A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.
problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.
Study designs incentives for adapting multi-agent systems without knowing their learning dynamics.
problem Designing incentives for an adapting population in multi-agent systems without prior knowledge of their learning dynamics.
method Introduces a model-based non-episodic Reinforcement Learning (RL) formulation for steering Markovian agents towards desired policies, focusing on history-dependent strategies to handle model uncertainty.
result Identifies conditions for the existence of steering strategies to guide agents to desired policies and provides empirical algorithms to approximately solve the objective.
How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already present in the market may match early or wait for the small group of new entrants.…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges. Given the strategy choices of all agents, a maximal circulation that adheres to the…
Heterogeneous SVO leads to diverse policies in sequential social dilemmas.
problem Understanding how diverse social value orientations affect behavior in sequential social dilemmas.
method Extending prior reinforcement learning studies, we instantiated heterogeneous SVO in a sequential social dilemma setting and measured task-specific diversity metrics.
result Heterogeneous SVO leads to meaningfully diverse policies across various incentive structures.
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a model for how strategic agents can invest effort in order to change the outcome…
We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that the likelihood of agents trading in a given asset depends on the relative amount of information available in that market. More s…
The design of personalized incentives or recommendations to improve user engagement is gaining prominence as digital platform providers continually emerge. We propose a multi-armed bandit framework for matching incentives to users, whose preferences are unknown a priori and evolving dynamically in time, in a resource c…
Calibrated models can lead to miscalibrated aggregations in strategic interactions.
problem Miscalibration in aggregated predictions from multiple calibrated models.
method Analysis of strategic interactions between calibrated predictors, proving conditions for miscalibration and comparing VCG and Brier-score aggregation methods.
result VCG aggregation method outperforms Brier-score in strategic settings, providing robustness and comparable accuracy.
The paper proposes incentivizing human annotators with 'golden questions' to improve data quality.
problem Ensuring high-quality human annotations for training large language models.
method A principal-agent model is used to incentivize annotators with bonuses based on the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of their annotations. Hypothesis testing is applied to monitor the annotators' performance.
result The hypothesis testing rate for the principal-agent model is of Θ(1/nlogn), highlighting the importance of 'golden questions' for monitoring annotators.
We address a practical problem ubiquitous in modern marketing campaigns, in which a central agent tries to learn a policy for allocating strategic financial incentives to customers and observes only bandit feedback. In contrast to traditional policy optimization frameworks, we take into account the additional reward st…
We extend prior evidence that naively using intraday agent-based models that involve realistic order-matching processes for modeling continuous-time double auction markets seems to fail to be able to provide a robust link between data and many model parameters, even when these models are able to reproduce a number of w…
This work suggests modifications to a previously introduced class of heterogeneous agent models that allow for the inclusion of different types of agent motivations and behaviours in a unified way. The agents operate within a highly simplified environment where they are only able to be long or short one unit of the ass…
We consider the problem of belief aggregation: given a group of individual agents with probabilistic beliefs over a set of uncertain events, formulate a sensible consensus or aggregate probability distribution over these events. Researchers have proposed many aggregation methods, although on the question of which is be…
Study shows how adaptive market agents can lead to persistent overpricing in financial markets.
problem Persistent overpricing in financial markets by adaptive market agents.
method Analyzes a repeated game between market maker and market taker, decomposes the game into competitive and collaborative components, and uses projected stochastic gradient ascent.
result Decentralized learning by adaptive market agents can lead to persistent overpricing in financial markets.
Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.
problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.