A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
Study on local convergence of min-max algorithms to differential equilibria on Riemannian manifolds.
problem Solving zero-sum differential games on Riemannian manifolds.
method Analysis of two simultaneous min-max algorithms, τ-GDA and τ-SGA, to differential Stackelberg and Nash equilibria, with conditions for linear convergence and asymptotic approximation.
result Established sufficient conditions for linear convergence of τ-GDA and demonstrated faster convergence of τ-SGA in some cases.
We consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions f…
Investigates portfolio selection among competitive agents with mean-variance preferences.
problem Optimizing portfolios with multi-agent competition and relative wealth comparison.
method Reformulated as a constrained, non-homogeneous stochastic linear-quadratic control problem; derived optimal feedback strategies; used decoupling techniques and fixed-point theory to solve nonlinear BSDEs.
result Characterized three scenarios based on market and competition parameters: unique Nash equilibrium, no Nash equilibrium, or infinitely many Nash equilibria.
Study on optimal trading in a finite population with market frictions and asymmetric information.
problem Optimal trading in a finite population with market frictions and asymmetric information.
method Investigates stochastic differential games with asymmetric information and market frictions, proving existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg-Nash equilibria.
result Existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in both unconstrained and constrained trading scenarios.
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games, for which we refer as \emph{deep fictitious play}, a multi-stage learning pro…
We propose a deep neural network-based algorithm to identify the Markovian Nash equilibrium of general large N-player stochastic differential games. Following the idea of fictitious play, we recast the N-player game into N decoupled decision problems (one for each player) and solve them iteratively. The individua…
This paper develops a new methodology for studying continuous-time Nash equilibrium in a financial market with asymmetrically informed agents. This approach allows us to lift the restriction of risk neutrality imposed on market makers by the current literature. It turns out that, when the market makers are risk averse,…
We analyze a market impact game between n risk averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact model with permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and drift, are allowed to vary stochastically. Our first main result characterizes the Nash equilibrium in t…
We propose local symplectic surgery, a two-timescale procedure for finding local Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We first show that previous gradient-based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to local Nash equilibria due to the existence of non-Nash stationary points. By taking advantage of the differ…
In this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity…
We propose a model of inter-bank lending and borrowing which takes into account clearing debt obligations. The evolution of log-monetary reserves of N banks is described by coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in their drifts. Banks are minimizing their finite-horizon objective functions which take into a…
A game-theoretic analysis of DEX competition through dynamic trading fees.
problem Competition between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and their impact on trading fees and slippage.
method Characterization of an approximate Nash equilibrium via coupled system of partial differential equations and closed-form expressions for equilibrium fees.
result The equilibrium trading fees shift from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates under competition.
Study improves L∞ estimates and extreme value behavior in stochastic differential games.
problem Analyzing the mean-field limit of diffusive games through master equation.
method Using the Master Equation to approximate state processes and establishing L∞ estimates for the total error.
result Established No∞ asymptotic behavior of upper order statistics of Nash states, initiating Extreme Value Theory for stochastic differential games.
In his lectures at College de France, P.L. Lions introduced the concept of Master equation, see [5] for Mean Field Games. It is introduced in a heuristic fashion, from the system of partial differential equations, associated to a Nash equilibrium for a large, but finite, number of players. The method, also explained in…
In this paper we review our earlier work on quantum computing and the Nash Equilibrium, in particular, tracing the history of the discovery of new Nash Equilibria and then reviewing the ways in which quantum computing may be expected to generate new classes of Nash equilibria. We then extend this work through a substan…
We study an infinite-horizon discrete-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. A new method, which we call the iterative approach, is developed to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. When the discount function induces decreasing impatience, we establish the existence of an equilibrium through …
Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a `local Nash equilibrium` (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash equilibrium (NE), which implies that there are no guarantees on the quality of the found…