Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.
problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.
Study incentivizes sharing economy users to explore less-reviewed options.
problem Lack of reviews leads to neglect of less-popular options, creating a cycle.
method Introduced Coordinated Online Learning (CoOL) to learn optimal incentives.
result Algorithm increases exploration on Airbnb, improving user experience.
Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.
problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.
Incentive-aware recommender system for online platforms.
problem Myopic agents exploit optimal arms, not exploring alternatives.
method Model as multi-agent bandit problem, incentivizes exploration.
result Asymptotically optimal performance with ex-post fairness.
A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.
problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.
The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.
problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.
Study designs steering rewards for MFGs with unknown dynamics and model uncertainty.
problem Designing incentives for large populations of agents in MFGs with uncertain model details.
method Developed optimistic exploration algorithms for agents with no-adaptive regret behaviors.
result Sub-linear regret guarantees for cumulative gaps between agent behaviors and desired outcomes.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
The paper proposes a rubric and incentives to prevent peer review from becoming a 'tragedy of the commons'.
problem The growth of machine learning threatens the sustainability of peer review.
method Proposes a rubric for objective review quality and financial compensation for reviewers.
result Avoiding a 'tragedy of the commons' outcome in peer review.
Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.
problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves i l d e O ( T ) ilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) i l d e O ( T ) social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment. New approach incentivizes strategic agents to explore, making exploration almost free.
problem Incentivized exploration in multi-armed bandits with long-term strategic agents.
method Simple incentive-provision strategy, best arm identification algorithm, and UCB lower bound.
result Exploration can be (almost) free when there are many learning agents.
Paper tackles online learning for DR management with incentives.
problem Estimating baseline consumption in DR programs with consumer incentives.
method Online learning scheme using least-squares with perturbed reward prices.
result Achieves low regret of $\mathcal{O}\left((\log{T})^2
ight)$ compared to optimal.
This study examines how DMMs affect market liquidity and competition.
problem The impact of DMMs on market liquidity and competition.
method Agent-based simulations to explore the effects of varying competition levels and incentive structures among DMMs.
result Optimal competition among DMMs maximizes liquidity benefits without negatively impacting price discovery.
Model for open, decentralized network with task load balancing.
problem Complex computational tasks in open, decentralized networks.
method Incentive-based load balancing using economic mechanisms.
result Optimized resource allocation and enhanced system resilience.
Mobile payment incentives optimized using merchant transaction networks.
problem Optimizing marketing campaigns with limited budgets.
method Graph representation learning on transaction networks.
result Effective modeling of merchant sensitivity to incentives.
We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.
problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.
Model shows government incentives boost green bond investment.
problem Increasing green investments through government incentives.
method Optimal incentives indexed on bond prices and covariation, applied to a portfolio of bonds.
result Method outperforms current tax-incentives systems in green investments.
Study of repeated principal-agent bandit game with self-interested and exploratory learning agents.
problem Interaction between principal and agent in unknown environments with learning and exploration behaviors.
method Developed algorithms for self-interested and exploratory learning agents with bandit feedback, achieving regret bounds.
result Achieved O ~ ( T 2 / 3 ) \widetilde{O}(T^{2/3}) O ( T 2/3 ) regret bound for exploratory learning agent in i.i.d. reward setup. Modeling incentives for content creators on algorithm-curated platforms.
problem Maximizing exposure for content creators on algorithmic platforms.
method Formalized exposure game model, proving effects of algorithmic choices on equilibria, proposing tools for finding equilibria.
result Algorithmic choices significantly affect content exposure and creator behavior.
Exchange uses incentives to optimize limit order book dynamics.
problem Optimizing market liquidity in fragmented electronic markets.
method Modeling limit order book as SPDE and using control theory to design incentives.
result Exchange can design incentives to modify order book shape and increase liquidity.
Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.
problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.
AI task delegation faces incentive collapse with unbounded payments as AI accuracy rises.
problem Incentive collapse in AI-assisted task delegation schemes.
method General impossibility result and sentinel-auditing payment mechanism.
result Sentinel-auditing mechanism enforces positive human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.
problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.
New approach to avoid bad incentives in reinforcement learning agents.
problem Designing safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions.
method Break down side effects penalties into baseline state and deviation measure; introduce new stepwise inaction baseline and relative reachability deviation measure.
result Combination of new design choices avoids undesirable incentives, while simpler alternatives fail.
Paper tackles free rider attacks in federated learning.
problem Clients without local data can cheat for rewards.
method Proposes STD-DAGMM for anomaly detection of model parameters.
result STD-DAGMM effectively detects free rider attacks.
Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.
problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.
Model shows incentives in shared order book can lead to free-rider problem.
problem Incentives in shared order books can lead to free-rider problem.
method Developed a Principal-Agent model with CARA utility functions.
result Equilibrium analysis shows incentives can lead to reduced competition.
Study optimizes health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
problem Designing health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
method Inverse behavioral optimization framework integrating QALY-based incentives and adaptive learning.
result Modern health systems operate near an efficiency-saturated frontier, with small fairness adjustments yielding diminishing returns.
Study improves policy search in continuous control by using heavy-tailed distributions.
problem Challenges in continuous space policy search due to non-convexity and myopic-farsighted incentives.
method Introduced heavy-tailed policy parameterizations and analyzed convergence rates and stability.
result Convergence rate to stationarity depends on policy's tail index and exploration tolerance.
Token economics improves energy systems with incentives and efficiency.
problem Traditional energy systems have inefficiencies and lack incentives.
method Integrating token economy and blockchain technology.
result Token economic systems enhance energy efficiency and reduce emissions.
Framework trains safe agents avoiding deceptive behavior.
problem Training safe agents from unsafe incentives.
method Formal settings, causal influence analysis, maximizing non-mediated effects.
result Agents avoid manipulating delicate state for rewards.
Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.
problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.
Study shows ethanol blends and incentives can significantly reduce transportation carbon emissions.
problem Rapid growth in electric vehicles requires complementary strategies to decarbonize transportation.
method Analysis of ethanol blending, regulatory incentives, and economic assessments.
result Ethanol blending, especially E15 and E85, can substantially reduce carbon emissions and provide economic benefits.
Paper proposes FMore to incentivize edge nodes in federated learning with MEC.
problem Incentivizing edge nodes in federated learning with MEC resources.
method Multi-dimensional procurement auction with K winners.
result FMore improves model accuracy and reduces training rounds for AI tasks.
Proposes a bandit framework for dynamic user incentives.
problem Designing personalized incentives for users with evolving preferences.
method Combines greedy matching, UCB, and Markov chain theory.
result Algorithm provides theoretical regret bounds and practical examples.
The paper evaluates various bonus-based exploration methods in the ALE and finds limited improvement in performance.
problem Improving exploration in reinforcement learning algorithms, especially in challenging games.
method Empirical evaluation of different reward bonuses on the Arcade Learning Environment.
result Recently developed bonus-based exploration methods do not significantly improve performance in challenging games.
New method optimizes incentive allocation with budget constraints.
problem Optimizing financial incentives in marketing campaigns with limited feedback.
method Two-step approach: domain adaptation for reward estimation followed by policy optimization.
result Significant improvement in synthetic and real datasets.
When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…
Study shows visual feedback and monetary incentives reduce plugload energy consumption in commercial buildings.
problem Mitigating energy consumption in commercial buildings through occupant plugload control.
method Field experiments with visual feedback and monetary incentives in government and university buildings.
result Mean energy reduction of ~9.52% in office environments and ~21.61% in university environments with visual feedback.
dYdX updates liquidity provider incentives to enhance trading efficiency.
problem Incentivizing liquidity providers to maintain efficient market structures.
method Analyzed various metrics (makerVolume, depths, spreads) and used historical trades to update the LP Incentives Programme.
result Updated the LP Incentives Programme to encourage more active and efficient liquidity.
The study compares M6 competitors' performance to industry benchmarks and discusses incentives for investment managers.
problem Investors seek to understand the performance and skill of M6 competitors beyond the competition's metrics.
method Comparative analysis using financial metrics, factor models, and new strategies.
result Most competitors do not generate significant out-performance compared to industry benchmarks, but some show skill in recent performance.
COBRA addresses strategic behavior in online platforms by ensuring truthful reporting without monetary incentives.
problem Ensuring truthful reporting from strategic agents in online platforms.
method Proposes COBRA, an algorithm for contextual bandits involving strategic agents that disincentivizes strategic behavior.
result COBRA achieves sub-linear regret guarantee and incentive compatibility without monetary incentives.
Study incentive efficiency in monopoly insurance markets with hidden information.
problem Maximizing social welfare in a monopoly insurance market with hidden agent types.
method Maximizes social welfare function subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
result Optimal menus of contracts depend on the level of social welfare weight and agent risk attitudes.
Forward hedging reshapes incentive provision in firms.
problem How does forward hedging affect incentive provision in firms?
method We consider a CARA framework to jointly characterize optimal production, compensation, and static hedging in equilibrium.
result Delegation and external hedging are partial substitutes, and delegation can increase firm value even when the agent is more risk averse.
This paper argues, first, that a major problem in the planning of large infrastructure projects is the high level of misinformation about costs and benefits that decision makers face in deciding whether to build, and the high risks such misinformation generates. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and risk…
New method to understand incentives from complex models.
problem Understanding how complex models incentivize actions.
method Formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and solved using MDP tools.
result Identifies optimal actions to maximize model output.
Novel segmentation method for energy game-theoretic frameworks using graphical lasso.
problem Difficulty in computing utility functions for high-player energy game-theoretic frameworks.
method Graphical Lasso based approach to cluster features leading to energy usage behaviors.
result Characteristic clusters demonstrating different energy usage behaviors identified.