A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
Efficient verified double auctions improve matching speed and detect errors.
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for…
We formalize and verify double auctions for multiple-quantity trades.
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, …
Formal methods verify continuous auctions at exchanges.
The study classifies and imitates trading agents in financial markets.
In this paper, the survival function of waiting times between orders and the corresponding trades in a double-auction market is studied both by means of experiments and of empirical data. It turns out that, already at the level of order durations, the survival function cannot be represented by a single exponential, thu…
We consider a simplified model of the continuous double auction where prices are integers varying from to with limit orders and market orders, but quantity per order limited to a single share. For this model, the order process is equivalent to two queues. We study the behaviour of the auction in the low…
Developed scalable ABM for complex financial markets.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
We introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange is where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. These days, all big exchanges use computer algorithms that implement double sided auctions to match buy and sell requests and these algorithms must abide by certain regulator…
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyze it using simulation, dimensional analy…
In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens …
Statistical properties of order-driven double-auction markets with Bid-Ask spread are investigated through the dynamical quantities such as response function. We first attempt to utilize the so-called {\it Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans model} (MRR for short) to simulate the stochastic process of the price-change in empir…
The ultimate value of theories of the fundamental mechanisms comprising the asset price in financial systems will be reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidences from the fields of finance, ma…
We present a general Markovian framework for order book modeling. Through our approach, we aim at providing a tool enabling to get a better understanding of the price formation process and of the link between microscopic and macroscopic features of financial assets. To do so, we propose a new method of order book repre…
We introduce and treat rigorously a new multi-agent model of the continuous double auction or in other words the order book (OB). It is designed to explain collective behaviour of the market when new information affecting the market arrives. The novel feature of the model is two additional slow changing parameters, the…
Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs. We ask whether it is possible, instead, for loyalty to arise spontaneously, and…
Formally verifies fairness and uniformity in financial market trades.
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for - price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
Optimizes bidding strategy for Maker Protocol auctions.
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
In this study, we present a simple stochastic order-book model for investors' swarm behaviors seen in the continuous double auction mechanism, which is employed by major global exchanges. Our study shows a characteristic called "fat tail" is seen in the data obtained from our model that incorporates the investors' swar…
The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
We give a stochastic microscopic modelling of stock markets driven by continuous double auction. If we take into account the mimetic behavior of traders, when they place limit order, our virtual markets shows the power-law tail of the distribution of returns with the exponent outside the Levy stable region, the short m…
We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction price reacts to a single auction order placement or can…
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
Study on heavy tails in closing auction returns, explaining imbalance through limit order submission.
Study proposes a machine learning method for bid shading in first-price auctions.
In the last three decades, we have seen a significant increase in trading goods and services through online auctions. However, this business created an attractive environment for malicious moneymakers who can commit different types of fraud activities, such as Shill Bidding (SB). The latter is predominant across many a…
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
Optimal bidding strategy for multi-platform ad auctions under budget constraints.
Paper addresses selection bias in online advertising auctions.
MiFID II impacts European stock liquidity and price formation.
New algorithm optimizes auction prices in real-time.
Study adapts liquidity model to equity auctions, revealing accelerated event rates and reduced price impact.
Proposes a framework for modeling RTB auctions using point processes.
Paper proposes auction method for smart derivatives to avoid disputes.
The paper examines how builders in Ethereum auctions can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities, affecting searchers' bidding strategies.
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets…
Deep network optimizes ad bidding for first-price auctions.
Optimizes reserve prices for first-price auctions to maximize revenue.
We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios. 1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative. 2. We formulat…
Algorithm learns to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback.
Permutation-equivariant neural networks improve auction mechanisms by reducing regret and sample complexity.
Efficient methods estimate bid and value distributions in auctions.