Efficient verified double auctions improve matching speed and detect errors.
problem Improving the efficiency and reliability of double auctions in financial markets.
method Formally verified implementation using Coq proof assistant, reducing time complexity and improving error detection.
result Improved efficiency with O(nlogn) time complexity, reducing runtime from days to minutes. Paper analyzes bidding strategies in smart grid PDAs, proposing a new method that outperforms existing strategies.
problem Optimizing bidding strategies in smart grid PDAs to balance energy demand effectively.
method Theoretical analysis of double auctions, derivation of best response, and modeling as an MDP.
result Proposed MDPLCPBS strategy outperforms existing strategies in the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA.
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
We formalize and verify double auctions for multiple-quantity trades.
problem Matching multiple-quantity trade requests in double auctions.
method Formalized algorithms, correctness proofs, Coq proof assistant, verified OCaml and Haskell programs.
result Automatic detection of violations in exchange systems.
Study of a simplified auction model's price distribution and first passage times in low traffic.
problem Analyzing the price distribution and first passage times in a simplified continuous double auction model.
method Modeling the auction as two M/M/1 queues and studying the low-traffic limit.
result Exact distribution of prices in the low-traffic limit and reasonable approximation for low order arrival rates.
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, …
Formal methods verify continuous auctions at exchanges.
problem Ensuring fairness and correctness in continuous auctions.
method Formal specification, design, and verification of continuous double auctions.
result A verified algorithm satisfies natural properties of auctions.
The study classifies and imitates trading agents in financial markets.
problem Classifying and imitating trading agents in continuous double auctions.
method Developed an agent-based model for trading, applied opponent modeling for classification, and used behavioral cloning for imitation.
result Techniques for classification and imitation were experimentally compared and evaluated.
In this paper, the survival function of waiting times between orders and the corresponding trades in a double-auction market is studied both by means of experiments and of empirical data. It turns out that, already at the level of order durations, the survival function cannot be represented by a single exponential, thu…
Formal framework verifies fairness, uniformity, and rationality in financial market trades.
problem Ensuring fairness, uniformity, and rationality in financial market trades.
method Formal definition and proof of properties in a theorem prover (Coq).
result Formal verification of double-sided auctions in financial markets.
Developed scalable ABM for complex financial markets.
problem Simulating large-scale agent-based financial markets.
method Agent-based modeling, distributed computing, continuous double auction.
result Captures statistical properties of real financial markets.
We develop a new framework to understand price formation in financial markets.
problem Understanding the dynamics of financial markets and the relationship between micro and macro features.
method A general Markovian framework for order book modeling, including state dependency and non-instantaneous impact of order book updates.
result The price process converges to a Brownian motion under general assumptions.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
Loyalty emerges in markets through repeated interaction and adaptation.
problem Can loyalty arise spontaneously in markets?
method Stylized model of double auction markets with adaptive traders.
result Segregated market states are stable and provide higher rewards.
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyze it using simulation, dimensional analy…
Statistical properties of order-driven double-auction markets with Bid-Ask spread are investigated through the dynamical quantities such as response function. We first attempt to utilize the so-called {\it Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans model} (MRR for short) to simulate the stochastic process of the price-change in empir…
The paper develops a dynamic theory of supply and demand that explains price sensitivity in financial markets.
problem The standard Walrasian auction theory does not account for the impact of transactions on prices.
method Develops a dynamic theory based on agents with heterogeneous beliefs, allowing for continuous time transactions.
result Price sensitivity in financial markets is quadratic, not linear, due to market clearing.
The ultimate value of theories of the fundamental mechanisms comprising the asset price in financial systems will be reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidences from the fields of finance, ma…
We introduce and treat rigorously a new multi-agent model of the continuous double auction or in other words the order book (OB). It is designed to explain collective behaviour of the market when new information affecting the market arrives. The novel feature of the model is two additional slow changing parameters, the…
Formally verifies fairness and uniformity in financial market trades.
problem Ensuring fairness and uniformity in automated trading systems.
method Formal definition and verification in Coq proof assistant.
result Properties of double-sided auction mechanisms verified.
Exact solution found for k-price auctions, introducing a new fair auction type.
problem Finding fair solutions for auction mechanisms.
method Exact analytical solution for k-price auctions and introduction of a new auction type.
result New auction type provides fair solutions.
Study optimal pricing algorithms for strategic buyers in repeated auctions.
problem Optimizing revenue in auctions with strategic buyers over multiple rounds.
method Proposed a novel algorithm that never decreases prices and has a strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T).
result Closed the open research question on no-regret horizon-independent weakly consistent pricing.
Optimizes bidding strategy for Maker Protocol auctions.
problem Minimizing costs in Maker Protocol auctions.
method Developed and optimized a bidding function using historical data.
result Most auctions end at higher prices than optimal recommendations.
In this study, we present a simple stochastic order-book model for investors' swarm behaviors seen in the continuous double auction mechanism, which is employed by major global exchanges. Our study shows a characteristic called "fat tail" is seen in the data obtained from our model that incorporates the investors' swar…
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
problem Understanding price impact in equity auctions.
method High-quality data analysis of Paris stock exchange auctions.
result Price impact is linear up to a large volume, then becomes non-linear.
Study reveals patterns in US stock opening and closing auctions.
problem Investigating the dynamics of US equities opening and closing auctions.
method Analysis of historical data and conditional analysis of auction prices.
result Opening and closing auctions have distinct price reactions to order placements/cancellations.
The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
problem Strategic traders exploit accumulated information to delay their orders, distorting auction efficiency.
method Randomizing auction closing times and designing optimal transaction fees policies.
result Policies encourage strategic traders to send orders earlier, improving auction market efficiency.
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
problem Comparing the learning difficulty of uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions.
method Characterization of learning difficulty through regret minimization in both full-information and bandit feedback settings.
result Regret scales similarly for both auction formats under full-information, but uniform-price auctions can achieve faster learning rates.
We give a stochastic microscopic modelling of stock markets driven by continuous double auction. If we take into account the mimetic behavior of traders, when they place limit order, our virtual markets shows the power-law tail of the distribution of returns with the exponent outside the Levy stable region, the short m…
Study creates a dataset for fraud detection in online auctions.
problem Difficulty in detecting Shill Bidding (SB) due to similarity with normal bidding.
method Scraped eBay auctions, preprocessed data, created SB dataset.
result Shared preprocessed auction dataset for fraud detection.
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
Study on heavy tails in closing auction returns, explaining imbalance through limit order submission.
problem Understanding heavy tails in closing auction return distributions.
method Used the stochastic call auction model of Derksen et al. (2020a) to derive and verify a relation between tail exponents.
result Large closing price fluctuations are not caused by large market orders, but by imbalance in limit orders.
Study proposes a machine learning method for bid shading in first-price auctions.
problem Maintaining strategy equilibrium in first-price auctions.
method Machine learning approach to model optimal bid shading.
result Demonstrates superiority and robustness of new approach across various metrics.
Strategic traders adjust indicative prices near auctions to achieve nearly diffusive outcomes.
problem Achieving diffusive price behavior in Paris Stock Exchange auctions.
method Analyzing the diffusive properties of indicative auction prices and the strategic behavior of traders.
result Strategic traders adjust their order submission times to achieve nearly diffusive price behavior.
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
problem Efficiency and fairness in Dutch auctions on blockchains.
method Modeling Dutch auctions with Poisson process and geometric Brownian motion, computing expected losses and time-to-fill.
result Tradeoff between speed and quality in Dutch auctions, useful for setting parameters.
Develops auction theory for real-life applications with positive valuations.
problem Real-life auction settings with positive valuations and interdependent bidders.
method Approximations using log-normal distribution, positive symmetric discrete distribution, and interdependent valuations.
result New auction theory results applicable to finance and procurement.
New method for causal inference in RTB advertising auctions.
problem Measuring the effectiveness of online advertising in RTB systems.
method Adapted Thompson sampling algorithm for causal inference.
result The method outperforms existing methods in estimating advertising effects.
Optimal bidding strategy for multi-platform ad auctions under budget constraints.
problem Optimizing ad placements for budget-constrained advertisers across multiple platforms.
method Developed an optimal bidding strategy for non-incentive-compatible auctions with budget constraints.
result Maximized total utility across auctions while satisfying budget constraints in expectation.
Paper addresses selection bias in online advertising auctions.
problem Selection bias affects auction truthfulness and advertiser profits.
method Theoretical analysis combined with multi-task learning.
result Selection bias can be significantly reduced using multi-task learning.
MiFID II impacts European stock liquidity and price formation.
problem Impact of MiFID II on European stock liquidity and price formation.
method Analyzed effects of MiFID II on European stock markets, focusing on intraday and closing auction liquidity and tick size changes.
result Closing auction volumes increased and price formation became more efficient after MiFID II.
New algorithm optimizes auction prices in real-time.
problem Maximizing revenue in online auctions with high frequency data.
method First real-time algorithm for online learning of monopoly prices.
result Achieves constant time and memory complexity for updates.
Study adapts liquidity model to equity auctions, revealing accelerated event rates and reduced price impact.
problem Understanding and predicting price dynamics in equity auctions.
method Adapted latent/revealed order book framework to equity auctions, measuring order submissions, cancellations, and diffusion rates.
result Equity auctions exhibit accelerated event rates leading to reduced price impact and decreased volatility.
Proposes a framework for modeling RTB auctions using point processes.
problem Modeling and optimizing repeated auctions in the RTB ecosystem.
method Develops a stochastic framework using point processes to model and optimize RTB auctions.
result The proposed framework can be approximated to a Poisson point process, enabling the use of established properties.
The paper examines how builders in Ethereum auctions can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities, affecting searchers' bidding strategies.
problem Commitment problem in Ethereum auctions where builders can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities.
method Modeling and analysis of searchers' bidding strategies and the resulting equilibrium, using libMEV dataset.
result The equilibrium is piecewise, with the cost of imperfect commitment depending on replicability and competition. There is sharp heterogeneity across MEV types.
Paper proposes auction method for smart derivatives to avoid disputes.
problem Disputes over derivative liquidation processes in smart contracts.
method Defines an auction type resolution for smart derivatives.
result Proposes a beneficial method for smart derivatives participants.
Study tackles online auctions with unknown values, achieving optimal regret bounds.
problem Online auctions with unknown good values and bandit feedback.
method Online learning approach with bandit feedback, stochastic and adversarial models.
result Achieves logarithmic and sublinear regret bounds in both models.
Optimizes auction mechanisms in e-commerce search ads to balance revenue and user experience.
problem Optimizing auction mechanisms in e-commerce search ads while maintaining quality users and ROI.
method Developed a practical convex optimization formulation and auction simulation system to estimate business indicators.
result Proper entropy regularization can maximize revenue while constraining other business indicators.
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets…