Models show strategic agents can influence classifier outcomes by investing effort.
problem How strategic agents can influence classifier outcomes.
method Developed a model to characterize strategic effort investment.
result Simple linear mechanisms can incentivize strategic effort effectively.
New research shows strategic classification harms individuals and society.
problem Strategic behavior in decision-making leads to unfair outcomes.
method Introducing a social burden metric, the study quantifies the negative externalities of strategic classification.
result Any increase in institutional utility leads to a corresponding increase in social burden.
Optimizes decisions under strategic individual behavior.
problem Optimal decision-making in strategic environments.
method Characterizes strategic effort, identifies optimal policies under monotonic cost assumptions, develops iterative search algorithm.
result Demonstrates higher utility of decision policies accounting for strategic behavior.
The paper tackles strategic behavior in decision-making with counterfactual explanations.
problem Finding optimal counterfactual explanations and policies in a strategic setting.
method NP-hard problem, greedy algorithm, submodularity, randomized algorithm, matroid constraint.
result Optimal counterfactual explanations and policies increase utility.
AI task delegation faces incentive collapse with unbounded payments as AI accuracy rises.
problem Incentive collapse in AI-assisted task delegation schemes.
method General impossibility result and sentinel-auditing payment mechanism.
result Sentinel-auditing mechanism enforces positive human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy.
Study uses Open Banking data to estimate customer value, showing potential 21% increase.
problem Limited CLV estimation using single-entity data.
method Introduces PCLV framework using Open Banking data for comprehensive customer value estimation.
result Open Banking data can estimate PCLV per competitor, showing a 21.06% increase over Actual CLV.
We study the problem of training an accurate linear regression model by procuring labels from multiple noisy crowd annotators, under a budget constraint. We propose a Bayesian model for linear regression in crowdsourcing and use variational inference for parameter estimation. To minimize the number of labels crowdsourc…
New framework for robust uncertainty quantification in strategic settings.
problem Machine learning model predictions can be strategically altered by informed agents.
method Strategic Conformal Prediction framework
result Theoretical guarantees and experimental validation show remarkable effectiveness.
Paper generalizes strategic classification framework and introduces SVC for PAC-learning.
problem Strategic manipulation of testing data to fool classifiers.
method Unified framework for strategic classification, strategic VC-dimension (SVC).
result Characterizes the learnability and computational tractability of linear classifiers.
Study strategic dynamic pricing for buyers with unknown manipulation costs.
problem Strategic buyers manipulate their features to get lower prices, hindering profit maximization.
method Proposes a strategic dynamic pricing policy that incorporates strategic behavior and binary response data.
result Achieves sublinear regret bound of O ( T ) O(\sqrt{T}) O ( T ) compared to linear Ω ( T ) Ω(T) Ω ( T ) regret of non-strategic policies. New framework reduces strategic manipulation cost for minority groups in fair classification.
problem Strategic manipulation disparities in fair classification.
method Constrained optimization framework that constructs classifiers to reduce strategic manipulation cost for minority groups.
result Empirically, the approach reduces strategic manipulation cost for minority groups over multiple real-world datasets.
Study compares employers with and without anticipating strategic labor force responses.
problem Understanding and optimizing strategic interactions in labor markets.
method Formulation of causal strategic classification, theory, and experiments.
result Performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer and labor outcomes, but can also harm labor force utility.
Symmetric game analysis shows Nash equilibria in three strategic states.
problem Analyzing Nash equilibria in a symmetric multi-player zero-sum game with two strategic variables.
method Using the minimax theorem by Sion to show equivalence of Nash equilibria.
result Nash equilibria are equivalent in three strategic states.
New framework shows strategic behavior is actually a form of causal modeling.
problem Designing classifiers that incentivize strategic behavior to improve quality.
method Developed a causal framework to distinguish between gaming and improvement.
result Proved any procedure for designing incentive classifiers must solve a causal inference problem.
Study optimizes auction pricing for strategic bidders in repeated auctions.
problem Optimizing revenue in auctions with multiple strategic bidders.
method Proposes a novel algorithm with strategic regret bound of O(log log T).
result Algorithm learns strategic buyer's valuation with theoretical guarantees.
New algorithm learns optimal policies in strategic MDPs with private types.
problem Optimal policy learning in strategic MDPs with private types and information asymmetry.
method PLAN algorithm using instrumental variable regression and pessimism principle.
result PLAN achieves near-optimal policy with 1 / K 1 / \sqrt{K} 1/ K optimality. Defends against strategic data manipulation in machine learning.
problem Adversaries can tamper with datasets to influence learning outcomes.
method Uses multiple learners and strategic activation to counteract attacks.
result Demonstrates effectiveness of a game-theoretic approach to defense.
The paper develops a mathematical model for strategic shifts.
problem Finding optimal moments for strategy changes in market dynamics.
method Explicit strategy formulation using fluctuation theory.
result Analytical results predict optimal strategy shifts.
New findings show strategic interactions can undermine model expressiveness in machine learning.
problem How strategic interactions affect model performance in machine learning.
method Analyzing model expressiveness and strategic interactions in various machine learning settings.
result Optimizing over less expressive model classes can lead to better equilibrium outcomes in strategic environments.
Paper presents a defense framework against adversarial examples.
problem Vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples.
method Cross-layer strategic ensemble defense with input and output transformations.
result Strategic ensemble defense achieves high defense success rates and robustness.
Active IRL selects optimal human demonstrations for learning AI preferences.
problem Costly human demonstrations in IRL for autonomous systems.
method Information-theoretic acquisition function for selecting informative human demonstrations.
result Efficiently reduces human effort in learning AI preferences.
Strategic feature selection in high-stakes domains like healthcare.
problem Strategic manipulation of input features in algorithmic predictors.
method Formal study of strategic classification through feature selection and ridge regularization.
result Excluding individual features based on manipulability is generally suboptimal.
Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.
problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves i l d e O ( T ) ilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) i l d e O ( T ) social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment. The paper analyzes trading strategies in a competitive market with incomplete information.
problem Strategic trading under uncertainty when firms lack full knowledge of competitors' strategies.
method Bayesian games framework to incorporate uncertainty and derive optimal trading strategies.
result Uncertainty significantly impacts trading strategies compared to complete information scenarios.
Algorithm learns optimal coordination for strategic agents in uncertain settings.
problem Optimizing rewards for strategic agents with private types and actions.
method Combines delaying mechanism, reward angle estimation, and LinUCB algorithm.
result Near optimal regret bound of O ~ ( T ) \tilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) O ~ ( T ) for learning optimal policy. Study optimal pricing algorithms for strategic buyers in repeated auctions.
problem Optimizing revenue in auctions with strategic buyers over multiple rounds.
method Proposed a novel algorithm that never decreases prices and has a strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T).
result Closed the open research question on no-regret horizon-independent weakly consistent pricing.
Randomised classifiers outperform deterministic ones in strategic classification.
problem Strategic modification of features by agents in classification tasks.
method Theoretical analysis of randomised classifiers in strategic classification.
result Randomised classifiers can achieve better accuracy than deterministic ones under certain conditions.
Study one-shot strategic classification under unknown costs, improving worst-case accuracy.
problem Learning robust decision rules in strategic settings with unknown user costs.
method Formal study of one-shot strategic classification, framing as a minimax problem, designing efficient algorithms for full-batch and stochastic settings.
result Proves efficient algorithms converge to minimax solution, revealing dual norm regularization's value.
Strategic traders adjust indicative prices near auctions to achieve nearly diffusive outcomes.
problem Achieving diffusive price behavior in Paris Stock Exchange auctions.
method Analyzing the diffusive properties of indicative auction prices and the strategic behavior of traders.
result Strategic traders adjust their order submission times to achieve nearly diffusive price behavior.
We study a strategic version of the multi-armed bandit problem, where each arm is an individual strategic agent and we, the principal, pull one arm each round. When pulled, the arm receives some private reward v a v_a v a and can choose an amount x a x_a x a to pass on to the principal (keeping v a − x a v_a-x_a v a − x a for itself). All non-pulle…
COBRA addresses strategic behavior in online platforms by ensuring truthful reporting without monetary incentives.
problem Ensuring truthful reporting from strategic agents in online platforms.
method Proposes COBRA, an algorithm for contextual bandits involving strategic agents that disincentivizes strategic behavior.
result COBRA achieves sub-linear regret guarantee and incentive compatibility without monetary incentives.
Strategic feature manipulation helps learners identify meaningful variables in online regression settings.
problem Strategic feature manipulation poses a challenge for learners in online regression settings.
method Investigates how strategic feature manipulation by individuals can help learners recover meaningful features.
result Simple learner behavior can help accurately recover meaningful features and incentivize feature improvement.
The paper analyzes strategic behavior in reinsurance transactions leading to Nash equilibria.
problem Strategic behavior in reinsurance transactions affecting risk aversion and welfare gains.
method Identifying Nash equilibria within a class of risk measures.
result At strictly beneficial Nash equilibria, agents appear homogeneous in risk preferences.
Market-maker optimizes quotes based on strategic market-takers' behavior.
problem Optimizing market-making strategies in a strategic trading environment.
method Mean-field game approach to model strategic market-takers and derive optimal controls.
result Derivation of optimal controls for market-maker and market-taker.
Paper identifies bias and strategic behavior in crowdsourced performance assessments.
problem Crowdsourced performance assessment risks personal interest introducing distortions.
method Developed a method to identify bias and strategic behavior using a rich dataset.
result Discovers a pattern of 'discriminatory generosity' in peer evaluation.
The paper tackles performative policy learning with strategic agents, improving scalability and generalizability.
problem Strategic agents adjust their features in response to a released policy, causing endogenous distribution shifts.
method Relaxing parametric assumptions, the paper uncovers a low-dimensional structure in distribution shifts and proposes a gradient-based policy optimization algorithm.
result The proposed algorithm achieves high sample efficiency and provides theoretical guarantees for convergence.
New games model strategic interactions in incomplete information settings.
problem Modeling strategic interactions in incomplete information settings.
method Introduced new games that map input to private player types, aggregate strategies, and converge to near-Nash equilibria.
result Games can recover meaningful strategic interactions from real data.
Strategic brokers exploit private information in broker-mediated markets, affecting informed traders' performance.
problem Strategic interactions and information leakage in broker-mediated markets.
method Study of strategic trading behavior and information leakage in a broker-mediated market.
result Brokers hold a strategic advantage over informed traders due to information leakage in trading flows.
Introduces PIT-plot for prioritizing projects based on their impact.
problem Optimizing R&D investments in project portfolios.
method Develops a new tool (PIT-plot) focusing on project impact rather than project properties.
result Identifies projects with the largest impact for risk mitigation or value-adding.
This paper tackles online strategic decision making with asymmetry and knowledge transportability.
problem Strategic decision making with information asymmetry and knowledge transportability challenges.
method Developed a sample-efficient algorithm for online learning under these conditions.
result Proved sample complexity of O ( 1 / ε 2 ) O(1/ε^2) O ( 1/ ε 2 ) for learning an ε ε ε -optimal policy. User strategization undermines algorithmic trustworthiness.
problem User strategic behavior corrupts algorithmic data and trust.
method Modeling user-platform interactions as a game, analyzing strategic behavior's short-term benefits and long-term harms.
result User strategization can initially benefit platforms but ultimately harms their ability to make accurate decisions.
Classic bandit algorithms are robust to strategic manipulation as long as the total budget is small compared to the time horizon.
problem Behavior of stochastic bandit algorithms under strategic manipulation by self-interested arms.
method Analysis of three popular bandit algorithms: UCB, ε-Greedy, and Thompson Sampling.
result Regret upper bound of O(max{B, KlnT}) for all three algorithms under arbitrary adaptive manipulation.
New algorithms optimize decision rules in strategic scenarios, minimizing prediction risk and incentivizing better outcomes.
problem Strategic agents manipulate features to improve outcomes, complicating decision-making models.
method Efficient algorithms for learning decision rules that minimize prediction risk, incentivize better outcomes, and estimate true model coefficients.
result Optimal decision rules can be learned through testing and observing agent responses, circumventing hardness results.
Models analyze strategic risk-taking in continuous action games.
problem Strategic risk-taking dynamics in continuous action games.
method Normal form game, multi-player scenarios, regret minimization algorithms, numerical algorithm for calculation.
result Nash equilibrium also serves as a correlated equilibrium in continuous games.
Bayesian models can be tricked into believing false data.
problem Vulnerability of Bayesian inference to data poisoning attacks.
method Developed attacks to manipulate Bayesian posterior through deletion and replication of data.
result Demonstrated that Bayesian inference can be steered to target distributions.
A cased-based reasoning method predicts rare events on strategic sites using satellite imagery.
problem Manual prediction of rare events on strategic sites is impractical due to large datasets.
method Case-based reasoning approach incorporating expert knowledge for irregular time series and small datasets.
result The method significantly outperforms random selection on challenging applications.
New findings link causal models to strategic classification, improving robustness and alignment.
problem Strategic adaptation by users in classification tasks.
method Causal models to bound worst-case out-of-distribution risk.
result Causal classification optimizes classification error after adaptation under certain noise conditions.
New method handles uncertainty in adversarial attacks using ensemble noise simulation.
problem Uncertainty in adversarial attacks on neural networks.
method Simulates attacker's noisy perturbation using various gradient-based attack algorithms and a pre-processing Denoising Autoencoder (DAE) defense.
result Significant improvements in post-attack accuracy with the proposed ensemble-trained defense.