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A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,742 papers · 148 categories

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48 results for liquidity incentives

We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.

problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.

dYdX updates liquidity provider incentives to enhance trading efficiency.

problem Incentivizing liquidity providers to maintain efficient market structures.
method Analyzed various metrics (makerVolume, depths, spreads) and used historical trades to update the LP Incentives Programme.
result Updated the LP Incentives Programme to encourage more active and efficient liquidity.

Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.

problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.

This study examines how DMMs affect market liquidity and competition.

problem The impact of DMMs on market liquidity and competition.
method Agent-based simulations to explore the effects of varying competition levels and incentive structures among DMMs.
result Optimal competition among DMMs maximizes liquidity benefits without negatively impacting price discovery.

PoEL protocol aims to efficiently create and secure liquidity for blockchain networks.

problem Lack of sustainable liquidity and network security in Proof of Stake blockchains.
method PoEL uses staking rewards to attract risk capital, structuring incentives for capital efficiency and security.
result PoEL protocol enhances blockchain network security and liquidity sustainability.

This paper examines how institutional liquidity affects prediction markets.

problem How institutional liquidity impacts prediction markets and their quality.
method Defines a market-quality lens, separates channels, and uses synthetic microstructure lab.
result Institutional liquidity does not necessarily translate to equal gains for all traders.

Paper analyzes liquidity for everlasting options in DeFi, offering strategies to reduce costs.

problem Challenges of perpetual derivatives in decentralized finance markets.
method Dynamic proactive market maker model, simulations, hedging strategies.
result Liquidity providers can achieve net positive PnL with effective strategies.

Study on time-zero efficiency of European power derivatives markets using statistical tests and trading rules.

problem Assessing time-zero efficiency in European power derivatives markets.
method Statistical tests based on the law of one price and trading rules based on price differentials and no-arbitrage violations applied to daily data of three European power markets.
result Definite conclusions on time-zero efficiency are not possible for French and Spanish markets due to liquidity and representativeness challenges.

Financial exchanges provide incentives for limit order book (LOB) liquidity provision to certain market participants, termed designated market makers or designated sponsors. While quoting requirements typically enforce the activity of these participants for a certain portion of the day, we argue that liquidity demand t…

2015-08-18abs ↗pdf ↗

This paper analyzes liquidations in DeFi protocols, showing how price volatility can lead to significant losses.

problem Price volatility undermines overcollateralization in DeFi protocols, leading to potential losses.
method Empirical analysis of Compound's PLFs, examining participants' behavior and risk-appetite.
result Price volatility can result in over 10m USD becoming liquidable with only 3% price change.

This paper optimizes liquidity provision in automated market makers using auction theory.

problem Optimizing profit for a monopolist liquidity provider in automated market makers.
method Introduces a Bayesian-like belief inference framework to model AMMs, characterizes profit-maximizing strategies using Myerson's optimal auction theory.
result Characterizes the optimal demand curve and payments for an IC AMM, revealing a bid-ask spread caused by asymmetry and monopoly pricing.

We consider the problem of designing a derivatives exchange aiming at addressing clients needs in terms of listed options and providing suitable liquidity. We proceed into two steps. First we use a quantization method to select the options that should be displayed by the exchange. Then, using a principal-agent approach…

2019-09-19abs ↗pdf ↗

Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.

problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.

Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.

problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.

Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.

problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.

We propose a model of inter-bank lending and borrowing which takes into account clearing debt obligations. The evolution of log-monetary reserves of NN banks is described by coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in their drifts. Banks are minimizing their finite-horizon objective functions which take into a…

2016-07-21abs ↗pdf ↗

No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.

problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.

A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.

problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.

The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.

problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.

Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.

problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.

This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.

problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.

How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…

2018-06-04abs ↗pdf ↗

Study optimizes health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.

problem Designing health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
method Inverse behavioral optimization framework integrating QALY-based incentives and adaptive learning.
result Modern health systems operate near an efficiency-saturated frontier, with small fairness adjustments yielding diminishing returns.

Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.

problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.

Study shows ethanol blends and incentives can significantly reduce transportation carbon emissions.

problem Rapid growth in electric vehicles requires complementary strategies to decarbonize transportation.
method Analysis of ethanol blending, regulatory incentives, and economic assessments.
result Ethanol blending, especially E15 and E85, can substantially reduce carbon emissions and provide economic benefits.

When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…

2013-06-12abs ↗pdf ↗

Study shows visual feedback and monetary incentives reduce plugload energy consumption in commercial buildings.

problem Mitigating energy consumption in commercial buildings through occupant plugload control.
method Field experiments with visual feedback and monetary incentives in government and university buildings.
result Mean energy reduction of ~9.52% in office environments and ~21.61% in university environments with visual feedback.

The study compares M6 competitors' performance to industry benchmarks and discusses incentives for investment managers.

problem Investors seek to understand the performance and skill of M6 competitors beyond the competition's metrics.
method Comparative analysis using financial metrics, factor models, and new strategies.
result Most competitors do not generate significant out-performance compared to industry benchmarks, but some show skill in recent performance.

COBRA addresses strategic behavior in online platforms by ensuring truthful reporting without monetary incentives.

problem Ensuring truthful reporting from strategic agents in online platforms.
method Proposes COBRA, an algorithm for contextual bandits involving strategic agents that disincentivizes strategic behavior.
result COBRA achieves sub-linear regret guarantee and incentive compatibility without monetary incentives.

Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.

problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves ildeO(T) ilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment.

Study incentive efficiency in monopoly insurance markets with hidden information.

problem Maximizing social welfare in a monopoly insurance market with hidden agent types.
method Maximizes social welfare function subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
result Optimal menus of contracts depend on the level of social welfare weight and agent risk attitudes.

Forward hedging reshapes incentive provision in firms.

problem How does forward hedging affect incentive provision in firms?
method We consider a CARA framework to jointly characterize optimal production, compensation, and static hedging in equilibrium.
result Delegation and external hedging are partial substitutes, and delegation can increase firm value even when the agent is more risk averse.

Centralized exchanges influence staking behavior and decentralization in Proof of Stake blockchain ecosystems.

problem How do centralized exchanges affect staking behavior and decentralization in Proof of Stake blockchain ecosystems?
method Formulate a continuous-time mean field model of miners as validators and traders in a centralized market.
result Centralized trading activities enhance staking participation and promote decentralization through market incentives.