A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction price reacts to a single auction order placement or can…
We report statistical regularities of the opening and closing auctions of French equities, focusing on the diffusive properties of the indicative auction price. Two mechanisms are at play as the auction end time nears: the typical price change magnitude decreases, favoring underdiffusion, while the rate of these events…
We propose a model for price formation in financial markets based on clearing of a standard call auction with random orders, and verify its validity for prediction of the daily closing price distribution statistically. The model considers random buy and sell orders, placed following demand- and supply-side valuation di…
This work optimizes bid strategies for online auctions using measure-valued optimization.
problem Optimizing bid strategies in first-price auctions to maximize expected surplus.
method Formulates the problem as convex optimization over the joint distribution of shading parameters, adapts the distribution after each auction using a Wasserstein-proximal update.
result The proposed algorithm encourages bids on values with high expected surplus.
We study the statistical regularities of opening call auction using the ultra-high-frequency data of 22 liquid stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2003. The distribution of the relative price, defined as the relative difference between the order price in opening call auction and the closing price of last tr…
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for k- price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens …
The call auction is a widely used trading mechanism, especially during the opening and closing periods of financial markets. In this paper, we study a standard call auction problem where orders are submitted according to Poisson processes, with random prices distributed according to a general distribution, and may be c…
The ad-trading desks of media-buying agencies are increasingly relying on complex algorithms for purchasing advertising inventory. In particular, Real-Time Bidding (RTB) algorithms respond to many auctions -- usually Vickrey auctions -- throughout the day for buying ad-inventory with the aim of maximizing one or severa…
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
In the last three decades, we have seen a significant increase in trading goods and services through online auctions. However, this business created an attractive environment for malicious moneymakers who can commit different types of fraud activities, such as Shill Bidding (SB). The latter is predominant across many a…
The paper examines how builders in Ethereum auctions can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities, affecting searchers' bidding strategies.
problem Commitment problem in Ethereum auctions where builders can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities.
method Modeling and analysis of searchers' bidding strategies and the resulting equilibrium, using libMEV dataset.
result The equilibrium is piecewise, with the cost of imperfect commitment depending on replicability and competition. There is sharp heterogeneity across MEV types.
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets…
Optimizes reserve prices for first-price auctions to maximize revenue.
problem Optimizing reserve prices for first-price auctions in display advertising.
method Gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on bidder responsiveness to experimental shocks.
result Revenue optimization in first-price auctions can be decomposed into demand and bidding components, and techniques are introduced to reduce variance of each.
We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios. 1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative. 2. We formulat…
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
Sponsored search in E-commerce platforms such as Amazon, Taobao and Tmall provides sellers an effective way to reach potential buyers with most relevant purpose. In this paper, we study the auction mechanism optimization problem in sponsored search on Alibaba's mobile E-commerce platform. Besides generating revenue, we…
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions …