arXiv research

In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we consider the problem of pricing American game contingent claims by the utility maximiza…

We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.

In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A continuous-action graphical game can possibly have an uncountable set of Nash euqilibria. We p…

We introduce a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time in the framework of the game-theoretic probability established by Shafer and Vovk (Probability and Finance: It's Only a Game! (2001) Wiley). In our formulation, the market moves continuously, but an investor trades in discrete times, which can dep…

Models analyze strategic risk-taking in continuous action games.

We study multistep Bayesian betting strategies in coin-tossing games in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We show that by a countable mixture of these strategies, a gambler or an investor can exploit arbitrary patterns of deviations of nature's moves from independent Bernoulli trial…

The paper proposes a method to learn the structure of continuous-action games with non-parametric utilities using a limited number of samples.

Study proves value of non-Markovian games with partial, asymmetric info.

Motivated by the recent applications of game-theoretical learning techniques to the design of distributed control systems, we study a class of control problems that can be formulated as potential games with continuous action sets, and we propose an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm that provably converges t…

This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's value to be continuous with respect to the time horizon are obtained using recent …

Study policy gradient for large-agent mean-field control and game in continuous time.

Gradient-based methods for games suffer from discrete update steps that cause drift, affecting performance.

We show that the shortfall risk of binomial approximations of game (Israeli) options converges to the shortfall risk in the corresponding Black--Scholes market considering Lipschitz continuous path-dependent payoffs for both discrete- and continuous-time cases. These results are new also for usual American style option…

New framework for analyzing games with multi-dimensional singular controls and non-linear jumps.

We show by counterexample that policy-gradient algorithms have no guarantees of even local convergence to Nash equilibria in continuous action and state space multi-agent settings. To do so, we analyze gradient-play in N-player general-sum linear quadratic games, a classic game setting which is recently emerging as a b…

The paper explores how regularization can lead to convergence in imperfect information games.

This paper makes a small step towards a non-stochastic version of superhedging duality relations in the case of one traded security with a continuous price path. Namely, we prove the coincidence of game-theoretic and measure-theoretic expectation for lower semicontinuous positive functionals. We consider a new broad de…

A core novelty of Alpha Zero is the interleaving of tree search and deep learning, which has proven very successful in board games like Chess, Shogi and Go. These games have a discrete action space. However, many real-world reinforcement learning domains have continuous action spaces, for example in robotic control, na…

In this paper we consider Dynkin's games with payoffs which are functions of an underlying process. Assuming extended weak convergence of underlying processes $\{S^{(n)}\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ to a limit process $S$ we prove convergence Dynkin's games values corresponding to $\{S^{(n)}\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ to the Dynkin's game…

In this paper we study iterative procedures for stationary equilibria in games with large number of players. Most of learning algorithms for games with continuous action spaces are limited to strict contraction best reply maps in which the Banach-Picard iteration converges with geometrical convergence rate. When the be…

Novel proof shows continuity of optimal transport feasible set mapping.

Paper studies convergence of Mean-Field GDA dynamics for MNE of continuous games.

Novel approach finds implicit regularisation in two-player games using BEA.

Graphon game model simplifies stochastic interactions among agents.

PAPAL algorithm finds mixed Nash equilibria in continuous games.

Study on optimal strategies for minimizing shortfall risk in game options.

Most existing deep reinforcement learning (DRL) frameworks consider either discrete action space or continuous action space solely. Motivated by applications in computer games, we consider the scenario with discrete-continuous hybrid action space. To handle hybrid action space, previous works either approximate the hyb…

We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. By varying the `reality map', which rel…

This paper studies a two-person trading game in continuous time that generalizes Garivaltis (2018) to allow for stock prices that both jump and diffuse. Analogous to Bell and Cover (1988) in discrete time, the players start by choosing fair randomizations of the initial dollar, by exchanging it for a random wealth whos…

Paper studies constrained control games with a novel approximation method.

While most current research in Reinforcement Learning (RL) focuses on improving the performance of the algorithms in controlled environments, the use of RL under constraints like those met in the video game industry is rarely studied. Operating under such constraints, we propose Hybrid SAC, an extension of the Soft Act…

Study on convergence of Langevin dynamics for zero-sum games in probability distributions.

Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, intervening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and low dimensional. In AML, decisions are made by algorit…

This paper gives yet another definition of game-theoretic probability in the context of continuous-time idealized financial markets. Without making any probabilistic assumptions (but assuming positive and continuous price paths), we obtain a simple expression for the equity premium and derive a version of the capital a…

Study on LOB dynamics using mean-field game theory.

End-to-end model predicts multiagent trajectories using game theory and neural nets.

Paper presents a new approach to a strategic insider equilibrium problem in continuous time.

We justify and give error estimates for binomial approximations of game (Israeli) options in the Black--Scholes market with Lipschitz continuous path dependent payoffs which are new also for usual American style options. We show also that rational (optimal) exercise times and hedging self-financing portfolios of binomi…

The paper simplifies multi-agent RL dynamics in finite-state Markov games using homogenization.

We solve a continuous-time game-theoretic problem for Kihlstrom-Mirman preferences.

A variety of machine learning models have been proposed to assess the performance of players in professional sports. However, they have only a limited ability to model how player performance depends on the game context. This paper proposes a new approach to capturing game context: we apply Deep Reinforcement Learning (…

A new definition of events of game-theoretic probability zero in continuous time is proposed and used to prove results suggesting that trading in financial markets results in the emergence of properties usually associated with randomness. This paper concentrates on "qualitative" results, stated in terms of order (or or…

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical systems theory. For both general-sum and potential games, we characterize a non…

We use martingale and stochastic analysis techniques to study a continuous-time optimal stopping problem, in which the decision maker uses a dynamic convex risk measure to evaluate future rewards. We also find a saddle point for an equivalent zero-sum game of control and stopping, between an agent (the "stopper") who c…

Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze GCCs like their European and American counterparts by solving option holder's an…

Existence of strong randomized equilibria in mean-field games with common noise.

We present a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where one is allowed to choose in each turn the game that a large number of individuals play. It turns out that, by choosing the game which gives the highest average earnings at each step, one ends up with systematic loses, whereas a periodic or random seque…

Financial markets investors are involved in many games -- they must interact with other agents to achieve their goals. Among them are those directly connected with their activity on markets but one cannot neglect other aspects that influence human decisions and their performance as investors. Distinguishing all subgame…