We prove that in smooth Markovian continuous-time economies with potentially complete asset markets, Radner equilibria with endogenously complete markets exist.
Study shows randomized strategies can't be Nash equilibria in markets with transient price impact.
problem Existence of pure Nash equilibria in markets with transient price impact.
method Considered randomized strategies and showed that they cannot be Nash equilibria.
result Nash equilibria cannot contain randomized strategies.
New results on financial equilibria in markets with general semimartingales.
problem Existence and uniqueness of mean-variance equilibria in semimartingale markets.
method Analysis of dynamic mean-variance hedging and fixed-point problems.
result First results allowing for general semimartingales and both discrete and continuous time.
Existence of stochastic financial equilibria giving rise to semimartingale asset prices is established under a general class of assumptions. These equilibria are expressed in real terms and span complete markets or markets with withdrawal constraints.We deal with random endowment density streams which admit jumps and g…
The study examines Nash equilibria in utility maximization games with multiplicative performance criteria.
problem Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in multiplicative performance criteria games.
method General characterization of Nash equilibria for a large class of utility functions.
result Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria for arbitrary initial wealth vectors.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
Modeling reinsurance market, we find subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
problem Optimizing reinsurance market with multiple insurers and reinsurers.
method Sequential game with Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria analysis.
result Characterized subgame perfect Nash equilibria in some market cases.
This work models GHG offset credit markets to find optimal strategies for market participants.
problem Optimizing GHG offset credit markets to reduce emissions and penalize excess emissions.
method Characterized optimal behavior in single-player and two-player GHG offset credit markets using optimal stopping and control problems, and mixed-Nash equilibria.
result Market participants benefit from optimal OC trading and generation, highlighting the importance of acting optimally.
Two firms compete in a financial market, choosing dividend strategies to avoid default and maximize profits.
problem Strategic interaction between two financially constrained firms in a market with default risk.
method Construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control.
result Explicit identification of optimal strategies and equilibrium payoffs for different initial conditions.
Generative model solves financial market equilibria with stable reinforcement learning.
problem Financial market equilibria under realistic frictions and multiple agents.
method Generative adversarial reinforcement learning with decoupling feedback.
result Algorithm learns and predicts asset returns and volatilities.
Optimal fees for CFMMs prevent liquidity pools from competing to the bottom.
problem Maximizing liquidity provider returns in CFMMs with multiple pools.
method Theoretical and numerical analysis of Nash equilibria for optimal fees.
result Pure Nash equilibria of optimal fees exist for CFMMs using Uniswap's trade function.
Deep learning solves complex PA mean field games with market-clearing conditions.
problem Optimizing Principal-Agent interactions in renewable energy markets with market-clearing conditions.
method Actor-critic approach, deep backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE), neural net approximation.
result Efficacy of the deep learning algorithm in solving complex PA mean field games.
Modeling European spot power markets with game theory for Nash equilibria.
problem Optimizing electricity markets with risk-averse players and constraints.
method Game-theoretic framework with Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel schemes for approximate Nash equilibria.
result Innovative risk aversion model reduces price dimensionality and ensures boundedness.
Study strategic competition in commodity markets using impulse-switching controls.
problem Strategic competition between upstream and downstream firms in commodity markets.
method Non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls.
result Multiple Nash equilibria found, depending on the number of switches by the downstream firm.
Study Nash equilibria in mean field portfolio games with consumption.
problem Finding Nash equilibria in mean field portfolio games with consumption.
method Established a correspondence between equilibria and solutions to FBSDEs, using martingale and dynamic programming principles.
result Proved the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in closed form under certain conditions.
The paper solves portfolio optimization problems with risk constraints.
problem Maximizing utility while ensuring a certain wealth threshold with risk constraints.
method Derives Nash equilibria for two agents and characterizes them for more than two agents.
result Characterizes Nash equilibria for different cases of competition probabilities.
Study on market instability in multi-agent trading with price impact and transaction costs.
problem Analyzing market instability in multi-agent trading with price impact and transaction costs.
method Analytical and numerical methods to study Nash equilibria and stability conditions.
result Conditions on model parameters determine market stability, including scaling of market impact and transaction cost.
The dual crises of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the global financial crisis has prompted a call for explanations of non-equilibrium market dynamics. Recently a promising approach has been the use of agent based models (ABMs) to simulate aggregate market dynamics. A key aspect of these models is the endogenous emer…
We consider a market impact game for n risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a mean-variance functional of their costs or to maximize the expected exponential u…
Study examines pricing strategies in competitive supply chains with discrete prices.
problem Inaccurate assumptions in traditional SC models for pricing decisions.
method Examines a SC model with one supplier and two manufacturers, considering customer demand segmentation and discrete price setting.
result Nash equilibria among manufacturers are not unique, and low denomination factors can lead to instability.
This research uses reinforcement learning to find optimal emission offsets in greenhouse gas markets.
problem Finding optimal emission offsets in greenhouse gas markets to control excess emissions.
method Utilized reinforcement learning, specifically Nash-DQN, to estimate market Nash equilibria.
result Emitting firms can achieve significant financial savings by abiding by the Nash equilibria found in the market.
Study on liquidation games with market drop-out, proving unique equilibria.
problem Analyzing portfolio liquidation with market drop-out constraints.
method Proves existence and uniqueness of equilibria using integral equations.
result Existence and uniqueness of equilibria in both mean-field and finite-player games.
Study of insurance market equilibria with risk-averse policyholders.
problem Analyzing optimal insurance contracts in a monopoly market with risk-averse policyholders.
method Modeling Stackelberg equilibria with a profit-maximizing insurer and a risk-averse policyholder.
result Equilibrium contracts exhibit a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over pessimistic loss layers and no coverage over optimistic ones.
We offer mathematical tractability and new insights for a framework of exponential utility with non-negative consumption, a constraint often omitted in the literature giving rise to economically unviable solutions. Specifically, using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and the notion of aggregate state price density (Malamud and …
This paper investigates the equilibrium interactions between trading targets and private information in a multi-period Kyle (1985) market. There are two investors who each follow dynamic trading strategies: A strategic portfolio rebalancer who engages in order splitting to reach a cumulative trading target and an uncon…
Endogenous reinsurance pricing in large insurance markets
problem Endogenous reinsurance pricing in large insurance markets
method Stackelberg leader and insurer equilibrium analysis
result Characterization of insurers' equilibrium retention and Stackelberg equilibria
Model strategic interactions between market makers and traders to optimize execution.
problem Optimizing execution in markets with strategic interactions.
method Stochastic game modeling with FBSDEs and decoupling approach.
result Established Nash equilibria and global well-posedness for specific models.
In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a…
We study existence and uniqueness of continuous-time stochastic Radner equilibria in an incomplete market model among a group of agents whose preference is characterized by cash invariant time-consistent monetary utilities. An assumption of "smallness" type is shown to be sufficient for existence and uniqueness. In par…
We propose and analyze numerically a simple dynamical model that describes the firm behaviors under uncertainty of demand forecast. Iterating this simple model and varying some parameters values we observe a wide variety of market dynamics such as equilibria, periodic and chaotic behaviors. Interestingly the model is a…
Investor finds a fair outcome in complex financial markets.
problem Finding a fair outcome in complex financial markets.
method Recalled and proved the existence of personal equilibrium in a multistep, generically incomplete financial market model.
result Personal equilibrium exists in a multistep, generically incomplete financial market model under appropriate assumptions.
In recent years, data has played an increasingly important role in the economy as a good in its own right. In many settings, data aggregators cannot directly verify the quality of the data they purchase, nor the effort exerted by data sources when creating the data. Recent work has explored mechanisms to ensure that th…
Study shows bifurcating price dynamics in ASME with traders.
problem Understanding price dynamics in artificial stock markets.
method Agent-based model of endogenous traders interacting through a LOB.
result Bistability in price equilibria: zero-price and persistent positive-price states.
New algorithms learn stable matchings from uncertain user preferences.
problem Learning stable matchings from uncertain user preferences.
method Stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, incentive-aware learning objective, primal-dual formulation.
result Near-optimal regret bounds for learning stable matchings.
We develop a probabilistic consumer choice framework based on information asymmetry between consumers and firms. This framework makes it possible to study market competition of several firms by both quality and price of their products. We find Nash market equilibria and other optimal strategies in various situations ra…
This paper extends a Kyle model to include price-responsive traders, revealing new dynamics and equilibria.
problem Real-world market dynamics involve price-responsive traders, affecting market equilibrium and insider profits.
method Developed a continuous-time Kyle model with two types of price-responsive traders (momentum and contrarian), leading to a forward-backward Riccati system for equilibrium.
result The model shows that feedback effects can lead to multiple equilibria and amplify price informativeness.
The paper addresses how to complete incomplete risk markets by iteratively enhancing welfare.
problem How to complete incomplete risk markets to enhance welfare.
method Iterative mechanism to complete the market while monotonically enhancing welfare.
result Iterative completion of incomplete risk markets can enhance welfare.
We consider the risk sharing problem for capital requirements induced by capital adequacy tests and security markets. The agents involved in the sharing procedure may be heterogeneous in that they apply varying capital adequacy tests and have access to different security markets. We discuss conditions under which there…
Modeling gas fee competition in decentralized exchanges to optimize arbitrage profits.
problem Gas fees and transaction ordering in decentralized exchanges create arbitrage opportunities.
method Developed a first equilibrium model of gas fee competition between two arbitrageurs under three transaction reversion settings.
result Mixed equilibria exist, and their characteristics depend on inventory risk and transaction settings.
This study analyzes costs of CCP default resolution using Radner equilibrium approach.
problem Analyzing costs of CCP default resolution for investment banks' derivatives.
method Radner equilibrium approach for portfolio allocation and price discovery.
result Radner equilibria uniquely exist and provide solutions for market equilibria.
We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppliers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different qualities; each consumer buys 0 or 1 unit, and each supplier sells 0 or 1 unit. Consumer types, supplie…
Paper presents a new approach to a strategic insider equilibrium problem in continuous time.
problem Continuous time Kyle-Back model between insider and market marker.
method Uses forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) for characterization of equilibria.
result Characterizes all equilibria through FBSDEs and shows uniqueness of equilibrium without Markovian restrictions.
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of n-player equilibria converges to it as n→∞. However, both the finite and infinite player versions of the game often admit multiple equilibria. We show that me…
Study shows unique linear equilibrium in market with constrained trader.
problem Unique equilibrium in financial market with constrained trader.
method Linear equilibrium model with competitive market makers and noise traders.
result Equilibrium uniquely determined by two state variables.
Two-cycle GEILA equilibria are OLG equilibria and vice versa, with applications to indeterminacy and bubbles.
problem Relationship between GEILA and OLG models.
method Proof of equilibrium equivalence and application to indeterminacy and bubbles.
result GEILA and OLG models are equivalent under certain conditions.
Deep learning enhances solving complex mean field games in finance.
problem Solving large-scale mean field games with financial applications.
method Combining mean field games theory with deep learning techniques.
result Improved solutions for large-scale financial games.
The study examines different types of equilibria for stopping problems in one-dimensional diffusion processes.
problem Characterizing and comparing different types of equilibria for time-inconsistent stopping problems.
method Analyzes log sub-additive discount functions and one-dimensional diffusion processes to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for weak equilibria and other types of equilibria.
result Conditions for weak equilibria and their implications for other types of equilibria are provided.
We propose local symplectic surgery, a two-timescale procedure for finding local Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We first show that previous gradient-based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to local Nash equilibria due to the existence of non-Nash stationary points. By taking advantage of the differ…