We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold. First, we want the learning algorithm to be no-regret with respect to the best fixed …
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48 results for “incentive compatibility”
Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.
problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.
Study optimal reinsurance contracts to prevent moral hazard under non-concave premium principles.
problem Preventing moral hazard in reinsurance contracts under non-concave premium principles.
method Develops optimal reinsurance contracts under a diffusion risk model with incentive compatibility constraints and extended distortion premium principles.
result An optimal reinsurance contract exists and is characterized by solving a double obstacle problem.
COBRA addresses strategic behavior in online platforms by ensuring truthful reporting without monetary incentives.
problem Ensuring truthful reporting from strategic agents in online platforms.
method Proposes COBRA, an algorithm for contextual bandits involving strategic agents that disincentivizes strategic behavior.
result COBRA achieves sub-linear regret guarantee and incentive compatibility without monetary incentives.
Permutation-equivariant neural networks improve auction mechanisms by reducing regret and sample complexity.
problem Designing optimal auction mechanisms that balance revenue and bidders' regret.
method Introduced permutation-equivariant neural networks to auction mechanisms.
result Permutation-equivariant neural networks decrease expected ex-post regret and improve model generalizability.
This paper optimizes reinsurance contracts with belief differences between insurer and reinsurer.
problem Dynamic reinsurance design with heterogeneous beliefs under mean-variance framework.
method Modeling surplus process, applying partitioned domain optimization, solving HJB system.
result Optimal reinsurance contracts with belief heterogeneity are more complex than standard contracts.
Gaming-Resistant Insurance Contracts for Autonomous AI Agents: Strategy-Proof Toll Mechanism Designcs.GT
Insurance contracts for autonomous AI agents must be actuarially sound and resistant to gaming.
problem Designing insurance contracts for autonomous AI agents that are actuarially sound and resistant to gaming.
method Characterizing a five-attack space and proving the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant.
result An incentive-compatible layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.
COAD maximizes online auction revenue by quantifying uncertainty without known distributions.
problem Designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for online auctions with unknown bidder values and uncertain future participants.
method COAD uses distribution-free uncertainty quantification techniques and integrates machine learning methods to predict bidder values while ensuring revenue guarantees.
result COAD maximizes revenue in online auctions through bidder-specific reserve prices based on lower confidence bounds of valuations.
Optimal bidding strategy for multi-platform ad auctions under budget constraints.
problem Optimizing ad placements for budget-constrained advertisers across multiple platforms.
method Developed an optimal bidding strategy for non-incentive-compatible auctions with budget constraints.
result Maximized total utility across auctions while satisfying budget constraints in expectation.
Incentive-aware recommender system for online platforms.
problem Myopic agents exploit optimal arms, not exploring alternatives.
method Model as multi-agent bandit problem, incentivizes exploration.
result Asymptotically optimal performance with ex-post fairness.
Promising federated learning coupled with Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is considered as one of the most promising solutions to the AI-driven service provision. Plenty of studies focus on federated learning from the performance and security aspects, but they neglect the incentive mechanism. In MEC, edge nodes would not l…
Study incentive efficiency in monopoly insurance markets with hidden information.
problem Maximizing social welfare in a monopoly insurance market with hidden agent types.
method Maximizes social welfare function subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
result Optimal menus of contracts depend on the level of social welfare weight and agent risk attitudes.
New algorithm for learning preferences in decentralized matching markets reduces regret to logarithmic levels.
problem Learning preferences in decentralized matching markets without direct communication.
method Introduces a new algorithm for two-sided matching markets with competition.
result The algorithm achieves logarithmic stable regret in shared preferences and quadratic regret in general preferences.
New algorithm reduces regret in strategic prediction problem.
problem Designing an IC algorithm with sublinear regret for strategic experts.
method Developed a new algorithm WSU-UX and proved a worst-case regret bound.
result WSU-UX suffers a lower bound on regret.
Variance Contractsq-fin.RM
Optimal insurance contract limits insurer's risk exposure variance.
problem Designing an optimal insurance contract limiting insurer's risk exposure variance.
method Derive optimal policy semi-analytically, focusing on actuarially fair case.
result Expected coverage is larger for wealthier insured, indicating normal good.
Proposes a Carbon Equivalence Principle for financial products to align incentives and drive sustainability.
problem Align financial market incentives with carbon emissions to limit global warming.
method Introduces a Carbon Equivalence Principle requiring financial products to describe equivalent carbon flows alongside cash flows.
result Transparency of carbon flows in financial products can align incentives and reduce future costs, necessitating project re-structuring and financial net-zero designs.
A new mechanism optimizes data marketplace pricing efficiently.
problem Designing fair and efficient pricing mechanisms for data marketplaces.
method Two-stage approach: auctions to estimate value distributions, then optimal posted prices.
result MAPP achieves optimal revenue with minimal price discrimination.
We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.
problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.
Paper tackles entity matching over multi-source data, optimizing alignment and mitigating negative transfer.
problem Learning effective entity matching models over multi-source large-scale data with relaxed assumptions.
method Proposes a Relaxed Multi-source Large-scale Entity-matching (RMLE) problem and Incentive Compatible Pareto Alignment (ICPA) method.
result Optimized cross-source alignments and mitigated negative transfer, improving entity matching accuracy.
Model shows government incentives boost green bond investment.
problem Increasing green investments through government incentives.
method Optimal incentives indexed on bond prices and covariation, applied to a portfolio of bonds.
result Method outperforms current tax-incentives systems in green investments.
Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.
problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.
Mobile payment such as Alipay has been widely used in our daily lives. To further promote the mobile payment activities, it is important to run marketing campaigns under a limited budget by providing incentives such as coupons, commissions to merchants. As a result, incentive optimization is the key to maximizing the c…
Exchange uses incentives to optimize limit order book dynamics.
problem Optimizing market liquidity in fragmented electronic markets.
method Modeling limit order book as SPDE and using control theory to design incentives.
result Exchange can design incentives to modify order book shape and increase liquidity.
Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.
problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.
The paper analyzes regret in bilateral trade mechanisms without prior valuations.
problem Designing efficient trade mechanisms without prior knowledge of valuations.
method Regret minimization framework over rounds of interactions with no prior knowledge of valuations.
result Characterization of regret bounds for different feedback models and valuations.
Calibrated models can lead to miscalibrated aggregations in strategic interactions.
problem Miscalibration in aggregated predictions from multiple calibrated models.
method Analysis of strategic interactions between calibrated predictors, proving conditions for miscalibration and comparing VCG and Brier-score aggregation methods.
result VCG aggregation method outperforms Brier-score in strategic settings, providing robustness and comparable accuracy.
AI task delegation faces incentive collapse with unbounded payments as AI accuracy rises.
problem Incentive collapse in AI-assisted task delegation schemes.
method General impossibility result and sentinel-auditing payment mechanism.
result Sentinel-auditing mechanism enforces positive human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.
problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.
The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.
problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.
Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.
problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…
Model shows incentives in shared order book can lead to free-rider problem.
problem Incentives in shared order books can lead to free-rider problem.
method Developed a Principal-Agent model with CARA utility functions.
result Equilibrium analysis shows incentives can lead to reduced competition.
Study optimizes health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
problem Designing health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
method Inverse behavioral optimization framework integrating QALY-based incentives and adaptive learning.
result Modern health systems operate near an efficiency-saturated frontier, with small fairness adjustments yielding diminishing returns.
This paper optimizes liquidity provision in automated market makers using auction theory.
problem Optimizing profit for a monopolist liquidity provider in automated market makers.
method Introduces a Bayesian-like belief inference framework to model AMMs, characterizes profit-maximizing strategies using Myerson's optimal auction theory.
result Characterizes the optimal demand curve and payments for an IC AMM, revealing a bid-ask spread caused by asymmetry and monopoly pricing.
Framework trains safe agents avoiding deceptive behavior.
problem Training safe agents from unsafe incentives.
method Formal settings, causal influence analysis, maximizing non-mediated effects.
result Agents avoid manipulating delicate state for rewards.
Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.
problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.
Study shows ethanol blends and incentives can significantly reduce transportation carbon emissions.
problem Rapid growth in electric vehicles requires complementary strategies to decarbonize transportation.
method Analysis of ethanol blending, regulatory incentives, and economic assessments.
result Ethanol blending, especially E15 and E85, can substantially reduce carbon emissions and provide economic benefits.
We consider the problem of Probably Approximate Correct (PAC) learning of a binary classifier from noisy labeled examples acquired from multiple annotators (each characterized by a respective classification noise rate). First, we consider the complete information scenario, where the learner knows the noise rates of all…
When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…
The paper proposes incentivizing human annotators with 'golden questions' to improve data quality.
problem Ensuring high-quality human annotations for training large language models.
method A principal-agent model is used to incentivize annotators with bonuses based on the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of their annotations. Hypothesis testing is applied to monitor the annotators' performance.
result The hypothesis testing rate for the principal-agent model is of , highlighting the importance of 'golden questions' for monitoring annotators.
Study shows visual feedback and monetary incentives reduce plugload energy consumption in commercial buildings.
problem Mitigating energy consumption in commercial buildings through occupant plugload control.
method Field experiments with visual feedback and monetary incentives in government and university buildings.
result Mean energy reduction of ~9.52% in office environments and ~21.61% in university environments with visual feedback.
dYdX updates liquidity provider incentives to enhance trading efficiency.
problem Incentivizing liquidity providers to maintain efficient market structures.
method Analyzed various metrics (makerVolume, depths, spreads) and used historical trades to update the LP Incentives Programme.
result Updated the LP Incentives Programme to encourage more active and efficient liquidity.
The study compares M6 competitors' performance to industry benchmarks and discusses incentives for investment managers.
problem Investors seek to understand the performance and skill of M6 competitors beyond the competition's metrics.
method Comparative analysis using financial metrics, factor models, and new strategies.
result Most competitors do not generate significant out-performance compared to industry benchmarks, but some show skill in recent performance.
This paper tackles resource allocation in the Lightning Network using DRL.
problem Complex combinatorial problem of node selection and resource allocation in the Lightning Network.
method Attention-based Deep Reinforcement Learning framework.
result Improved resource allocation leads to better performance and decentralization in the LN.
Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.
problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment.
Forward hedging reshapes incentive provision in firms.
problem How does forward hedging affect incentive provision in firms?
method We consider a CARA framework to jointly characterize optimal production, compensation, and static hedging in equilibrium.
result Delegation and external hedging are partial substitutes, and delegation can increase firm value even when the agent is more risk averse.