We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction price reacts to a single auction order placement or can…
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48 results for “auction dynamics”
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
problem Understanding price impact in equity auctions.
method High-quality data analysis of Paris stock exchange auctions.
result Price impact is linear up to a large volume, then becomes non-linear.
Study adapts liquidity model to equity auctions, revealing accelerated event rates and reduced price impact.
problem Understanding and predicting price dynamics in equity auctions.
method Adapted latent/revealed order book framework to equity auctions, measuring order submissions, cancellations, and diffusion rates.
result Equity auctions exhibit accelerated event rates leading to reduced price impact and decreased volatility.
Study learns optimal bidding strategy in auctions with dynamic values and aggregated feedback.
problem Optimizing bidding in auctions with time-dependent values and limited feedback.
method Combines plug-in estimators with differential-equation characterization of optimal policy.
result Achieves near optimal regret bounds for learning optimal policy.
Optimistic Mirror Descent framework improves bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
problem Optimizing bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
method Introducing Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) framework with novel optimism configuration.
result Minimax-optimal dynamic regret rates achieved for non-stationary first-price auctions.
Adaptive Discretization against an Adversary: Lipschitz bandits, Dynamic Pricing, and Auction Tuningcs.LG
Algorithm tackles adaptive discretization in adversarial Lipschitz bandits for dynamic pricing and auctions.
problem Adaptive discretization in adversarial Lipschitz bandits.
method Adversarial Zooming algorithm for adaptive discretization.
result First algorithm for adversarial Lipschitz bandits with instance-dependent regret bounds.
In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens …
This study uses OPE methods to quickly assess auction policies.
problem Rapid decision-making in dynamic auction environments.
method Off-Policy Evaluation and counterfactual methods.
result Improved policy selection and optimization.
Optimizes bidding strategies for LinkedIn ads across multiple platforms.
problem Optimizing automated bidding agents for dynamic online marketplaces.
method Developed a general optimization framework for buyer's interest, agnostic to auction mechanisms.
result Automatically guarantees the optimality of budget allocation across ad units and platforms.
Optimizes e-commerce traffic sales by incorporating hidden costs into auction mechanisms.
problem Hidden costs from unexpected advertising items in search results.
method Dynamic reserve price design with distributed solving algorithm.
result Ensures a balanced relationship between revenue and user experience.
Modeling high-frequency speculative markets as auction search processes.
problem Understanding trading dynamics in high-frequency order-driven markets.
method Total order book model with diffusion-drift-reaction model, inspired by foraging and chemotaxis.
result Analytic and numerical analysis of trading performance in various search mechanisms.
Algorithm learns to bid in auctions with shilling, masking real bids.
problem Learning to bid in auctions manipulated by shilling.
method Combines interval-elimination and optimistic branches, debiases losing-side reports.
result Achieves dynamic-pricing rate and first-price auctions rate .
We formalize and verify double auctions for multiple-quantity trades.
problem Matching multiple-quantity trade requests in double auctions.
method Formalized algorithms, correctness proofs, Coq proof assistant, verified OCaml and Haskell programs.
result Automatic detection of violations in exchange systems.
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for - price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
Optimizes bidding strategy for Maker Protocol auctions.
problem Minimizing costs in Maker Protocol auctions.
method Developed and optimized a bidding function using historical data.
result Most auctions end at higher prices than optimal recommendations.
Auction theory and demographyq-fin.GN
The paper analyzes auction theory and its impact on buyer demographics.
problem Understanding the dynamics of auctions and buyer demographics.
method Analyzing various auction scenarios and their psychological aspects.
result Identified key auction criteria and their influence on buyer groups.
The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
problem Strategic traders exploit accumulated information to delay their orders, distorting auction efficiency.
method Randomizing auction closing times and designing optimal transaction fees policies.
result Policies encourage strategic traders to send orders earlier, improving auction market efficiency.
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
problem Comparing the learning difficulty of uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions.
method Characterization of learning difficulty through regret minimization in both full-information and bandit feedback settings.
result Regret scales similarly for both auction formats under full-information, but uniform-price auctions can achieve faster learning rates.
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
Study on heavy tails in closing auction returns, explaining imbalance through limit order submission.
problem Understanding heavy tails in closing auction return distributions.
method Used the stochastic call auction model of Derksen et al. (2020a) to derive and verify a relation between tail exponents.
result Large closing price fluctuations are not caused by large market orders, but by imbalance in limit orders.
Study proposes a machine learning method for bid shading in first-price auctions.
problem Maintaining strategy equilibrium in first-price auctions.
method Machine learning approach to model optimal bid shading.
result Demonstrates superiority and robustness of new approach across various metrics.
In the last three decades, we have seen a significant increase in trading goods and services through online auctions. However, this business created an attractive environment for malicious moneymakers who can commit different types of fraud activities, such as Shill Bidding (SB). The latter is predominant across many a…
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
problem Efficiency and fairness in Dutch auctions on blockchains.
method Modeling Dutch auctions with Poisson process and geometric Brownian motion, computing expected losses and time-to-fill.
result Tradeoff between speed and quality in Dutch auctions, useful for setting parameters.
Optimal bidding strategy for multi-platform ad auctions under budget constraints.
problem Optimizing ad placements for budget-constrained advertisers across multiple platforms.
method Developed an optimal bidding strategy for non-incentive-compatible auctions with budget constraints.
result Maximized total utility across auctions while satisfying budget constraints in expectation.
Paper addresses selection bias in online advertising auctions.
problem Selection bias affects auction truthfulness and advertiser profits.
method Theoretical analysis combined with multi-task learning.
result Selection bias can be significantly reduced using multi-task learning.
MiFID II impacts European stock liquidity and price formation.
problem Impact of MiFID II on European stock liquidity and price formation.
method Analyzed effects of MiFID II on European stock markets, focusing on intraday and closing auction liquidity and tick size changes.
result Closing auction volumes increased and price formation became more efficient after MiFID II.
New algorithm optimizes auction prices in real-time.
problem Maximizing revenue in online auctions with high frequency data.
method First real-time algorithm for online learning of monopoly prices.
result Achieves constant time and memory complexity for updates.
Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that describes the item. However, the seller is not aware of the relationship between the …
Proposes a framework for modeling RTB auctions using point processes.
problem Modeling and optimizing repeated auctions in the RTB ecosystem.
method Develops a stochastic framework using point processes to model and optimize RTB auctions.
result The proposed framework can be approximated to a Poisson point process, enabling the use of established properties.
A new mechanism optimizes data marketplace pricing efficiently.
problem Designing fair and efficient pricing mechanisms for data marketplaces.
method Two-stage approach: auctions to estimate value distributions, then optimal posted prices.
result MAPP achieves optimal revenue with minimal price discrimination.
Paper proposes auction method for smart derivatives to avoid disputes.
problem Disputes over derivative liquidation processes in smart contracts.
method Defines an auction type resolution for smart derivatives.
result Proposes a beneficial method for smart derivatives participants.
The paper examines how builders in Ethereum auctions can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities, affecting searchers' bidding strategies.
problem Commitment problem in Ethereum auctions where builders can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities.
method Modeling and analysis of searchers' bidding strategies and the resulting equilibrium, using libMEV dataset.
result The equilibrium is piecewise, with the cost of imperfect commitment depending on replicability and competition. There is sharp heterogeneity across MEV types.
Models of auctions or tendering processes are introduced. In every round of bidding the players select their bid from a probability distribution and whenever a bid is unsuccessful, it is discarded and replaced. For simple models, the probability distributions evolve to a stationary power law with the exponent dependent…
Lowest Unique Bid Auctionsmath.PR
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets…
We present a general Markovian framework for order book modeling. Through our approach, we aim at providing a tool enabling to get a better understanding of the price formation process and of the link between microscopic and macroscopic features of financial assets. To do so, we propose a new method of order book repre…
Deep network optimizes ad bidding for first-price auctions.
problem Optimizing bid prices for first-price auctions in online advertising.
method Introduced a deep distribution network for optimal bidding.
result Algorithm outperforms previous methods in terms of surplus and eCPX metrics.
Optimizes reserve prices for first-price auctions to maximize revenue.
problem Optimizing reserve prices for first-price auctions in display advertising.
method Gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on bidder responsiveness to experimental shocks.
result Revenue optimization in first-price auctions can be decomposed into demand and bidding components, and techniques are introduced to reduce variance of each.
We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios. 1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative. 2. We formulat…
Algorithm learns to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback.
problem Learning to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with incomplete feedback.
method Developed an algorithm exploiting the specific feedback structure and payoff function of first-price auctions.
result Achieved a near-optimal regret bound for first-price auctions.
Permutation-equivariant neural networks improve auction mechanisms by reducing regret and sample complexity.
problem Designing optimal auction mechanisms that balance revenue and bidders' regret.
method Introduced permutation-equivariant neural networks to auction mechanisms.
result Permutation-equivariant neural networks decrease expected ex-post regret and improve model generalizability.
Efficient methods estimate bid and value distributions in auctions.
problem Estimating bid and value distributions in auctions with limited information.
method Non-parametric estimation algorithms for first- and second-price auctions.
result Uniform estimation bounds for bid and value distributions, independent of distributions being estimated.
This paper tackles optimal bidding strategies in adversarial first-price auctions.
problem How to bid optimally and efficiently in adversarial first-price auctions.
method Developed a minimax optimal online bidding algorithm leveraging expert-chaining structure and exploiting product structure.
result Achieved an regret, superior to existing algorithms.
Formal methods verify continuous auctions at exchanges.
problem Ensuring fairness and correctness in continuous auctions.
method Formal specification, design, and verification of continuous double auctions.
result A verified algorithm satisfies natural properties of auctions.
Study optimal auction formats for maximizing MEV on Ethereum.
problem Maximizing extractable value from Ethereum auctions.
method Empirical analysis of 2.2 million transactions, modeling affiliation among bidders.
result English and second-price sealed-bid auctions dominate other formats, with significant revenue losses.
We report statistical regularities of the opening and closing auctions of French equities, focusing on the diffusive properties of the indicative auction price. Two mechanisms are at play as the auction end time nears: the typical price change magnitude decreases, favoring underdiffusion, while the rate of these events…
New neural network architecture for auction design exploiting permutation symmetry.
problem Designing incentive-compatible auctions that maximize expected revenue.
method Constructed a permutation-equivariant neural network architecture.
result Permutation-equivariant architectures can perfectly recover optimal mechanisms.
Neural networks can learn optimal auction mechanisms and satisfy mode connectivity.
problem Optimal auction design in complex settings.
method Generalized RochetNet and affine maximizer auctions.
result Neural networks (RochetNet and generalized version) satisfy mode connectivity.
This study evaluates price improvements in order flow auctions on Ethereum.
problem Improving trading outcomes in blockchain-based trading platforms.
method Utilized open-source tools to attribute price improvements to specific system inputs.
result Auction-enhanced interfaces can provide statistically significant improvements in trading outcomes, averaging 4-5 basis points.