The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
problem Strategic traders exploit accumulated information to delay their orders, distorting auction efficiency.
method Randomizing auction closing times and designing optimal transaction fees policies.
result Policies encourage strategic traders to send orders earlier, improving auction market efficiency.
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
Study on heavy tails in closing auction returns, explaining imbalance through limit order submission.
problem Understanding heavy tails in closing auction return distributions.
method Used the stochastic call auction model of Derksen et al. (2020a) to derive and verify a relation between tail exponents.
result Large closing price fluctuations are not caused by large market orders, but by imbalance in limit orders.
Study optimizes rebate design in auction markets to enhance efficiency.
problem Designing optimal rebate policies in auction markets to improve efficiency.
method Formulated as a principal-agent problem, solved using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations and Deep BSDE method.
result Optimal transaction fees and rebates narrow the price spread, improving market efficiency.
A Deep Q-Learning framework tackles market-making by incorporating closing auctions.
problem Managing end-of-day risk in market-making models.
method Developed a Deep Q-Learning framework that anticipates closing auctions and continuously refines projected clearing prices.
result The Deep Q-Learning framework outperforms classical market-making models in simulations and real data.
Optimizes bidding in hourly and quarter-hourly electricity markets to reduce price impact.
problem Maximizing profit in two consecutive electricity markets with market impact and transaction costs.
method Examined multiple price scenarios, estimated market impact, used trading strategies, provided theoretical results.
result Minimizing price impact is more profitable than maximizing arbitrage in the German EPEX market.
MiFID II impacts European stock liquidity and price formation.
problem Impact of MiFID II on European stock liquidity and price formation.
method Analyzed effects of MiFID II on European stock markets, focusing on intraday and closing auction liquidity and tick size changes.
result Closing auction volumes increased and price formation became more efficient after MiFID II.
We consider an auction market in which market makers fill the order book during a given time period while some other investors send market orders. We define the clearing price of the auction as the price maximizing the exchanged volume at the clearing time according to the supply and demand of each market participants.…
Optimal bidding strategy for multi-platform ad auctions under budget constraints.
problem Optimizing ad placements for budget-constrained advertisers across multiple platforms.
method Developed an optimal bidding strategy for non-incentive-compatible auctions with budget constraints.
result Maximized total utility across auctions while satisfying budget constraints in expectation.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
problem Understanding price impact in equity auctions.
method High-quality data analysis of Paris stock exchange auctions.
result Price impact is linear up to a large volume, then becomes non-linear.
Modeling high-frequency speculative markets as auction search processes.
problem Understanding trading dynamics in high-frequency order-driven markets.
method Total order book model with diffusion-drift-reaction model, inspired by foraging and chemotaxis.
result Analytic and numerical analysis of trading performance in various search mechanisms.
Proposes a framework for modeling RTB auctions using point processes.
problem Modeling and optimizing repeated auctions in the RTB ecosystem.
method Develops a stochastic framework using point processes to model and optimize RTB auctions.
result The proposed framework can be approximated to a Poisson point process, enabling the use of established properties.
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for…
In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a…
We formalize and verify double auctions for multiple-quantity trades.
problem Matching multiple-quantity trade requests in double auctions.
method Formalized algorithms, correctness proofs, Coq proof assistant, verified OCaml and Haskell programs.
result Automatic detection of violations in exchange systems.
Develops a diamond price index for online auction platforms.
problem Tracking market trends of wholesale diamond prices.
method Modelling diamond prices to create a hedonic index.
result Provides a basis for constructing derivatives for collectables.
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
problem Comparing the learning difficulty of uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions.
method Characterization of learning difficulty through regret minimization in both full-information and bandit feedback settings.
result Regret scales similarly for both auction formats under full-information, but uniform-price auctions can achieve faster learning rates.
The study classifies and imitates trading agents in financial markets.
problem Classifying and imitating trading agents in continuous double auctions.
method Developed an agent-based model for trading, applied opponent modeling for classification, and used behavioral cloning for imitation.
result Techniques for classification and imitation were experimentally compared and evaluated.
Paper proposes auction method for smart derivatives to avoid disputes.
problem Disputes over derivative liquidation processes in smart contracts.
method Defines an auction type resolution for smart derivatives.
result Proposes a beneficial method for smart derivatives participants.
Efficient verified double auctions improve matching speed and detect errors.
problem Improving the efficiency and reliability of double auctions in financial markets.
method Formally verified implementation using Coq proof assistant, reducing time complexity and improving error detection.
result Improved efficiency with O(nlogn) time complexity, reducing runtime from days to minutes. Developed scalable ABM for complex financial markets.
problem Simulating large-scale agent-based financial markets.
method Agent-based modeling, distributed computing, continuous double auction.
result Captures statistical properties of real financial markets.
A new AMM mechanism reduces losses and maximizes revenue from orderflows.
problem Reduces losses to informed orderflow and maximizes revenue from uninformed orderflow.
method Runs an onchain auction for pool manager role, allowing fee setting and price sensitivity.
result Proves higher liquidity in equilibrium compared to standard AMMs.
In this paper, the survival function of waiting times between orders and the corresponding trades in a double-auction market is studied both by means of experiments and of empirical data. It turns out that, already at the level of order durations, the survival function cannot be represented by a single exponential, thu…
We analyze empirical data from the internet auction site Aukro.cz. The time series of activity shows truncated fractal structure on scales from about 1 minute to about 1 day. The distribution of waiting times as well as the distribution of number of auctions within fixed interval is a power law, with exponents 1.5 an…
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
problem Efficiency and fairness in Dutch auctions on blockchains.
method Modeling Dutch auctions with Poisson process and geometric Brownian motion, computing expected losses and time-to-fill.
result Tradeoff between speed and quality in Dutch auctions, useful for setting parameters.
Walraswap solves batch auction pricing by finding optimal AMM swaps.
problem Executing all trade orders with optimal automated market makers (AMMs).
method Uses Brouwer's fixed-point theorem to find equilibrium prices.
result A solution to batch auction pricing problems in blockchain.
In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens …
We consider a simplified model of the continuous double auction where prices are integers varying from 1 to N with limit orders and market orders, but quantity per order limited to a single share. For this model, the order process is equivalent to two M/M/1 queues. We study the behaviour of the auction in the low…
The ultimate value of theories of the fundamental mechanisms comprising the asset price in financial systems will be reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidences from the fields of finance, ma…
Ad exchanges use CORP to set reserve prices against strategic buyers.
problem Setting optimal reserve prices in ad exchanges with strategic buyers.
method Proposes CORP policy to learn and set reserve prices robustly.
result Achieves sublinear regret in unknown noise distribution.
Trading floors need to be twice as deep as electronic markets to compete.
problem Informed traders prefer fast electronic markets over slow trading floors.
method Examined the performance of trading floors and electronic markets in a hybrid system.
result Trading floors need to be twice as deep as electronic markets to compete.
A new RL approach optimizes reserve prices in multi-phase auctions, reducing revenue regret.
problem Optimizing reserve prices in multi-phase second-price auctions with noisy and potentially untruthful bidders.
method Combines RL techniques with buffer periods, a novel algorithm, and LSVI-UCB extension.
result Achieves optimal revenue regret under known and unknown noise conditions.
Generates realistic stock market order streams using GANs.
problem Creating high-fidelity stock market data.
method Conditional Wasserstein GAN with auction mechanism and order-book augmentation.
result Generated data is close to real market data.
The paper analyzes auction theory and its impact on buyer demographics.
problem Understanding the dynamics of auctions and buyer demographics.
method Analyzing various auction scenarios and their psychological aspects.
result Identified key auction criteria and their influence on buyer groups.
Formally verifies fairness and uniformity in financial market trades.
problem Ensuring fairness and uniformity in automated trading systems.
method Formal definition and verification in Coq proof assistant.
result Properties of double-sided auction mechanisms verified.
In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle (1985)'s inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insiders in the market with long-lived private information, under the requirement that each insider publicly discloses his stock trades after the fact. Based on this model, …
The paper analyzes profitable bidding strategies for BESS in day-ahead and intraday markets.
problem Optimizing profitability of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) in day-ahead and intraday markets.
method Employing the rolling intrinsic approach to model continuous intraday markets, accounting for bid-ask spreads and liquidity constraints.
result Multi-market bidding strategies outperform single-market participation, and relaxing daily cycling constraints can unlock additional value.
Study optimal auction formats for maximizing MEV on Ethereum.
problem Maximizing extractable value from Ethereum auctions.
method Empirical analysis of 2.2 million transactions, modeling affiliation among bidders.
result English and second-price sealed-bid auctions dominate other formats, with significant revenue losses.
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, …
This study analyzes costs of CCP default resolution using Radner equilibrium approach.
problem Analyzing costs of CCP default resolution for investment banks' derivatives.
method Radner equilibrium approach for portfolio allocation and price discovery.
result Radner equilibria uniquely exist and provide solutions for market equilibria.
The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. In this work, we cast the problem of predicting clearing prices into a learning framework and use the resulting models to perform revenue optimization in auctions and markets with contextual information. T…
Deep learning enhances art market valuation by incorporating visual data.
problem Improving valuation accuracy in the art market, especially for first-time sales.
method Benchmarked classical and modern deep learning models using a large auction dataset.
result Visual embeddings add distinct economic value for first-time art sales.
Efficient algorithms for second-price auctions with action-dependent censoring.
problem Sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions with incomplete information.
method Proposed novel UCB-like algorithms for second-price auctions in a stochastic setting.
result Significant improvement in worst-case regret, especially for low item values.
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyze it using simulation, dimensional analy…
We introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange is where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. These days, all big exchanges use computer algorithms that implement double sided auctions to match buy and sell requests and these algorithms must abide by certain regulator…
Using ultra-high-frequency data extracted from the order flows of 23 stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we study the empirical regularities of order placement in the opening call auction, cool period and continuous auction. The distributions of relative logarithmic prices against reference prices in the thre…
We study the statistical regularities of opening call auction using the ultra-high-frequency data of 22 liquid stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2003. The distribution of the relative price, defined as the relative difference between the order price in opening call auction and the closing price of last tr…