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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

169,051 papers · 148 categories

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305989118 · Jun 202019922001200920172026
48 results for non-zero sum game

Paper studies competitive networks where teams aim to minimize their own objectives, adapting to each other's strategies.

problem Competitive networks where teams have conflicting objectives.
method Proposes diffusion learning algorithms for two classes of network games: zero-sum and non-zero-sum.
result Stability performance of proposed algorithms analyzed and demonstrated through experiments.

We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to the other player's action. In the first part of the paper, we consider the game wh…

2015-08-25abs ↗pdf ↗

Paper analyzes robust strategies in a pension plan game with ambiguous financial markets.

problem Analyzing robust strategies in a defined benefit pension plan game with ambiguous financial markets.
method Formulated and solved two robust non-zero-sum games using stochastic dynamic programming.
result Explicit forms and optimality of the solutions are shown for the firm and union.

This paper analyzes a hybrid reinsurance and investment game with bounded memory.

problem A hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game between reinsurer and insurers.
method Stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame and non-zero-sum stochastic differential subgame, using backward induction and dynamic programming.
result Derive equilibrium strategy and value functions explicitly, showing how delay and competition affect strategies.

The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.

problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.

Paper mitigates information leakage in image representations using maximum entropy.

problem Mitigating unintended leakage of user information from image representations.
method Formulates an adversarial non-zero sum game to find an embedding function that maximizes task-dependent discriminative information while minimizing entropy of sensitive attributes.
result Proposed approach learns image representations with high task performance and reduced leakage of sensitive information.

Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze GCCs like their European and American counterparts by solving option holder's an…

2017-07-28abs ↗pdf ↗

The paper analyzes reinsurance strategies in a competitive multi-agent system.

problem Strategic interactions and competitive behavior in multi-layer reinsurance chains.
method Stochastic differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies.
result Intensified competition reduces safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.

New research shows no-regret learning is impossible in Markov games under certain assumptions.

problem Achieving no-regret learning in decentralized Markov games.
method Novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning to prove lower bounds.
result No polynomial-time algorithm exists for independent no-regret learning in general-sum Markov games.

Gradient Descent Ascent converges to von-Neumann solution in hidden zero-sum games.

problem Understanding dynamics of zero-sum games with hidden structure.
method Gradient Descent Ascent applied to hidden zero-sum games with specific convex-concave structure.
result Gradient Descent Ascent converges to von-Neumann solution in strictly convex-concave hidden games.

Deep learning theory for Nash equilibrium in stochastic games.

problem Computing Nash equilibrium in non-zero-sum stochastic differential games.
method Fictitious play applied to deep neural networks for solving NN-player optimization problems.
result Deep learning algorithm converges to open-loop Nash equilibrium under appropriate assumptions.

New algorithm finds near-optimal policies efficiently in zero-sum games.

problem Lack of provable efficiency guarantees for policy optimization in zero-sum games.
method Policy optimization algorithm with function approximation.
result Proves efficient convergence to near-optimal policies with polynomial samples and iterations.

Policy optimization converges to Nash equilibria in zero-sum LQ games.

problem Finding Nash equilibria in zero-sum linear quadratic games.
method Developed three projected nested-gradient methods to converge to NE.
result Policy optimization methods converge to Nash equilibria in zero-sum LQ games.

Study strategic competition in commodity markets using impulse-switching controls.

problem Strategic competition between upstream and downstream firms in commodity markets.
method Non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls.
result Multiple Nash equilibria found, depending on the number of switches by the downstream firm.

A new algorithm calculates optimal strategies for two-player zero-sum games.

problem Computing the optimal strategies for two-player zero-sum games.
method Extending successive relaxation to two-player zero-sum games and developing a generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm.
result The proposed algorithm converges and effectively computes optimal strategies.

This paper tackles learning Stackelberg equilibrium in asymmetric games efficiently from noisy samples.

problem Learning Stackelberg equilibrium in asymmetric, general-sum games efficiently from noisy samples.
method The paper initiates the theoretical study of sample-efficient learning of the Stackelberg equilibrium in bandit feedback setting.
result Sharp positive results on sample-efficient learning of Stackelberg equilibrium with value optimal up to a fundamental gap identified.

Gradient methods converge better for alternating updates in bilinear zero-sum games.

problem Understanding the dynamics of gradient algorithms for bilinear zero-sum games.
method Systematic analysis of popular gradient updates for simultaneous and alternating versions of bilinear zero-sum games.
result Alternating updates converge better than simultaneous ones, with optimal parameter setup and rates.

Gradient-descent-ascent dynamics can exhibit various behaviors in non-convex non-concave games.

problem Gradient-descent-ascent dynamics in non-convex non-concave games can lead to recurrent behavior and spurious equilibria.
method Combines optimization theory, game theory, and dynamical systems.
result Gradient-descent-ascent dynamics can exhibit Poincaré recurrence and converge to spurious equilibria.

Investors' strategic trading affects asset prices, modeled as a game.

problem Investors' trading rates influence asset prices in dynamic markets.
method Model as a non-zero sum singular stochastic differential game, establishing equivalence between best-response and auxiliary control problems.
result Unique Nash equilibrium is deterministic with a closed-form solution.

New assumptions and algorithm solve offline two-player zero-sum Markov games.

problem Solving offline two-player zero-sum Markov games under insufficient assumptions.
method Proposed unilateral concentration assumption and pessimism-type algorithm.
result Algorithm efficiently learns Nash equilibrium under unilateral concentration.

Study bounds for prices of European and American options with optional termination.

problem Bounding prices of options with potential termination.
method Duality results linking upper prices of vulnerable options to American options with constrained exercise times.
result Linking upper prices of vulnerable options to American options and game options.

Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of agents of increasing strength. However, nontransitive games, such as rock-paper-scissors, can ex…

2019-01-23abs ↗pdf ↗

The paper solves investment problems with uncertain factors using game theory.

problem Optimal forward investment in an incomplete market with model uncertainty.
method Combining stochastic differential games and ergodic BSDE approach.
result Representation of robust forward performance processes in factor form.

Research tackles alliance formation in many-player zero-sum games, showing reinforcement learning fails but a contract mechanism can help.

problem Tackles the challenge of alliance formation in many-player zero-sum games.
method Demonstrates the social dilemma aspect of alliance formation, introduces a contract mechanism to augment reinforcement learning.
result Naïve reinforcement learning fails to form alliances, but a contract mechanism can help.

This work finds mixed equilibria in zero-sum games using interacting particle dynamics.

problem Finding mixed equilibrium points in continuous minmax games.
method A method based on entropic regularisation of two-layer zero-sum games with interacting particle dynamics.
result The sequence of empirical measures of the particle system satisfies a large deviation principle as the number of particles grows to infinity, implying convergence of the empirical measure and the Nikaidô-Isoda error.

The paper explores how regularization can lead to convergence in imperfect information games.

problem Finding equilibrium in imperfect information games with imperfect information.
method Investigates Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics and how adding a regularization term can lead to strong convergence guarantees.
result The approach leads to algorithms that converge exactly to the Nash equilibrium in imperfect information games.

Study proposes new OPE estimators for two-player zero-sum games.

problem Evaluating new policies using historical data from a different policy in multi-player zero-sum games.
method Doubly robust and double reinforcement learning estimators to project exploitability.
result Prove exploitability estimation error bounds and regret bounds for policy profiles.

Study best-response learning dynamics in zero-sum polymatrix games under full and minimal information settings.

problem Learning dynamics in zero-sum polymatrix games under different information settings.
method Two-timescale learning dynamics combining smoothed best-response updates and TD-learning for estimating local payoff functions.
result Polynomial-time finite-sample guarantees for convergence to an ε-Nash equilibrium in the minimal information case.

Algorithm learns Nash equilibria in stochastic games using entropy-regularized policies.

problem Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games is computationally expensive.
method Entropy-regularized soft policies for Q-function updates.
result Algorithm converges to Nash equilibrium under certain conditions.

A RL approach finds Nash equilibrium for turn-based zero-sum games.

problem Finding Nash equilibrium in two-player turn-based zero-sum games.
method EIS method combining exploration, policy improvement, and supervised learning.
result EIS method finds an ε-approximate value function of Nash equilibrium in O(ε^(-(d+4))) steps.

Paper proposes a mean-field gradient descent for zero-sum games, proving convergence to Nash equilibrium.

problem Finding mixed Nash equilibria in zero-sum games with multiple players.
method Mean-field gradient descent dynamics with time-averaging, incorporating exponentially discounted gradients.
result Exponential convergence rate to mixed Nash equilibrium with respect to total variation metric.