Exact solution found for k-price auctions, introducing a new fair auction type.
problem Finding fair solutions for auction mechanisms.
method Exact analytical solution for k-price auctions and introduction of a new auction type.
result New auction type provides fair solutions.
Optimizes bidding strategy for Maker Protocol auctions.
problem Minimizing costs in Maker Protocol auctions.
method Developed and optimized a bidding function using historical data.
result Most auctions end at higher prices than optimal recommendations.
Study optimizes auction pricing for strategic bidders in repeated auctions.
problem Optimizing revenue in auctions with multiple strategic bidders.
method Proposes a novel algorithm with strategic regret bound of O(log log T).
result Algorithm learns strategic buyer's valuation with theoretical guarantees.
Deep network optimizes ad bidding for first-price auctions.
problem Optimizing bid prices for first-price auctions in online advertising.
method Introduced a deep distribution network for optimal bidding.
result Algorithm outperforms previous methods in terms of surplus and eCPX metrics.
Efficient algorithms for second-price auctions with action-dependent censoring.
problem Sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions with incomplete information.
method Proposed novel UCB-like algorithms for second-price auctions in a stochastic setting.
result Significant improvement in worst-case regret, especially for low item values.
Study proposes a machine learning method for bid shading in first-price auctions.
problem Maintaining strategy equilibrium in first-price auctions.
method Machine learning approach to model optimal bid shading.
result Demonstrates superiority and robustness of new approach across various metrics.
Study learns optimal bidding strategy in auctions with dynamic values and aggregated feedback.
problem Optimizing bidding in auctions with time-dependent values and limited feedback.
method Combines plug-in estimators with differential-equation characterization of optimal policy.
result Achieves near optimal regret bounds for learning optimal policy.
New method for causal inference in RTB advertising auctions.
problem Measuring the effectiveness of online advertising in RTB systems.
method Adapted Thompson sampling algorithm for causal inference.
result The method outperforms existing methods in estimating advertising effects.
Optimizes reserve prices for first-price auctions to maximize revenue.
problem Optimizing reserve prices for first-price auctions in display advertising.
method Gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on bidder responsiveness to experimental shocks.
result Revenue optimization in first-price auctions can be decomposed into demand and bidding components, and techniques are introduced to reduce variance of each.
This paper tackles optimal bidding strategies in adversarial first-price auctions.
problem How to bid optimally and efficiently in adversarial first-price auctions.
method Developed a minimax optimal online bidding algorithm leveraging expert-chaining structure and exploiting product structure.
result Achieved an O ~ ( T ) \widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) O ( T ) regret, superior to existing algorithms. Many online companies sell advertisement space in second-price auctions with reserve. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic method to learn a profitable strategy to set the reserve price. We use historical auction data with features to fit a predictor of the best reserve price. This problem is delicate - the struct…
Optimistic Mirror Descent framework improves bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
problem Optimizing bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
method Introducing Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) framework with novel optimism configuration.
result Minimax-optimal dynamic regret rates achieved for non-stationary first-price auctions.
Study non-stationary online auctions with semi-bandit feedback.
problem Maximize revenue in a non-stationary online second price auction.
method Develops an algorithm to handle non-stationary private value distributions.
result Achieves nearly optimal non-stationary regret bound.
Study optimal auction formats for maximizing MEV on Ethereum.
problem Maximizing extractable value from Ethereum auctions.
method Empirical analysis of 2.2 million transactions, modeling affiliation among bidders.
result English and second-price sealed-bid auctions dominate other formats, with significant revenue losses.
A new RL approach optimizes reserve prices in multi-phase auctions, reducing revenue regret.
problem Optimizing reserve prices in multi-phase second-price auctions with noisy and potentially untruthful bidders.
method Combines RL techniques with buffer periods, a novel algorithm, and LSVI-UCB extension.
result Achieves optimal revenue regret under known and unknown noise conditions.
Study shows priority access in ELA auctions is less valuable due to volatility risks.
problem Impact of volatility on time-based transaction ordering policies.
method Single-round model with risk-averse bidders, tested using ETH price data.
result Priority access is discounted due to volatility and risk aversion.
Optimizes web publisher revenues from RTB auctions.
problem Maximizing revenue from RTB auctions with limited information.
method Incremental time-weighted matrix factorization for user and placement profiles; Aalen's Additive model for censored bid predictions.
result Significant revenue increase for web publishers.
A new DSP bidding strategy maximizes revenue under budget constraints.
problem Optimizing ad selection and bid price in RTB auctions.
method Formalized as a constrained optimization problem, proposed augmented MMKP solution.
result Our strategy outperforms state-of-the-art methods in real applications.
Efficient methods estimate bid and value distributions in auctions.
problem Estimating bid and value distributions in auctions with limited information.
method Non-parametric estimation algorithms for first- and second-price auctions.
result Uniform estimation bounds for bid and value distributions, independent of distributions being estimated.
New algorithms reduce regret in online learning with partial feedback.
problem Reducing regret in online learning with partial feedback.
method Combining chaining and auction theory, designed algorithms for different feedback models.
result Improved regret bounds for semi-Lipschitz losses and second-price auctions.
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
problem Understanding price impact in equity auctions.
method High-quality data analysis of Paris stock exchange auctions.
result Price impact is linear up to a large volume, then becomes non-linear.
Study reveals patterns in US stock opening and closing auctions.
problem Investigating the dynamics of US equities opening and closing auctions.
method Analysis of historical data and conditional analysis of auction prices.
result Opening and closing auctions have distinct price reactions to order placements/cancellations.
Ad exchanges use CORP to set reserve prices against strategic buyers.
problem Setting optimal reserve prices in ad exchanges with strategic buyers.
method Proposes CORP policy to learn and set reserve prices robustly.
result Achieves sublinear regret in unknown noise distribution.
Strategic traders adjust indicative prices near auctions to achieve nearly diffusive outcomes.
problem Achieving diffusive price behavior in Paris Stock Exchange auctions.
method Analyzing the diffusive properties of indicative auction prices and the strategic behavior of traders.
result Strategic traders adjust their order submission times to achieve nearly diffusive price behavior.
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
problem Comparing the learning difficulty of uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions.
method Characterization of learning difficulty through regret minimization in both full-information and bandit feedback settings.
result Regret scales similarly for both auction formats under full-information, but uniform-price auctions can achieve faster learning rates.
Study adapts liquidity model to equity auctions, revealing accelerated event rates and reduced price impact.
problem Understanding and predicting price dynamics in equity auctions.
method Adapted latent/revealed order book framework to equity auctions, measuring order submissions, cancellations, and diffusion rates.
result Equity auctions exhibit accelerated event rates leading to reduced price impact and decreased volatility.
The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
problem Strategic traders exploit accumulated information to delay their orders, distorting auction efficiency.
method Randomizing auction closing times and designing optimal transaction fees policies.
result Policies encourage strategic traders to send orders earlier, improving auction market efficiency.
Optimal auction duration affects price formation in markets.
problem Improving price formation in auction markets.
method Derived the optimal auction duration and analyzed its impact on price formation.
result Optimal auction durations are from 2 to 10 minutes, improving price formation.
Study on stochastic one-sided full-information bandit problem.
problem Online repeated second-price auctions with unknown reward distributions.
method Elimination-based algorithm with distribution independent and dependent regret bounds.
result Achieves optimal theoretical regret bounds for the problem.
MiFID II impacts European stock liquidity and price formation.
problem Impact of MiFID II on European stock liquidity and price formation.
method Analyzed effects of MiFID II on European stock markets, focusing on intraday and closing auction liquidity and tick size changes.
result Closing auction volumes increased and price formation became more efficient after MiFID II.
Study optimal pricing algorithms for strategic buyers in repeated auctions.
problem Optimizing revenue in auctions with strategic buyers over multiple rounds.
method Proposed a novel algorithm that never decreases prices and has a strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T).
result Closed the open research question on no-regret horizon-independent weakly consistent pricing.
Deep RNN predicts vehicle license plate auction prices with high accuracy.
problem Predicting the auction price of vehicle license plates with desirable numbers.
method Constructed a deep recurrent neural network (RNN) to predict prices based on license plate characters.
result Deep RNN predictions explain over 80 percent of price variations, significantly outperforming previous models.
This study evaluates price improvements in order flow auctions on Ethereum.
problem Improving trading outcomes in blockchain-based trading platforms.
method Utilized open-source tools to attribute price improvements to specific system inputs.
result Auction-enhanced interfaces can provide statistically significant improvements in trading outcomes, averaging 4-5 basis points.
Algorithm learns to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback.
problem Learning to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with incomplete feedback.
method Developed an algorithm exploiting the specific feedback structure and payoff function of first-price auctions.
result Achieved a near-optimal O ~ ( T ) \widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) O ( T ) regret bound for first-price auctions. The paper proposes a new method to forecast winning prices in real-time bidding.
problem Accurately forecasting winning prices in real-time bidding with limited data.
method The paper introduces a heteroscedastic fully parametric censored regression approach and a mixture density censored network.
result The proposed method significantly improves winning price forecasting compared to existing methods.
Model predicts daily closing price distributions in call auctions.
problem Predicting price distributions in financial markets.
method Modeling price formation in call auctions with random orders and equilibrium equation.
result Model accurately predicts daily closing price distributions for financial indices.
A new pricing strategy minimizes regret by controlling strategic buyer behavior.
problem Designing a pricing policy for strategic buyers with limited seller information.
method Phased-structure policy with randomized isolation periods.
result Regret of T T T -period O ~ ( T ) \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) O ( T ) against a benchmark policy. We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent M / M / 1 M/M/1 M / M /1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
Improved learning algorithm for first-price auctions reduces regret significantly.
problem Challenges in learning optimal bidding strategies for first-price auctions.
method Introduced novel ideas to achieve lower regret in sequential learning.
result Achieved l o g 2 ( T ) log^2(T) l o g 2 ( T ) regret when opponents' bid distribution is known, and T 1 / 3 + ε T^{1/3+ ε} T 1/3 + ε regret in learning case. New algorithm optimizes auction prices in real-time.
problem Maximizing revenue in online auctions with high frequency data.
method First real-time algorithm for online learning of monopoly prices.
result Achieves constant time and memory complexity for updates.
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
problem Efficiency and fairness in Dutch auctions on blockchains.
method Modeling Dutch auctions with Poisson process and geometric Brownian motion, computing expected losses and time-to-fill.
result Tradeoff between speed and quality in Dutch auctions, useful for setting parameters.
Optimizes bidding in hourly and quarter-hourly electricity markets to reduce price impact.
problem Maximizing profit in two consecutive electricity markets with market impact and transaction costs.
method Examined multiple price scenarios, estimated market impact, used trading strategies, provided theoretical results.
result Minimizing price impact is more profitable than maximizing arbitrage in the German EPEX market.
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
We study the statistical regularities of opening call auction using the ultra-high-frequency data of 22 liquid stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2003. The distribution of the relative price, defined as the relative difference between the order price in opening call auction and the closing price of last tr…
New approach considers a buyer with no-regret learning to optimize seller's revenue.
problem Optimizing revenue for a seller selling to a buyer with no-regret learning.
method Analyzes different learning algorithms for the buyer and corresponding optimal auctions for the seller.
result Seller can achieve optimal revenue by setting decreasing reserves over time, surpassing truthful auctions.
We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant. Moreover, it explicitly supplies a construction for a finite minimal set of possible bids on which such a sum is not …
The private car license plates issued in Shanghai are bestowed the title of "the most expensive sheet iron all over the world", more expensive than gold. A citizen has to bid in an monthly auction to obtain a license plate for his new private car. We perform statistical analysis to investigate the influence of the mini…
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions …