A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
Game theory models incentivizes honesty in collaborative learning among competitors.
problem Incentivizing honest updates among competitors in collaborative learning schemes.
method Formulated a game to model interactions, studied two learning tasks, proposed mechanisms to incentivize honest communication.
result Rational clients are incentivized to manipulate their updates, preventing learning; proposed mechanisms ensure comparable learning quality to full cooperation.
We study incentivized exploration for the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem where the players receive compensation for exploring arms other than the greedy choice and may provide biased feedback on reward. We seek to understand the impact of this drifted reward feedback by analyzing the performance of three instantiatio…
An algorithmic decision-maker incentivizes people to act in certain ways to receive better decisions. These incentives can dramatically influence subjects' behaviors and lives, and it is important that both decision-makers and decision-recipients have clarity on which actions are incentivized by the chosen model. While…
We propose a contextual bandit based model to capture the learning and social welfare goals of a web platform in the presence of myopic users. By using payments to incentivize these agents to explore different items/recommendations, we show how the platform can learn the inherent attributes of items and achieve a subli…
Consequential decision-making incentivizes individuals to strategically adapt their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. While a long line of work has viewed strategic adaptation as gaming and attempted to mitigate its effects, recent work has instead sought to design classifiers that incentivize individuals…
We study platforms in the sharing economy and discuss the need for incentivizing users to explore options that otherwise would not be chosen. For instance, rental platforms such as Airbnb typically rely on customer reviews to provide users with relevant information about different options. Yet, often a large fraction o…
The paper proposes incentivizing human annotators with 'golden questions' to improve data quality.
problem Ensuring high-quality human annotations for training large language models.
method A principal-agent model is used to incentivize annotators with bonuses based on the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of their annotations. Hypothesis testing is applied to monitor the annotators' performance.
result The hypothesis testing rate for the principal-agent model is of Θ(1/nlogn), highlighting the importance of 'golden questions' for monitoring annotators.
User engagement in social networks depends critically on the number of online actions their users take in the network. Can we design an algorithm that finds when to incentivize users to take actions to maximize the overall activity in a social network? In this paper, we model the number of online actions over time usin…
New algorithms optimize decision rules in strategic scenarios, minimizing prediction risk and incentivizing better outcomes.
problem Strategic agents manipulate features to improve outcomes, complicating decision-making models.
method Efficient algorithms for learning decision rules that minimize prediction risk, incentivize better outcomes, and estimate true model coefficients.
result Optimal decision rules can be learned through testing and observing agent responses, circumventing hardness results.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
Classification-as-a-Service (CaaS) is widely deployed today in machine intelligence stacks for a vastly diverse set of applications including anything from medical prognosis to computer vision tasks to natural language processing to identity fraud detection. The computing power required for training complex models on l…
As researchers and practitioners of applied machine learning, we are given a set of requirements on the problem to be solved, the plausibly obtainable data, and the computational resources available. We aim to find (within those bounds) reliably useful combinations of problem, data, and algorithm. An emphasis on algori…
We study the problem of collaborative machine learning markets where multiple parties can achieve improved performance on their machine learning tasks by combining their training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine learning markets in terms of fair revenue distribution and potential threats, including…
We study an online multi-task learning setting, in which instances of related tasks arrive sequentially, and are handled by task-specific online learners. We consider an algorithmic framework to model the relationship of these tasks via a set of convex constraints. To exploit this relationship, we design a novel algori…
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of securities lending in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of identical copies of some scarce resource to n clients, each of whom has a priv…
Paper explores how to design federated learning protocols that benefit all participants while maintaining privacy.
problem Privacy concerns undermine the accuracy benefits of federated learning in privacy-sensitive domains.
method The paper provides conditions for mutually beneficial federated learning protocols and designs protocols that maximize total utility and accuracy.
result The paper demonstrates that federated learning can be designed to be mutually beneficial, striking a balance between privacy and model accuracy.
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a model for how strategic agents can invest effort in order to change the outcome…
No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.
problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.
We consider learning in decentralized heterogeneous networks: agents seek to minimize a convex functional that aggregates data across the network, while only having access to their local data streams. We focus on the case where agents seek to estimate a regression \emph{function} that belongs to a reproducing kernel Hi…
We consider the problem of fitting a linear model to data held by individuals who are concerned about their privacy. Incentivizing most players to truthfully report their data to the analyst constrains our design to mechanisms that provide a privacy guarantee to the participants; we use differential privacy to model in…
Efficient exploration is a long-standing problem in sensorimotor learning. Major advances have been demonstrated in noise-free, non-stochastic domains such as video games and simulation. However, most of these formulations either get stuck in environments with stochastic dynamics or are too inefficient to be scalable t…
The design of personalized incentives or recommendations to improve user engagement is gaining prominence as digital platform providers continually emerge. We propose a multi-armed bandit framework for matching incentives to users, whose preferences are unknown a priori and evolving dynamically in time, in a resource c…
In this paper we introduce a simple approach for exploration in reinforcement learning (RL) that allows us to develop theoretically justified algorithms in the tabular case but that is also extendable to settings where function approximation is required. Our approach is based on the successor representation (SR), which…
We present an adversarial active exploration for inverse dynamics model learning, a simple yet effective learning scheme that incentivizes exploration in an environment without any human intervention. Our framework consists of a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agent and an inverse dynamics model contesting with each …