Paper analyzes strategic underreporting in competitive insurance markets.
problem Strategic underreporting by insureds in competitive insurance markets.
method Develops a dynamic insurance market model with two competing companies and a continuum of insureds, examines the interaction between strategic underreporting and competitive pricing under a Bonus-Malus System framework.
result Establishes the existence and uniqueness of the insureds' optimal reporting barrier and its dependence on BMS premiums; proves the existence of Nash equilibrium premium strategies.
Two-layer model studies reinsurance contracts and competition between insurer and reinsurers.
problem Modeling and analyzing reinsurance contracts and competition between insurer and reinsurers.
method Two-layer stochastic game model with insurer negotiating with reinsurers, and reinsurers competing for business.
result Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies for the insurer and reinsurers, characterized in semiclosed form.
Model analyzes competitive pricing strategies in large markets of perishable products.
problem Maximizing profits in a competitive market of perishable products.
method Mean-field competition model, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, iterative numerical algorithm.
result Properties of equilibrium pricing strategies and market dynamics.
The paper analyzes competition among fund managers using excess logarithmic returns and constructs games to find optimal allocations.
problem Optimal allocation strategies among fund managers considering excess logarithmic returns.
method Constructs both n-player and mean field games to address the competition problem. result The MFE of the MFG represents the limit of n-player game's equilibrium as n approaches infinity. A game-theoretic analysis of DEX competition through dynamic trading fees.
problem Competition between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and their impact on trading fees and slippage.
method Characterization of an approximate Nash equilibrium via coupled system of partial differential equations and closed-form expressions for equilibrium fees.
result The equilibrium trading fees shift from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates under competition.
Study examines strategic exit timing in uncertain competition.
problem Timing of strategic exit decisions in competitive markets with uncertainty.
method Constructs a stochastic game equilibrium for exit strategies involving state variable and posterior belief process.
result Unique equilibrium found for symmetric Bayesian players.
Modeling dealer competition, internalisation and externalisation impact market dynamics and costs.
problem Understanding and optimizing dealer competition in risky asset markets.
method Variational approach to derive Nash equilibrium for dealer competition.
result Dealers using internalisation are incentivized to increase externalisation, leading to higher hedging costs and wider spreads.
Study shows unique linear equilibrium in market with constrained trader.
problem Unique equilibrium in financial market with constrained trader.
method Linear equilibrium model with competitive market makers and noise traders.
result Equilibrium uniquely determined by two state variables.
Modeling trading behavior with information signals and limit order books, showing market impact and equilibrium properties.
problem Analyzing the impact of information signals on trading behavior and market equilibrium in limit order books.
method Static equilibrium model with profit-maximizing investors and competitive dealers, using iterative algorithms and asymptotic analysis.
result The market impact of large trades follows a power law with fat tails and a logarithmic law with lighter tails, and the order book flattens as noise trading increases.
The paper analyzes reinsurance strategies in a competitive multi-agent system.
problem Strategic interactions and competitive behavior in multi-layer reinsurance chains.
method Stochastic differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies.
result Intensified competition reduces safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.
Models of spatial firm competition assume that customers are distributed in space and transportation costs are associated with their purchases of products from a small number of firms that are also placed at definite locations. It has been long known that the competition equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist if the mo…
New paper finds strategic trade centralization benefits firms, while naive centralization often harms them.
problem Finding optimal trading strategies in competitive markets.
method Complete solution to finding equilibrium strategies in competition using Fourier Series methods.
result Firms that strategically centralize trades generally benefit, while naive centralization often harms them.
Investigates portfolio selection among competitive agents with mean-variance preferences.
problem Optimizing portfolios with multi-agent competition and relative wealth comparison.
method Reformulated as a constrained, non-homogeneous stochastic linear-quadratic control problem; derived optimal feedback strategies; used decoupling techniques and fixed-point theory to solve nonlinear BSDEs.
result Characterized three scenarios based on market and competition parameters: unique Nash equilibrium, no Nash equilibrium, or infinitely many Nash equilibria.
Dynamic pricing policy converges to Nash equilibrium with low regret.
problem Sequential price competition among sellers over multiple periods.
method Semi-parametric least-squares estimation of s-concave demand functions.
result Prices converge to Nash equilibrium with rate O(T−1/7) and sellers incur regret O(T5/7). The paper analyzes optimal stock position-building strategies in competitive markets.
problem Optimal stock position-building in competitive markets with market impact.
method Developed a game-theoretic framework to find best-response strategies.
result Closed-form solutions for equilibrium trading strategies were derived.
Study optimal investment and consumption strategies for competitive agents with habit formation.
problem Optimal investment and consumption strategies for competitive agents with habit formation.
method Formulated n-agent game problems and mean field game problems, derived mean field equilibrium, constructed approximate Nash equilibrium.
result Explicit convergence order of approximate Nash equilibrium can be obtained.
Market equilibrium price proven in a large-agent model.
problem Proving market equilibrium in a large-agent setting.
method Proved existence of equilibrium price in a complete, continuous time market with infinite agents.
result The equilibrium price dynamics decouple as the number of agents increases.
The paper analyzes optimal investment strategies in a game with jump risk, deriving mean field equilibria.
problem Optimal investment strategies in a game with jump risk and peer competition.
method Formulated mean field game and n-player game models, characterized equilibrium states, and derived approximation errors.
result Explicit mean field equilibrium and approximate Nash equilibrium for large n-player games.
Two strategic agents track their portfolios, influencing each other's trading targets.
problem Strategic competition in portfolio tracking with price impact.
method Stochastic linear quadratic differential game with terminal state constraints.
result Unique open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies emerge based on price impact types.
We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic aspect is captured through a reduced-form price-impact model for the CO_2 allowance…
Brokers and an informed trader compete for liquidity, affecting trading costs and inventory risk.
problem How brokers and an informed trader manage liquidity and trading costs.
method Sequential Stackelberg game, solving for trading strategies, numerical solutions.
result Equilibrium strategies and liquidity prices determined, not Pareto efficient.
Agents trained with reinforcement learning deviate from Nash equilibrium in optimal execution game.
problem Deviation of reinforcement learning strategies from Nash equilibrium in optimal execution game.
method Two-player optimal execution game with reinforcement learning algorithms (Double Deep Q-Learning).
result Strategies learned by agents deviate significantly from Nash equilibrium, exhibiting supra-competitive solutions.
Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders is large enough compared to the number of the states of the world that determine the return of the asset. We study …
New algorithm improves self-play reinforcement learning for competitive games.
problem Inefficient opponent selection in self-play reinforcement learning.
method Intelligently selects opponents based on adversarial rules derived from saddle point optimization.
result Algorithm converges to approximate equilibrium with high probability in convex-concave games.
Informed traders strategically reveal noisier signals, making prices less responsive to public information.
problem How informed traders strategically reveal signals impacts market prices and utility.
method Modeling a market with an informed trader, an uninformed trader, and liquidity providers, proving equilibrium existence.
result In equilibrium, the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, making prices less responsive to public information.
We study Nash equilibria for inventory-averse high-frequency traders (HFTs), who trade to exploit information about future price changes. For discrete trading rounds, the HFTs' optimal trading strategies and their equilibrium price impact are described by a system of nonlinear equations; explicit solutions obtain aroun…
Study competitive energy markets using stochastic impulse games.
problem Maximizing profits in competitive retail energy markets.
method Connection between Nash equilibrium and quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs).
result Value functions are constrained viscosity solutions of QVIs.
Study Nash equilibrium in mean field portfolio games with random market parameters.
problem Modeling wealth and relative performance in competitive financial markets.
method Martingale optimality principle approach to characterize Nash equilibrium in mean field FBSDE.
result Unique Nash equilibrium found under weak interaction assumption and market parameters independence.
Investors' strategic trading affects asset prices, modeled as a game.
problem Investors' trading rates influence asset prices in dynamic markets.
method Model as a non-zero sum singular stochastic differential game, establishing equivalence between best-response and auxiliary control problems.
result Unique Nash equilibrium is deterministic with a closed-form solution.
Our study shows that many firms would accumulate at zero output level (namely, Bankruptcy status) if a perfectly competitive market reaches full employment (namely, those people who should obtain employment have obtained employment). As a result, appearance of economic crisis is determined by two points; that is, (a). …
Study analyzes market equilibrium returns with price impact and transaction costs.
problem Modeling equilibrium returns in markets with strategic order placement and transaction costs.
method Analyzes frictionless and transaction-cost markets, characterizes Nash equilibrium via FBSDEs.
result Equilibrium returns are affected by transaction costs, especially with noise traders.
Study time-inconsistent portfolio optimization for competitive agents with relative performance criteria.
problem Time-inconsistent mean field and n-agent games under relative performance criteria.
method Construct open-loop equilibrium strategies for n-agent games and mean field games.
result Explicit solutions for n-agent games and mean field games, unique in a special class of equilibria.
Model shows incentives in shared order book can lead to free-rider problem.
problem Incentives in shared order books can lead to free-rider problem.
method Developed a Principal-Agent model with CARA utility functions.
result Equilibrium analysis shows incentives can lead to reduced competition.
We propose a simple dynamical model of the formation of production networks among monopolistically competitive firms. The model subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach à la Arrow-Debreu but displays a wide set of potential dynamic behaviors. It robustly reproduces key stylized facts of firms' demographics. O…
This paper is the continuation of "Pricing with coherent risk" and deals with further applications of coherent risk measures to problems of finance. First, we study the optimization problem. Three forms of this problem are considered. Furthermore, the results obtained are applied to the optimality pricing. Again three …
Modeling pollution from competing firms using mean-field games.
problem Pollution regulation of competitive firms producing similar goods.
method Developed a mean-field game model with cap-and-trade regulation.
result Explicit solutions found through Riccati differential equations.
DREAM learns optimal strategies in imperfect games without needing a simulator.
problem Learning optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents.
method DREAM is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that converges to Nash Equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria.
result DREAM achieves state-of-the-art performance in benchmark games and is competitive with simulator-based algorithms.
Study shows how multiple traders can trade together without excessive price impact.
problem Coordination issues in trading to exploit a common signal.
method Closed-loop Nash competition model for stochastic differential games.
result Excessive trading reduced but not significantly for practical parameters.
This paper studies how relative performance concerns affect stock prices in a tree-like market model.
problem The impact of relative performance concerns on stock prices in a tree-like market model.
method Mean-field equilibrium analysis in a binomial tree framework with exponential utility.
result Existence and uniqueness of market-clearing mean-field equilibrium in both single- and multi-population settings.
We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to market risk tend to submit more elasti…
Modeling gas fee competition in decentralized exchanges to optimize arbitrage profits.
problem Gas fees and transaction ordering in decentralized exchanges create arbitrage opportunities.
method Developed a first equilibrium model of gas fee competition between two arbitrageurs under three transaction reversion settings.
result Mixed equilibria exist, and their characteristics depend on inventory risk and transaction settings.
This paper provides an attempt to formalize Hayek's notion of spontaneous order within the framework of the Arrow-Debreu economy. Our study shows that if a competitive economy is enough fair and free, then a spontaneous economic order shall emerge in long-run competitive equilibria so that social members together occup…
Model predicts BESS interactions and price impacts in energy markets.
problem Understanding BESS interactions and price formation in energy markets.
method Stochastic game-theoretic model with linear-quadratic differential game.
result Equilibrium controls and prices derived for BESSs in both heterogeneous and homogeneous settings.
The paper analyzes strategic irreversible investments with novel dynamic strategies.
problem Tradeoff between preemption incentives and option value of waiting in oligopolistic markets.
method Developed novel Markov perfect equilibrium to handle singular control of optimal investment.
result Simpler strategies lead to a 'preemption trap' with zero net present values.
In statistical physics, the conservation of particle number results in the equalization of the chemical potential throughout a system at equilibrium. In contrast, the homogeneity of utility in socio-economic models is usually thought to rely on the competition between individuals, leading to Nash equilibrium. We show t…
Market competition depends on computational complexity, P != NP makes it impossible.
problem Competitive market outcomes require computational intractability.
method Analyzes the computational hardness of collusion detection in markets.
result If P != NP, collusion detection is computationally infeasible, making collusion unstable.
The paper analyzes strategic interactions in a multi-agent reinsurance chain using game theory.
problem Strategic behavior and competition among insurers and reinsurers in a multi-layer reinsurance chain.
method Employed Stackelberg differential games and non-zero-sum game models to characterize strategic interactions. Used dynamic programming and game theory to derive equilibrium strategies for investment and reinsurance.
result Intensified competition leads to reduced safety loadings in reinsurance contracts.
We study a continuous-time version of the intermediation model of Grossman and Miller (1988). To wit, we solve for the competitive equilibrium prices at which liquidity takers' demands are absorbed by dealers with quadratic inventory costs, who can in turn gradually transfer these positions to an exogenous open market …