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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,695 papers · 148 categories

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48 results for strategic competition

The paper analyzes trading strategies in a competitive market with incomplete information.

problem Strategic trading under uncertainty when firms lack full knowledge of competitors' strategies.
method Bayesian games framework to incorporate uncertainty and derive optimal trading strategies.
result Uncertainty significantly impacts trading strategies compared to complete information scenarios.

Paper analyzes strategic underreporting in competitive insurance markets.

problem Strategic underreporting by insureds in competitive insurance markets.
method Develops a dynamic insurance market model with two competing companies and a continuum of insureds, examines the interaction between strategic underreporting and competitive pricing under a Bonus-Malus System framework.
result Establishes the existence and uniqueness of the insureds' optimal reporting barrier and its dependence on BMS premiums; proves the existence of Nash equilibrium premium strategies.

LLMs can collude in market divisions, maximizing profits.

problem Strategic collusion of LLM agents in multi-commodity markets.
method Examined LLMs in Cournot competition frameworks, analyzing pricing and resource allocation strategies.
result LLMs can monopolize specific commodities without direct human input or explicit collusion commands.

New paper finds strategic trade centralization benefits firms, while naive centralization often harms them.

problem Finding optimal trading strategies in competitive markets.
method Complete solution to finding equilibrium strategies in competition using Fourier Series methods.
result Firms that strategically centralize trades generally benefit, while naive centralization often harms them.

Study strategic competition in commodity markets using impulse-switching controls.

problem Strategic competition between upstream and downstream firms in commodity markets.
method Non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls.
result Multiple Nash equilibria found, depending on the number of switches by the downstream firm.

Study examines pricing strategies in competitive supply chains with discrete prices.

problem Inaccurate assumptions in traditional SC models for pricing decisions.
method Examines a SC model with one supplier and two manufacturers, considering customer demand segmentation and discrete price setting.
result Nash equilibria among manufacturers are not unique, and low denomination factors can lead to instability.

Game theory models storage investment to balance market competition and profits.

problem Strategic storage investment impacts electricity market prices and revenues.
method Formulated a non-cooperative game between investors to model strategic storage decisions.
result Increasing storage capacity reduces individual profits but increases total investment.

Study examines how traders with asymmetric information and adaptive learning strategies affect market efficiency.

problem Effect of traders' strategic behavior on market efficiency and informational asymmetry.
method Examines a market with boundedly rational, asymmetrically informed traders using multiarmed bandit algorithms.
result Strategically acting traders can lead to more efficient markets than purely competitive ones under certain conditions.

The paper analyzes strategic irreversible investments with novel dynamic strategies.

problem Tradeoff between preemption incentives and option value of waiting in oligopolistic markets.
method Developed novel Markov perfect equilibrium to handle singular control of optimal investment.
result Simpler strategies lead to a 'preemption trap' with zero net present values.

Informed traders strategically reveal noisier signals, making prices less responsive to public information.

problem How informed traders strategically reveal signals impacts market prices and utility.
method Modeling a market with an informed trader, an uninformed trader, and liquidity providers, proving equilibrium existence.
result In equilibrium, the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, making prices less responsive to public information.

Study optimal treatment assignment policies under strategic agent responses.

problem Learning optimal treatment policies with strategic agents complicates estimation.
method Dynamic model with threshold convergence to mean-field equilibrium, consistent estimator for policy gradient.
result Threshold for treatment assignment converges to mean-field equilibrium threshold under large but finite number of agents.

Investors' strategic trading affects asset prices, modeled as a game.

problem Investors' trading rates influence asset prices in dynamic markets.
method Model as a non-zero sum singular stochastic differential game, establishing equivalence between best-response and auxiliary control problems.
result Unique Nash equilibrium is deterministic with a closed-form solution.

Study explores optimal strategies in games with multiple players and mean-field interactions.

problem Optimal strategies in games with multiple players and mean-field interactions.
method Exploration of three different notions of optimality, including mean-field control solution, mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, and mean-field Nash equilibria.
result Approximation of cooperative and competitive equilibria in large NN-player games by mean-field control and mean-field equilibria.

We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to market risk tend to submit more elasti…

2017-07-17abs ↗pdf ↗

Modeling dealer competition, internalisation and externalisation impact market dynamics and costs.

problem Understanding and optimizing dealer competition in risky asset markets.
method Variational approach to derive Nash equilibrium for dealer competition.
result Dealers using internalisation are incentivized to increase externalisation, leading to higher hedging costs and wider spreads.

The paper tackles strategic behavior in decision-making with counterfactual explanations.

problem Finding optimal counterfactual explanations and policies in a strategic setting.
method NP-hard problem, greedy algorithm, submodularity, randomized algorithm, matroid constraint.
result Optimal counterfactual explanations and policies increase utility.

The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.

problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.

A game-theoretic analysis of DEX competition through dynamic trading fees.

problem Competition between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and their impact on trading fees and slippage.
method Characterization of an approximate Nash equilibrium via coupled system of partial differential equations and closed-form expressions for equilibrium fees.
result The equilibrium trading fees shift from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates under competition.

Two firms compete in a financial market, choosing dividend strategies to avoid default and maximize profits.

problem Strategic interaction between two financially constrained firms in a market with default risk.
method Construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control.
result Explicit identification of optimal strategies and equilibrium payoffs for different initial conditions.

We investigate a randomization procedure undertaken in real option games which can serve as a basic model of regulation in a duopoly model of preemptive investment. We recall the rigorous framework of [M. Grasselli, V. Leclère and M. Ludkovsky, Priority Option: the value of being a leader, International Journal of Theo…

2013-09-07abs ↗pdf ↗

Paper studies competitive networks where teams aim to minimize their own objectives, adapting to each other's strategies.

problem Competitive networks where teams have conflicting objectives.
method Proposes diffusion learning algorithms for two classes of network games: zero-sum and non-zero-sum.
result Stability performance of proposed algorithms analyzed and demonstrated through experiments.

A new method for analyzing product competition using low-dimensional embeddings.

problem Computational challenges in studying product-level competition for millions of products.
method Product2Vec, a method based on representation learning algorithm Word2Vec.
result The method produces more accurate demand forecasts and price elasticities compared to state-of-the-art models.

Study optimal liquidation strategies in lit and dark pools with and without regulation.

problem Optimal liquidation strategies in dark and lit pools with execution uncertainty.
method Design optimal make-take fee policies, solve HJB-Fokker-Planck systems, use BSDEs.
result Explicit solutions for optimal strategies in both competitive and regulated markets.

The paper analyzes reinsurance strategies in a competitive multi-agent system.

problem Strategic interactions and competitive behavior in multi-layer reinsurance chains.
method Stochastic differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies.
result Intensified competition reduces safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.

Dynamic pricing policy converges to Nash equilibrium with low regret.

problem Sequential price competition among sellers over multiple periods.
method Semi-parametric least-squares estimation of s-concave demand functions.
result Prices converge to Nash equilibrium with rate O(T1/7)O(T^{-1/7}) and sellers incur regret O(T5/7)O(T^{5/7}).

An ability to postpone one's execution without penalty provides an important strategic advantage in high-frequency trading. To elucidate competition between traders one has to formulate to a quantitative theory of formation of the execution price from market expectations and quotes. This theory was provided in 2005 by …

2012-04-06abs ↗pdf ↗

Paper generalizes strategic classification framework and introduces SVC for PAC-learning.

problem Strategic manipulation of testing data to fool classifiers.
method Unified framework for strategic classification, strategic VC-dimension (SVC).
result Characterizes the learnability and computational tractability of linear classifiers.

Study strategic dynamic pricing for buyers with unknown manipulation costs.

problem Strategic buyers manipulate their features to get lower prices, hindering profit maximization.
method Proposes a strategic dynamic pricing policy that incorporates strategic behavior and binary response data.
result Achieves sublinear regret bound of O(T)O(\sqrt{T}) compared to linear Ω(T)Ω(T) regret of non-strategic policies.

Study analyzes market equilibrium returns with price impact and transaction costs.

problem Modeling equilibrium returns in markets with strategic order placement and transaction costs.
method Analyzes frictionless and transaction-cost markets, characterizes Nash equilibrium via FBSDEs.
result Equilibrium returns are affected by transaction costs, especially with noise traders.

New framework reduces strategic manipulation cost for minority groups in fair classification.

problem Strategic manipulation disparities in fair classification.
method Constrained optimization framework that constructs classifiers to reduce strategic manipulation cost for minority groups.
result Empirically, the approach reduces strategic manipulation cost for minority groups over multiple real-world datasets.

Study compares employers with and without anticipating strategic labor force responses.

problem Understanding and optimizing strategic interactions in labor markets.
method Formulation of causal strategic classification, theory, and experiments.
result Performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer and labor outcomes, but can also harm labor force utility.

Study uses Open Banking data to estimate customer value, showing potential 21% increase.

problem Limited CLV estimation using single-entity data.
method Introduces PCLV framework using Open Banking data for comprehensive customer value estimation.
result Open Banking data can estimate PCLV per competitor, showing a 21.06% increase over Actual CLV.

New algorithm learns optimal policies in strategic MDPs with private types.

problem Optimal policy learning in strategic MDPs with private types and information asymmetry.
method PLAN algorithm using instrumental variable regression and pessimism principle.
result PLAN achieves near-optimal policy with 1/K1 / \sqrt{K} optimality.

Deep neural network (DNN) has demonstrated its success in multiple domains. However, DNN models are inherently vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are generated by adding adversarial perturbations to benign inputs to fool the DNN model to misclassify. In this paper, we present a cross-layer strategic ensemble fra…

2019-10-01abs ↗pdf ↗

New analysis shows rational actors will deploy AGI despite negative social value due to catastrophic risk.

problem Rational actors will deploy AGI despite negative social value due to shared catastrophic risk.
method Continuous-time preemption game with shared catastrophic externalities, showing suicide region and welfare distortion.
result The suicide region widens as catastrophic risk grows, and two mechanisms can close it.

New findings show strategic interactions can undermine model expressiveness in machine learning.

problem How strategic interactions affect model performance in machine learning.
method Analyzing model expressiveness and strategic interactions in various machine learning settings.
result Optimizing over less expressive model classes can lead to better equilibrium outcomes in strategic environments.

Consequential decision-making typically incentivizes individuals to behave strategically, tailoring their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. A long line of work has therefore sought to counteract strategic behavior by designing more conservative decision boundaries in an effort to increase robustness to th…

2018-08-25abs ↗pdf ↗