A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
We consider the problem of finding stationary Nash equilibria (NE) in a finite discounted general-sum stochastic game. We first generalize a non-linear optimization problem from Filar and Vrieze [2004] to a N-player setting and break down this problem into simpler sub-problems that ensure there is no Bellman error fo…
We show by counterexample that policy-gradient algorithms have no guarantees of even local convergence to Nash equilibria in continuous action and state space multi-agent settings. To do so, we analyze gradient-play in N-player general-sum linear quadratic games, a classic game setting which is recently emerging as a b…
New learning dynamics achieve fast convergence in games without needing to know utility scales.
problem Fast convergence guarantees in learning games require prior knowledge of utility scales.
method Developed scale-free and scale-invariant learning dynamics using optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader with adaptive learning rates and clipping techniques.
result Achieved fast convergence rates to Nash and correlated equilibria without prior utility scale knowledge.
This paper addresses the problem of multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL) in a two-player general-sum stochastic game framework. Five variants of MIRL are considered: uCS-MIRL, advE-MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL, each distinguished by its solution concept. Problem uCS-MIRL is a cooperative game in…
Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing reinforcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable only in small state-action spaces or other simplified settings. Here, we develop a new data efficient Deep-Q-learning method…
We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical systems theory. For both general-sum and potential games, we characterize a non…
This paper tackles sample-efficient reinforcement learning for partially observable Markov games.
problem Learning in partially observable Markov games with incomplete information.
method A simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for self-play, and a variant of optimistic MLE for adversarial opponents.
result The proposed algorithms achieve approximate Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria in polynomial samples for weakly revealing POMGs.
Almost all of the work in graphical models for game theory has mirrored previous work in probabilistic graphical models. Our work considers the opposite direction: Taking advantage of recent advances in equilibrium computation for probabilistic inference. We present formulations of inference problems in Markov random f…
Can machine learning models for recommendation be easily fooled? While the question has been answered for hand-engineered fake user profiles, it has not been explored for machine learned adversarial attacks. This paper attempts to close this gap. We propose a framework for generating fake user profiles which, when inco…
In the last few years, deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) has become a highly active area of research. A particularly challenging class of problems in this area is partially observable, cooperative, multi-agent learning, in which teams of agents must learn to coordinate their behaviour while conditioning only…
In this work, we ask the following question: Can visual analogies, learned in an unsupervised way, be used in order to transfer knowledge between pairs of games and even play one game using an agent trained for another game? We attempt to answer this research question by creating visual analogies between a pair of game…
Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This note introduces graphical…
We introduce a topological combinatorial game called the Region Smoothing Swap Game. The game is played on a game board derived from the connected shadow of a link diagram on a (possibly non-orientable) surface by smoothing at crossings. Moves in the game are performed on regions of the diagram and can switch the direc…
We present a new general board game (GBG) playing and learning framework. GBG defines the common interfaces for board games, game states and their AI agents. It allows one to run competitions of different agents on different games. It standardizes those parts of board game playing and learning that otherwise would be t…
Just as war is sometimes fallaciously represented as a zero sum game -- when in fact war is a negative sum game - stock market trading, a positive sum game over time, is often erroneously represented as a zero sum game. This is called the "zero sum fallacy" -- the erroneous belief that one trader in a stock market exch…