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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,657 papers · 148 categories

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275582109 · May 202619922001200920172026
48 results for trading incentives

dYdX updates liquidity provider incentives to enhance trading efficiency.

problem Incentivizing liquidity providers to maintain efficient market structures.
method Analyzed various metrics (makerVolume, depths, spreads) and used historical trades to update the LP Incentives Programme.
result Updated the LP Incentives Programme to encourage more active and efficient liquidity.

Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.

problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.

Short-term incentives lead to riskier trading strategies.

problem Optimal execution with performance barriers.
method Analyzes the impact of short-term performance incentives on trading behavior.
result Short-term incentives result in more aggressive but less risky trading strategies in the short term, but poorer performance over long periods.

Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.

problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated…

2011-03-15abs ↗pdf ↗

Study optimizes health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.

problem Designing health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
method Inverse behavioral optimization framework integrating QALY-based incentives and adaptive learning.
result Modern health systems operate near an efficiency-saturated frontier, with small fairness adjustments yielding diminishing returns.

This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.

problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.

We investigate the role of networks of alliances in preventing (multilateral) interstate wars. We first show that, in the absence of international trade, no network of alliances is peaceful and stable. We then show that international trade induces peaceful and stable networks: trade increases the density of alliances s…

2014-05-25abs ↗pdf ↗

Study on time-zero efficiency of European power derivatives markets using statistical tests and trading rules.

problem Assessing time-zero efficiency in European power derivatives markets.
method Statistical tests based on the law of one price and trading rules based on price differentials and no-arbitrage violations applied to daily data of three European power markets.
result Definite conclusions on time-zero efficiency are not possible for French and Spanish markets due to liquidity and representativeness challenges.

The paper proposes a model reward scheme for collaborative ML based on Shapley value and information gain.

problem Designing fair incentives for collaborative machine learning.
method The paper proposes a reward scheme based on Shapley value and information gain, with properties like fairness and stability.
result The proposed reward scheme satisfies fairness and trade-offs between desirable properties via an adjustable parameter.

Triangle fees adjust fees based on trade size and price movement, improving price accuracy and revenue.

problem Price staleness and low fee revenue in AMMs.
method Decreasing marginal fees proportional to price movement, creating incentives for price accuracy.
result Triangle fees strictly improve the Pareto frontier of price accuracy versus losses.

Model analyzes trading frictions in cap-and-trade markets, showing how they interact to affect market effectiveness.

problem Analyzing how trading frictions impact cap-and-trade market effectiveness.
method Developed a dynamic stochastic model with multiple trading frictions, characterized access choices in closed form, and quantified using EU ETS data.
result Trading frictions interact to amplify or dampen market responses, and their combined effect is non-additive.

We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.

problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.

We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that the likelihood of agents trading in a given asset depends on the relative amount of information available in that market. More s…

2006-03-19abs ↗pdf ↗

Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.

problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.

Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.

problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.

Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.

problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.

Modeling business expansion as a stochastic control problem, the study finds that firms are incentivized to expand but may wait.

problem Optimizing business expansion under exposure constraints and opportunity costs.
method Formulated as a novel stochastic control problem combined with optimal stopping time, derived an explicit solution for exponential utility.
result Firms are incentivized to expand but may wait due to opportunity costs and other factors.

In an economy with asymmetric information, the smart contract in the blockchain protocol mitigates uncertainty. Since, as a new trading platform, the blockchain triggers segmentation of market and differentiation of agents in both the sell and buy sides of the market, it recomposes the asymmetric information and genera…

2018-02-27abs ↗pdf ↗

A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.

problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.

The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.

problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.

Market trade-routes can support infectious-disease transmission, impacting biological populations and even disrupting causal trade. Epidemiological models increasingly account for reductions in infectious contact, such as risk-aversion behaviour in response to pathogen outbreaks. However, market dynamics clearly differ…

2013-10-23abs ↗pdf ↗

The relationship between international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main features of globalization. In this paper we investigate the effects of FDI on trade from a network perspective, since FDI takes not only direct but also indirect channels from origin to destination countries because of f…

2017-05-05abs ↗pdf ↗

We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold. First, we want the learning algorithm to be no-regret with respect to the best fixed …

2020-02-20abs ↗pdf ↗

Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.

problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.

How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…

2018-06-04abs ↗pdf ↗

Centralized exchanges influence staking behavior and decentralization in Proof of Stake blockchain ecosystems.

problem How do centralized exchanges affect staking behavior and decentralization in Proof of Stake blockchain ecosystems?
method Formulate a continuous-time mean field model of miners as validators and traders in a centralized market.
result Centralized trading activities enhance staking participation and promote decentralization through market incentives.

Study shows ethanol blends and incentives can significantly reduce transportation carbon emissions.

problem Rapid growth in electric vehicles requires complementary strategies to decarbonize transportation.
method Analysis of ethanol blending, regulatory incentives, and economic assessments.
result Ethanol blending, especially E15 and E85, can substantially reduce carbon emissions and provide economic benefits.

When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…

2013-06-12abs ↗pdf ↗

Study shows visual feedback and monetary incentives reduce plugload energy consumption in commercial buildings.

problem Mitigating energy consumption in commercial buildings through occupant plugload control.
method Field experiments with visual feedback and monetary incentives in government and university buildings.
result Mean energy reduction of ~9.52% in office environments and ~21.61% in university environments with visual feedback.

The study compares M6 competitors' performance to industry benchmarks and discusses incentives for investment managers.

problem Investors seek to understand the performance and skill of M6 competitors beyond the competition's metrics.
method Comparative analysis using financial metrics, factor models, and new strategies.
result Most competitors do not generate significant out-performance compared to industry benchmarks, but some show skill in recent performance.

COBRA addresses strategic behavior in online platforms by ensuring truthful reporting without monetary incentives.

problem Ensuring truthful reporting from strategic agents in online platforms.
method Proposes COBRA, an algorithm for contextual bandits involving strategic agents that disincentivizes strategic behavior.
result COBRA achieves sub-linear regret guarantee and incentive compatibility without monetary incentives.

Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.

problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves ildeO(T) ilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment.

Study incentive efficiency in monopoly insurance markets with hidden information.

problem Maximizing social welfare in a monopoly insurance market with hidden agent types.
method Maximizes social welfare function subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
result Optimal menus of contracts depend on the level of social welfare weight and agent risk attitudes.

Forward hedging reshapes incentive provision in firms.

problem How does forward hedging affect incentive provision in firms?
method We consider a CARA framework to jointly characterize optimal production, compensation, and static hedging in equilibrium.
result Delegation and external hedging are partial substitutes, and delegation can increase firm value even when the agent is more risk averse.