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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,695 papers · 148 categories

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14274154 · Feb 202019922001200920172026
48 results for general-sum games

This paper tackles learning Stackelberg equilibrium in asymmetric games efficiently from noisy samples.

problem Learning Stackelberg equilibrium in asymmetric, general-sum games efficiently from noisy samples.
method The paper initiates the theoretical study of sample-efficient learning of the Stackelberg equilibrium in bandit feedback setting.
result Sharp positive results on sample-efficient learning of Stackelberg equilibrium with value optimal up to a fundamental gap identified.

Algorithm finds ε-equilibrium policies for multi-agent Markov games with hidden low-rank structure.

problem Designing efficient algorithms for multi-agent Markov games with unknown representation and hidden low-rank structure.
method Model-based and model-free approaches using representation learning to construct an effective representation from data.
result Achieves poly(H,d,A,1/ε)(H,d,A,1/\varepsilon) sample complexity for both model-based and model-free approaches.

New RL algorithms find SNE in Markov games with myopic followers.

problem Finding SNE in Markov games with myopic followers.
method Optimistic and pessimistic variants of least-squares value iteration, incorporating function approximation.
result First provably efficient RL algorithms for SNEs in general-sum Markov games with myopic followers.

Algorithm minimizes regret and converges to equilibria in Markov games.

problem Regret minimization and convergence to equilibria in general-sum Markov games under adversarial opponents.
method Decentralized algorithm that uses policy optimization and controls path length to achieve sublinear regret.
result Sublinear regret guarantees for convergence to correlated equilibrium in Markov games.

This paper improves sample efficiency for learning equilibria in multi-player games.

problem Sample-efficient learning of equilibria in games with many players.
method Designs algorithms for learning CCE and CE with polynomial sample complexity in the number of players.
result First to show polynomial sample complexity for learning CCE and CE in multi-player games.

New learning dynamics achieve fast convergence in games without needing to know utility scales.

problem Fast convergence guarantees in learning games require prior knowledge of utility scales.
method Developed scale-free and scale-invariant learning dynamics using optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader with adaptive learning rates and clipping techniques.
result Achieved fast convergence rates to Nash and correlated equilibria without prior utility scale knowledge.

Efficient reinforcement learning for simultaneous-move zero-sum games using optimistic value iteration.

problem Learning optimal strategies in simultaneous-move zero-sum Markov games with function approximation.
method Developed an optimistic variant of least-squares minimax value iteration algorithm for offline and online settings.
result Achieved an upper bound of ildeO(d3H3T) ilde O(\sqrt{d^3 H^3 T}) on duality gap and regret.

Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing reinforcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable only in small state-action spaces or other simplified settings. Here, we develop a new data efficient Deep-Q-learning method…

2019-04-23abs ↗pdf ↗

We introduce CSE for MLSF games and devise online learning algorithms for achieving no-external Stackelberg-regret.

problem Learning equilibrium in leader-follower games with noisy bandit feedback.
method Proposed Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium (CSE) and online learning algorithms balancing exploration and exploitation.
result Achieves no-external Stackelberg-regret, converging to approximate CSE.

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical systems theory. For both general-sum and potential games, we characterize a non…

2018-04-16abs ↗pdf ↗

R2-B2 optimizes game interactions with recursive reasoning.

problem Optimizing interactions between boundedly rational agents with unknown payoff functions.
method Recursive Reasoning-Based Bayesian Optimization (R2-B2) for repeated games.
result R2-B2 achieves faster asymptotic convergence to no regret than non-recursive methods.

Paper solves learning imperfect-information games with fewer episodes.

problem Learning imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback.
method Balanced Online Mirror Descent and Balanced Counterfactual Regret Minimization algorithms.
result Achieves near-optimal sample complexity for finding approximate Nash equilibria.

This work presents a game-theoretic method for AVs that handles imperfect communication and individual rewards.

problem Real-time, imperfect communication and individual rewards in multi-agent interactions.
method Game-theoretic approach that allows for imperfect communication and individual rewards.
result More realistic assumptions lead to better reward inference and prediction of future actions.

Algorithm solves online binary classification and infinite games using ERM oracle.

problem Online learning and solving infinite games with computationally inefficient oracles.
method Proposes an algorithm relying solely on ERM oracle calls for online binary classification and nonparametric games.
result Achieves finite and sublinearly growing regret in various settings.

This paper tackles sample-efficient reinforcement learning for partially observable Markov games.

problem Learning in partially observable Markov games with incomplete information.
method A simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for self-play, and a variant of optimistic MLE for adversarial opponents.
result The proposed algorithms achieve approximate Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria in polynomial samples for weakly revealing POMGs.

New approach tackles non-stationary multi-agent games with black-box methods.

problem Challenges in learning equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems.
method Versatile black-box approach applicable to various games, including general-sum, potential, and Markov games.
result Achieves optimal regret bounds for non-stationary games, with or without knowledge of total variation.

Paper develops efficient algorithms for learning rationalizable equilibria in multiplayer games.

problem Learning rationalizable behavior in multiplayer games under bandit feedback.
method New algorithms for finding rationalizable Coarse Correlated Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria with polynomial sample complexity.
result Achieved polynomial sample complexity for learning rationalizable equilibria, improving over existing exponential complexity.

Novel algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning reduce sample complexity.

problem Efficiently learning Nash equilibria in multi-agent settings.
method Information-Directed Sampling (IDS) principles applied to multi-agent reinforcement learning.
result Sample-efficient algorithms for learning Nash equilibria in various multi-agent settings.

Almost all of the work in graphical models for game theory has mirrored previous work in probabilistic graphical models. Our work considers the opposite direction: Taking advantage of recent advances in equilibrium computation for probabilistic inference. We present formulations of inference problems in Markov random f…

2016-04-10abs ↗pdf ↗

Improved model-based reinforcement learning for multi-agent Markov games.

problem Suboptimal sample complexity for model-based algorithms in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
method Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI) for two-player zero-sum Markov games.
result First model-based algorithm matching information-theoretic lower bound with improved sample complexity.

New research shows no-regret learning is impossible in Markov games under certain assumptions.

problem Achieving no-regret learning in decentralized Markov games.
method Novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning to prove lower bounds.
result No polynomial-time algorithm exists for independent no-regret learning in general-sum Markov games.

New algorithms achieve near-optimal cumulative loss in nonparametric online learning and games.

problem Fast rates of convergence in nonparametric online regression and classification.
method Randomized proper learning algorithms, hierarchical aggregation, multi-scale extension, stability proof.
result Achieved near-optimal cumulative loss bounds for real-valued and binary games.

Maker-taker fees can prevent algorithmic cooperation in market making, but not always.

problem Unexpected cooperation among independent algorithms in market making.
method Modeling market making as a repeated game, experimental analysis of transaction costs and rebates.
result Maker-taker fee models can destabilize cooperation, but not always with a specific relationship between costs and rebates.

Agents learn to give rewards to others in a shared learning environment.

problem How to encourage cooperation among RL agents in a shared environment.
method Each agent learns a reward function to influence others, optimizing for its own and others' extrinsic objectives.
result Agents significantly outperform standard RL in Markov games, often finding near-optimal division of labor.

New learning dynamics adapt to corrupted games, improving performance in real-world scenarios.

problem Learning dynamics in games are limited to honest players, ignoring real-world corruption.
method Adaptive learning dynamics that adapt to player deviations from prescribed algorithms.
result Learning dynamics achieve better performance in corrupted games, matching honest regime bounds.

Can machine learning models for recommendation be easily fooled? While the question has been answered for hand-engineered fake user profiles, it has not been explored for machine learned adversarial attacks. This paper attempts to close this gap. We propose a framework for generating fake user profiles which, when inco…

2018-09-21abs ↗pdf ↗

The paper analyzes RL in high-frequency market making with theoretical and practical implications.

problem Applying RL to high-frequency market making with theoretical rigor.
method Theoretical analysis bridging RL and financial economics, focusing on sampling frequency effects.
result An interesting tradeoff between error and complexity in RL algorithms as sampling frequency decreases.

Algorithm improves RL model selection for repeated games with utility maximization.

problem Optimal policy learning in repeated games with unknown opponent strategy.
method Proposes MRBEAR for average reward RL, applying to utility maximization in repeated games.
result Regret bound shows linear dependence on number of model classes in average reward RL.

In the last few years, deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) has become a highly active area of research. A particularly challenging class of problems in this area is partially observable, cooperative, multi-agent learning, in which teams of agents must learn to coordinate their behaviour while conditioning only…

2019-02-11abs ↗pdf ↗

V-learning tackles multiagent reinforcement learning by reducing sample complexity.

problem Curse of multiagents in multiagent reinforcement learning.
method V-learning is a fully decentralized algorithm that learns Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria.
result V-learning achieves sample complexity that scales with the maximum number of actions per agent, not the joint action space.

Paper presents content-based models for game recommendation in cold start scenarios.

problem Cold start problem in game recommendation where new games and players have no historical data.
method Uses survey data to develop content-based interaction models that generalize to new games, players, and both.
result Content models outperform collaborative filtering in predicting new interactions.

Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This note introduces graphical…

2015-05-06abs ↗pdf ↗

IGGP learns game rules from varying quality game play, finding no overall trend.

problem Learn game rules from varying quality game play.
method Used Sancho's intelligent game traces and ILP systems (Metagol, Aleph, ILASP) to induce game rules from traces of varying quality and volume.
result No overall trend in accuracy of learned game rules from varying quality and volume of training data.

We introduce a topological combinatorial game called the Region Smoothing Swap Game. The game is played on a game board derived from the connected shadow of a link diagram on a (possibly non-orientable) surface by smoothing at crossings. Moves in the game are performed on regions of the diagram and can switch the direc…

2019-09-26abs ↗pdf ↗