator behavior.
Competition has been introduced in the electricity markets with the goal of reducing prices and improving efficiency. The basic idea which stays behind this choice is that, in competitive markets, a greater quantity of the good is exchanged at a lower and a lower price, leading to higher market efficiency. Electricity …
Paper presents a new approach to a strategic insider equilibrium problem in continuous time.
problem Continuous time Kyle-Back model between insider and market marker.
method Uses forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) for characterization of equilibria.
result Characterizes all equilibria through FBSDEs and shows uniqueness of equilibrium without Markovian restrictions.
Strategic feature manipulation helps learners identify meaningful variables in online regression settings.
problem Strategic feature manipulation poses a challenge for learners in online regression settings.
method Investigates how strategic feature manipulation by individuals can help learners recover meaningful features.
result Simple learner behavior can help accurately recover meaningful features and incentivize feature improvement.
We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior in strategic se…
The paper develops classifiers that encourage positive adaptation in machine learning settings.
problem Strategic behavior by decision subjects leads to performance loss in machine learning models.
method Formulates a two-stage game to characterize optimal strategies for model designers and decision subjects.
result Trained classifiers maintain accuracy while inducing higher improvement and less manipulation.
This work explains crises in markets without external news using bounded rational agents.
problem Inability to model out-of-equilibrium dynamics in economic markets.
method Modeling bounded rational strategic reasoning in multi-agent market games.
result Bounded rational strategic reasoning can lead to endogenously emerging crises.
Algorithm learns optimal coordination for strategic agents in uncertain settings.
problem Optimizing rewards for strategic agents with private types and actions.
method Combines delaying mechanism, reward angle estimation, and LinUCB algorithm.
result Near optimal regret bound of O ~ ( T ) \tilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) O ~ ( T ) for learning optimal policy. Study explores algorithmic collusion in repeated games using various learning dynamics.
problem Understanding algorithmic collusion in repeated games with different learning dynamics.
method Examines Q Q Q -learning, gradient learning, and other dynamics in a general repeated game setting. result Characterizes the set of payoff vectors achievable by these dynamics, revealing possibilities for collusion.
New algorithm improves performance in nontransitive games.
problem Nontransitive games lack a clear winner.
method Geometric framework for agent objectives, PSRO_rN algorithm.
result PSRO_rN consistently outperforms alternatives in nontransitive games.
Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games: therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decentralised optimisation tasks. Fictitious play is the canonical example of these algorithms. Nevertheless fic…
Paper studies competitive networks where teams aim to minimize their own objectives, adapting to each other's strategies.
problem Competitive networks where teams have conflicting objectives.
method Proposes diffusion learning algorithms for two classes of network games: zero-sum and non-zero-sum.
result Stability performance of proposed algorithms analyzed and demonstrated through experiments.
Modeling European spot power markets with game theory for Nash equilibria.
problem Optimizing electricity markets with risk-averse players and constraints.
method Game-theoretic framework with Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel schemes for approximate Nash equilibria.
result Innovative risk aversion model reduces price dimensionality and ensures boundedness.