We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
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48 results for “continuous double auctions”
Efficient verified double auctions improve matching speed and detect errors.
problem Improving the efficiency and reliability of double auctions in financial markets.
method Formally verified implementation using Coq proof assistant, reducing time complexity and improving error detection.
result Improved efficiency with time complexity, reducing runtime from days to minutes.
Formal methods verify continuous auctions at exchanges.
problem Ensuring fairness and correctness in continuous auctions.
method Formal specification, design, and verification of continuous double auctions.
result A verified algorithm satisfies natural properties of auctions.
The study classifies and imitates trading agents in financial markets.
problem Classifying and imitating trading agents in continuous double auctions.
method Developed an agent-based model for trading, applied opponent modeling for classification, and used behavioral cloning for imitation.
result Techniques for classification and imitation were experimentally compared and evaluated.
Low-traffic limit and first-passage times for a simple model of the continuous double auctionmath.PR
We consider a simplified model of the continuous double auction where prices are integers varying from to with limit orders and market orders, but quantity per order limited to a single share. For this model, the order process is equivalent to two queues. We study the behaviour of the auction in the low…
Developed scalable ABM for complex financial markets.
problem Simulating large-scale agent-based financial markets.
method Agent-based modeling, distributed computing, continuous double auction.
result Captures statistical properties of real financial markets.
Statistical theory of the continuous double auctioncond-mat.stat-mech
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyze it using simulation, dimensional analy…
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for…
In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens …
We formalize and verify double auctions for multiple-quantity trades.
problem Matching multiple-quantity trade requests in double auctions.
method Formalized algorithms, correctness proofs, Coq proof assistant, verified OCaml and Haskell programs.
result Automatic detection of violations in exchange systems.
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, …
We introduce and treat rigorously a new multi-agent model of the continuous double auction or in other words the order book (OB). It is designed to explain collective behaviour of the market when new information affecting the market arrives. The novel feature of the model is two additional slow changing parameters, the…
We present a general Markovian framework for order book modeling. Through our approach, we aim at providing a tool enabling to get a better understanding of the price formation process and of the link between microscopic and macroscopic features of financial assets. To do so, we propose a new method of order book repre…
The ultimate value of theories of the fundamental mechanisms comprising the asset price in financial systems will be reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidences from the fields of finance, ma…
In this paper, the survival function of waiting times between orders and the corresponding trades in a double-auction market is studied both by means of experiments and of empirical data. It turns out that, already at the level of order durations, the survival function cannot be represented by a single exponential, thu…
The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
problem Strategic traders exploit accumulated information to delay their orders, distorting auction efficiency.
method Randomizing auction closing times and designing optimal transaction fees policies.
result Policies encourage strategic traders to send orders earlier, improving auction market efficiency.
In this study, we present a simple stochastic order-book model for investors' swarm behaviors seen in the continuous double auction mechanism, which is employed by major global exchanges. Our study shows a characteristic called "fat tail" is seen in the data obtained from our model that incorporates the investors' swar…
We give a stochastic microscopic modelling of stock markets driven by continuous double auction. If we take into account the mimetic behavior of traders, when they place limit order, our virtual markets shows the power-law tail of the distribution of returns with the exponent outside the Levy stable region, the short m…
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
Continuous-Time Random Walk with multi-step memory: An application to market dynamicsphysics.data-an
A novel version of the Continuous-Time Random Walk (CTRW) model with memory is developed. This memory means the dependence between arbitrary number of successive jumps of the process, while waiting times between jumps are considered as i.i.d. random variables. The dependence was found by analysis of empirical histogram…
We introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange is where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. These days, all big exchanges use computer algorithms that implement double sided auctions to match buy and sell requests and these algorithms must abide by certain regulator…
We consider an auction market in which market makers fill the order book during a given time period while some other investors send market orders. We define the clearing price of the auction as the price maximizing the exchanged volume at the clearing time according to the supply and demand of each market participants.…
A Deep Q-Learning framework tackles market-making by incorporating closing auctions.
problem Managing end-of-day risk in market-making models.
method Developed a Deep Q-Learning framework that anticipates closing auctions and continuously refines projected clearing prices.
result The Deep Q-Learning framework outperforms classical market-making models in simulations and real data.
Statistical properties of order-driven double-auction markets with Bid-Ask spread are investigated through the dynamical quantities such as response function. We first attempt to utilize the so-called {\it Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans model} (MRR for short) to simulate the stochastic process of the price-change in empir…
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
problem Efficiency and fairness in Dutch auctions on blockchains.
method Modeling Dutch auctions with Poisson process and geometric Brownian motion, computing expected losses and time-to-fill.
result Tradeoff between speed and quality in Dutch auctions, useful for setting parameters.
Study adapts liquidity model to equity auctions, revealing accelerated event rates and reduced price impact.
problem Understanding and predicting price dynamics in equity auctions.
method Adapted latent/revealed order book framework to equity auctions, measuring order submissions, cancellations, and diffusion rates.
result Equity auctions exhibit accelerated event rates leading to reduced price impact and decreased volatility.
Using ultra-high-frequency data extracted from the order flows of 23 stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we study the empirical regularities of order placement in the opening call auction, cool period and continuous auction. The distributions of relative logarithmic prices against reference prices in the thre…
PRZI traders adapt their quote-prices based on a strategy parameter s, affecting market dynamics.
problem Understanding the dynamics of continuous double auction markets with adaptive traders.
method Introduced a new zero-intelligence trader PRZI that uses a parameterised probability distribution to generate quote-prices. Used a stochastic hill-climber algorithm to adapt strategies based on market conditions.
result The co-evolutionary dynamics of PRZI traders can lead to rich and complex market behaviors, including periods of stability and change.
Study learns optimal bidding strategy in auctions with dynamic values and aggregated feedback.
problem Optimizing bidding in auctions with time-dependent values and limited feedback.
method Combines plug-in estimators with differential-equation characterization of optimal policy.
result Achieves near optimal regret bounds for learning optimal policy.
Study optimizes rebate design in auction markets to enhance efficiency.
problem Designing optimal rebate policies in auction markets to improve efficiency.
method Formulated as a principal-agent problem, solved using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations and Deep BSDE method.
result Optimal transaction fees and rebates narrow the price spread, improving market efficiency.
Modeling high-frequency speculative markets as auction search processes.
problem Understanding trading dynamics in high-frequency order-driven markets.
method Total order book model with diffusion-drift-reaction model, inspired by foraging and chemotaxis.
result Analytic and numerical analysis of trading performance in various search mechanisms.
Real-time bidding (RTB) systems, which utilize auctions to allocate user impressions to competing advertisers, continue to enjoy success in digital advertising. Assessing the effectiveness of such advertising remains a challenge in research and practice. This paper proposes a new approach to perform causal inference on…
Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs. We ask whether it is possible, instead, for loyalty to arise spontaneously, and…
We use high-frequency data of 1364 Chinese A-share stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange to investigate the intraday patterns in the bid-ask spreads. The daily periodicity in the spread time series is confirmed by Lomb analysis and the intraday bid-ask spreads are found to exhibit …
Formally verifies fairness and uniformity in financial market trades.
problem Ensuring fairness and uniformity in automated trading systems.
method Formal definition and verification in Coq proof assistant.
result Properties of double-sided auction mechanisms verified.
Exploiting a precise reproduction of a stock exchange, the robustness of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism, evaluated by means of the waiting time distributions, has been proved versus 36 different set ups made by varying both the operators' behaviour and the market micro structure. The obtained results dem…
Study shows time matters in automated trading, improving simple strategies over complex ones.
problem Effects of reaction speed and trading urgency on automated trading strategies.
method Simulated financial markets with public limit order book and continuous double auction matching. Examined reaction speed and trading urgency.
result Simple strategies outperform complex ones when considering reaction speed and trading urgency.
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for - price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
Optimizes bidding strategy for Maker Protocol auctions.
problem Minimizing costs in Maker Protocol auctions.
method Developed and optimized a bidding function using historical data.
result Most auctions end at higher prices than optimal recommendations.
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
problem Understanding price impact in equity auctions.
method High-quality data analysis of Paris stock exchange auctions.
result Price impact is linear up to a large volume, then becomes non-linear.
We extend prior evidence that naively using intraday agent-based models that involve realistic order-matching processes for modeling continuous-time double auction markets seems to fail to be able to provide a robust link between data and many model parameters, even when these models are able to reproduce a number of w…
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
problem Comparing the learning difficulty of uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions.
method Characterization of learning difficulty through regret minimization in both full-information and bandit feedback settings.
result Regret scales similarly for both auction formats under full-information, but uniform-price auctions can achieve faster learning rates.
Study examines strategies to reduce volatility in leveraged ETF markets.
problem Rebalancing trades in leveraged ETFs can destabilize financial markets.
method Agent-based simulation to compare different trading strategies.
result Increasing the minimum number of orders in rebalancing trades reduces market volatility.
We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction price reacts to a single auction order placement or can…
Study on heavy tails in closing auction returns, explaining imbalance through limit order submission.
problem Understanding heavy tails in closing auction return distributions.
method Used the stochastic call auction model of Derksen et al. (2020a) to derive and verify a relation between tail exponents.
result Large closing price fluctuations are not caused by large market orders, but by imbalance in limit orders.
Study proposes a machine learning method for bid shading in first-price auctions.
problem Maintaining strategy equilibrium in first-price auctions.
method Machine learning approach to model optimal bid shading.
result Demonstrates superiority and robustness of new approach across various metrics.
We explore the competitive effects of reaction time of automated trading strategies in simulated financial markets containing a single exchange with public limit order book and continuous double auction matching. A large body of research conducted over several decades has been devoted to trading agent design and simula…