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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,657 papers · 148 categories

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13274053 · Feb 202019922001200920172026
48 results for Principal-Agent Games

A study on how a principal can incentivize an agent to make better decisions in a repeated game.

problem Optimizing a principal's utility in a misaligned principal-agent bandit game.
method Developed nearly optimal learning algorithms for the principal's regret in multi-armed and linear contextual settings.
result The principal can iteratively learn an incentive policy to maximize her total utility.

Deep learning solves complex PA mean field games with market-clearing conditions.

problem Optimizing Principal-Agent interactions in renewable energy markets with market-clearing conditions.
method Actor-critic approach, deep backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE), neural net approximation.
result Efficacy of the deep learning algorithm in solving complex PA mean field games.

Study of repeated principal-agent bandit game with self-interested and exploratory learning agents.

problem Interaction between principal and agent in unknown environments with learning and exploration behaviors.
method Developed algorithms for self-interested and exploratory learning agents with bandit feedback, achieving regret bounds.
result Achieved O~(T2/3)\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3}) regret bound for exploratory learning agent in i.i.d. reward setup.

Study of repeated games with unobserved agent rewards using MAB framework.

problem Designing policies for principals in repeated principal-agent games with unobservable agent rewards.
method Developed a policy achieving low regret (square-root regret up to a log factor) for perfect-knowledge agents.
result Constructed an estimator for agent's expected reward and designed a policy achieving low regret.

Study optimizes scoring rules for incentivizing agent's information gathering in online settings.

problem Optimizing incentives for agents to acquire information in online settings.
method Designing a sample-efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm to the strategic agent's model.
result Achieves sublinear T2/3T^{2/3}-regret after TT iterations, independent of the number of states.

Algorithm learns optimal coordination for strategic agents in uncertain settings.

problem Optimizing rewards for strategic agents with private types and actions.
method Combines delaying mechanism, reward angle estimation, and LinUCB algorithm.
result Near optimal regret bound of O~(T)\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) for learning optimal policy.

We analyze conditional optimization problems arising in discrete time Principal-Agent problems of delegated portfolio optimization with linear contracts. Applying tools from Conditional Analysis we show that some results known in the literature for very specific instances of the problem carry over to translation invari…

2014-12-15abs ↗pdf ↗

The main purpose of this paper is to formalize the modelling process, analysis and mathematical definition of corruption when entering into a contract between principal agent and producers. The formulation of the problem and the definition of concepts for the general case are considered. For definiteness, all calculati…

2018-04-06abs ↗pdf ↗

Study a continuous-time PA problem with private effort and consumption decisions.

problem Continuous-time Principal-Agent problem with private information.
method Proposes a new sufficient condition for solving the agent's problem directly.
result Directly yields a solution to the agent's problem without verification.

A model for collaborative learning with principal-agent interaction.

problem Optimizing parameter estimates in a collaborative learning setting.
method Decision-theoretic model with aggregation coefficients and Langevin dynamics.
result Advantages in stability and generalization due to cooperative behavior.

Optimal contracts are found for agents with quadratic effort costs.

problem Finding optimal contracts in principal-agent problems with quadratic effort costs.
method Modeling the problem using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations and proving the existence of classical solutions.
result Existence of optimal contracts for agents with quadratic effort costs is proven.

A note on learning with agents having global perspectives and a principal optimizing their performance.

problem Learning with dynamic-optimizing principal-agent setting, where agents have global views and the principal optimizes performance.
method Empirical-likelihood estimator under conditional moment restrictions model, considering agents' out-of-sample and private dataset performances.
result A coherent mathematical argument for the learning process in this framework.

Study uses machine learning to estimate effective policies in settings with hidden individual actions.

problem Estimating effective policies in settings with hidden individual actions.
method Instrumental Regression and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.
result Demonstrates how to estimate a good contract in principal-agent problems.

Optimal reinsurance contracts designed for a continuum of risk types.

problem Designing optimal reinsurance contracts with a continuum of risk types.
method Principal-agent model, VaR at risk tolerance level, change of variables, univariate approach.
result Optimal reinsurance contracts are in stop-loss form, classifying agents into high and low risk groups.

The paper proposes incentivizing human annotators with 'golden questions' to improve data quality.

problem Ensuring high-quality human annotations for training large language models.
method A principal-agent model is used to incentivize annotators with bonuses based on the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of their annotations. Hypothesis testing is applied to monitor the annotators' performance.
result The hypothesis testing rate for the principal-agent model is of Θ(1/nlogn)Θ(1/\sqrt{n \log n}), highlighting the importance of 'golden questions' for monitoring annotators.

We consider the problem of designing a derivatives exchange aiming at addressing clients needs in terms of listed options and providing suitable liquidity. We proceed into two steps. First we use a quantization method to select the options that should be displayed by the exchange. Then, using a principal-agent approach…

2019-09-19abs ↗pdf ↗

This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.

problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.

We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on th…

2018-05-07abs ↗pdf ↗

Paper presents content-based models for game recommendation in cold start scenarios.

problem Cold start problem in game recommendation where new games and players have no historical data.
method Uses survey data to develop content-based interaction models that generalize to new games, players, and both.
result Content models outperform collaborative filtering in predicting new interactions.

Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This note introduces graphical…

2015-05-06abs ↗pdf ↗

IGGP learns game rules from varying quality game play, finding no overall trend.

problem Learn game rules from varying quality game play.
method Used Sancho's intelligent game traces and ILP systems (Metagol, Aleph, ILASP) to induce game rules from traces of varying quality and volume.
result No overall trend in accuracy of learned game rules from varying quality and volume of training data.

We introduce a topological combinatorial game called the Region Smoothing Swap Game. The game is played on a game board derived from the connected shadow of a link diagram on a (possibly non-orientable) surface by smoothing at crossings. Moves in the game are performed on regions of the diagram and can switch the direc…

2019-09-26abs ↗pdf ↗

The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels". This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with finite actions and state-independe…

2013-11-07abs ↗pdf ↗

Combinatorial two-player games have recently been applied to knot theory. Examples of this include the Knotting-Unknotting Game and the Region Unknotting Game, both of which are played on knot shadows. These are turn-based games played by two players, where each player has a separate goal to achieve in order to win the…

2018-07-29abs ↗pdf ↗

We start briefly surveying research on optimal stopping games since their introduction by E.B.Dynkin more than 40 years ago. Recent renewed interest to dynkin's games is due, in particular, to the study of Israeli (game) options introduced in 2000. We discuss the work on these options and related derivative securities …

2012-09-09abs ↗pdf ↗

Educational game on crypto investment helps students grasp macroeconomics.

problem Weak connections between microeconomic decision-making and macroeconomic concepts in classroom games.
method Design and study of an educational game on cryptocurrency investment.
result Engages students in understanding macroeconomics through incentivized individual investment decisions.

The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.

problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.

We introduce TextWorld, a sandbox learning environment for the training and evaluation of RL agents on text-based games. TextWorld is a Python library that handles interactive play-through of text games, as well as backend functions like state tracking and reward assignment. It comes with a curated list of games whose …

2018-06-29abs ↗pdf ↗

Gradient Descent Ascent converges to von-Neumann solution in hidden zero-sum games.

problem Understanding dynamics of zero-sum games with hidden structure.
method Gradient Descent Ascent applied to hidden zero-sum games with specific convex-concave structure.
result Gradient Descent Ascent converges to von-Neumann solution in strictly convex-concave hidden games.

We introduce CSE for MLSF games and devise online learning algorithms for achieving no-external Stackelberg-regret.

problem Learning equilibrium in leader-follower games with noisy bandit feedback.
method Proposed Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium (CSE) and online learning algorithms balancing exploration and exploitation.
result Achieves no-external Stackelberg-regret, converging to approximate CSE.

EBIs/ESOs substantially change the traditional production/service function because ESOs/EBIs can have different psychological effects(motivation or de-motivation), and can create intangible capital and different economic payoffs. Although Game Theory is flawed, it can be helpful in describing interactions in ESO/EBIs t…

2020-02-15abs ↗pdf ↗