We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for - price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
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48 results for “Second Price Auctions”
Optimizes bidding strategy for Maker Protocol auctions.
problem Minimizing costs in Maker Protocol auctions.
method Developed and optimized a bidding function using historical data.
result Most auctions end at higher prices than optimal recommendations.
Deep network optimizes ad bidding for first-price auctions.
problem Optimizing bid prices for first-price auctions in online advertising.
method Introduced a deep distribution network for optimal bidding.
result Algorithm outperforms previous methods in terms of surplus and eCPX metrics.
Efficient algorithms for second-price auctions with action-dependent censoring.
problem Sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions with incomplete information.
method Proposed novel UCB-like algorithms for second-price auctions in a stochastic setting.
result Significant improvement in worst-case regret, especially for low item values.
Study proposes a machine learning method for bid shading in first-price auctions.
problem Maintaining strategy equilibrium in first-price auctions.
method Machine learning approach to model optimal bid shading.
result Demonstrates superiority and robustness of new approach across various metrics.
Study learns optimal bidding strategy in auctions with dynamic values and aggregated feedback.
problem Optimizing bidding in auctions with time-dependent values and limited feedback.
method Combines plug-in estimators with differential-equation characterization of optimal policy.
result Achieves near optimal regret bounds for learning optimal policy.
Optimizes reserve prices for first-price auctions to maximize revenue.
problem Optimizing reserve prices for first-price auctions in display advertising.
method Gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on bidder responsiveness to experimental shocks.
result Revenue optimization in first-price auctions can be decomposed into demand and bidding components, and techniques are introduced to reduce variance of each.
This paper tackles optimal bidding strategies in adversarial first-price auctions.
problem How to bid optimally and efficiently in adversarial first-price auctions.
method Developed a minimax optimal online bidding algorithm leveraging expert-chaining structure and exploiting product structure.
result Achieved an regret, superior to existing algorithms.
Objective Variables for Probabilistic Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Auctions with Reservestat.ML
Many online companies sell advertisement space in second-price auctions with reserve. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic method to learn a profitable strategy to set the reserve price. We use historical auction data with features to fit a predictor of the best reserve price. This problem is delicate - the struct…
Optimistic Mirror Descent framework improves bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
problem Optimizing bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
method Introducing Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) framework with novel optimism configuration.
result Minimax-optimal dynamic regret rates achieved for non-stationary first-price auctions.
Study non-stationary online auctions with semi-bandit feedback.
problem Maximize revenue in a non-stationary online second price auction.
method Develops an algorithm to handle non-stationary private value distributions.
result Achieves nearly optimal non-stationary regret bound.
Study optimal auction formats for maximizing MEV on Ethereum.
problem Maximizing extractable value from Ethereum auctions.
method Empirical analysis of 2.2 million transactions, modeling affiliation among bidders.
result English and second-price sealed-bid auctions dominate other formats, with significant revenue losses.
A new RL approach optimizes reserve prices in multi-phase auctions, reducing revenue regret.
problem Optimizing reserve prices in multi-phase second-price auctions with noisy and potentially untruthful bidders.
method Combines RL techniques with buffer periods, a novel algorithm, and LSVI-UCB extension.
result Achieves optimal revenue regret under known and unknown noise conditions.
Study shows priority access in ELA auctions is less valuable due to volatility risks.
problem Impact of volatility on time-based transaction ordering policies.
method Single-round model with risk-averse bidders, tested using ETH price data.
result Priority access is discounted due to volatility and risk aversion.
Optimizes web publisher revenues from RTB auctions.
problem Maximizing revenue from RTB auctions with limited information.
method Incremental time-weighted matrix factorization for user and placement profiles; Aalen's Additive model for censored bid predictions.
result Significant revenue increase for web publishers.
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated second-price auctions with reserve where a seller interacts with multiple strategic bidders each of which holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his expected future cumulative discounted surplus. We propose a novel algorithm that h…
Efficient methods estimate bid and value distributions in auctions.
problem Estimating bid and value distributions in auctions with limited information.
method Non-parametric estimation algorithms for first- and second-price auctions.
result Uniform estimation bounds for bid and value distributions, independent of distributions being estimated.
Equity auctions show linear price impact up to a large volume, then non-linear.
problem Understanding price impact in equity auctions.
method High-quality data analysis of Paris stock exchange auctions.
result Price impact is linear up to a large volume, then becomes non-linear.
Ad exchanges use CORP to set reserve prices against strategic buyers.
problem Setting optimal reserve prices in ad exchanges with strategic buyers.
method Proposes CORP policy to learn and set reserve prices robustly.
result Achieves sublinear regret in unknown noise distribution.
We investigate contextual online learning with nonparametric (Lipschitz) comparison classes under different assumptions on losses and feedback information. For full information feedback and Lipschitz losses, we design the first explicit algorithm achieving the minimax regret rate (up to log factors). In a partial feedb…
We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction price reacts to a single auction order placement or can…
The study compares uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in terms of learning difficulty.
problem Comparing the learning difficulty of uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions.
method Characterization of learning difficulty through regret minimization in both full-information and bandit feedback settings.
result Regret scales similarly for both auction formats under full-information, but uniform-price auctions can achieve faster learning rates.
Study adapts liquidity model to equity auctions, revealing accelerated event rates and reduced price impact.
problem Understanding and predicting price dynamics in equity auctions.
method Adapted latent/revealed order book framework to equity auctions, measuring order submissions, cancellations, and diffusion rates.
result Equity auctions exhibit accelerated event rates leading to reduced price impact and decreased volatility.
The paper tackles auction market design flaws by randomizing closing times and optimizing transaction fees.
problem Strategic traders exploit accumulated information to delay their orders, distorting auction efficiency.
method Randomizing auction closing times and designing optimal transaction fees policies.
result Policies encourage strategic traders to send orders earlier, improving auction market efficiency.
MiFID II impacts European stock liquidity and price formation.
problem Impact of MiFID II on European stock liquidity and price formation.
method Analyzed effects of MiFID II on European stock markets, focusing on intraday and closing auction liquidity and tick size changes.
result Closing auction volumes increased and price formation became more efficient after MiFID II.
We report statistical regularities of the opening and closing auctions of French equities, focusing on the diffusive properties of the indicative auction price. Two mechanisms are at play as the auction end time nears: the typical price change magnitude decreases, favoring underdiffusion, while the rate of these events…
This study evaluates price improvements in order flow auctions on Ethereum.
problem Improving trading outcomes in blockchain-based trading platforms.
method Utilized open-source tools to attribute price improvements to specific system inputs.
result Auction-enhanced interfaces can provide statistically significant improvements in trading outcomes, averaging 4-5 basis points.
Algorithm learns to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback.
problem Learning to bid optimally in repeated first-price auctions with incomplete feedback.
method Developed an algorithm exploiting the specific feedback structure and payoff function of first-price auctions.
result Achieved a near-optimal regret bound for first-price auctions.
The paper proposes a new method to forecast winning prices in real-time bidding.
problem Accurately forecasting winning prices in real-time bidding with limited data.
method The paper introduces a heteroscedastic fully parametric censored regression approach and a mixture density censored network.
result The proposed method significantly improves winning price forecasting compared to existing methods.
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
A new pricing strategy minimizes regret by controlling strategic buyer behavior.
problem Designing a pricing policy for strategic buyers with limited seller information.
method Phased-structure policy with randomized isolation periods.
result Regret of -period against a benchmark policy.
Improved learning algorithm for first-price auctions reduces regret significantly.
problem Challenges in learning optimal bidding strategies for first-price auctions.
method Introduced novel ideas to achieve lower regret in sequential learning.
result Achieved regret when opponents' bid distribution is known, and regret in learning case.
New algorithm optimizes auction prices in real-time.
problem Maximizing revenue in online auctions with high frequency data.
method First real-time algorithm for online learning of monopoly prices.
result Achieves constant time and memory complexity for updates.
We consider an auction market in which market makers fill the order book during a given time period while some other investors send market orders. We define the clearing price of the auction as the price maximizing the exchanged volume at the clearing time according to the supply and demand of each market participants.…
Study on efficiency of Dutch auctions on blockchains considering various parameters.
problem Efficiency and fairness in Dutch auctions on blockchains.
method Modeling Dutch auctions with Poisson process and geometric Brownian motion, computing expected losses and time-to-fill.
result Tradeoff between speed and quality in Dutch auctions, useful for setting parameters.
Optimizes bidding in hourly and quarter-hourly electricity markets to reduce price impact.
problem Maximizing profit in two consecutive electricity markets with market impact and transaction costs.
method Examined multiple price scenarios, estimated market impact, used trading strategies, provided theoretical results.
result Minimizing price impact is more profitable than maximizing arbitrage in the German EPEX market.
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
We study the statistical regularities of opening call auction using the ultra-high-frequency data of 22 liquid stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2003. The distribution of the relative price, defined as the relative difference between the order price in opening call auction and the closing price of last tr…
The private car license plates issued in Shanghai are bestowed the title of "the most expensive sheet iron all over the world", more expensive than gold. A citizen has to bid in an monthly auction to obtain a license plate for his new private car. We perform statistical analysis to investigate the influence of the mini…
Over the last decade, digital media (web or app publishers) generalized the use of real time ad auctions to sell their ad spaces. Multiple auction platforms, also called Supply-Side Platforms (SSP), were created. Because of this multiplicity, publishers started to create competition between SSPs. In this setting, there…
We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant. Moreover, it explicitly supplies a construction for a finite minimal set of possible bids on which such a sum is not …
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions …
Real-time bidding (RTB) systems, which utilize auctions to allocate user impressions to competing advertisers, continue to enjoy success in digital advertising. Assessing the effectiveness of such advertising remains a challenge in research and practice. This paper proposes a new approach to perform causal inference on…
Walraswap solves batch auction pricing by finding optimal AMM swaps.
problem Executing all trade orders with optimal automated market makers (AMMs).
method Uses Brouwer's fixed-point theorem to find equilibrium prices.
result A solution to batch auction pricing problems in blockchain.
In Chinese societies, superstition is of paramount importance, and vehicle license plates with desirable numbers can fetch very high prices in auctions. Unlike other valuable items, license plates are not allocated an estimated price before auction. I propose that the task of predicting plate prices can be viewed as a …
The call auction is a widely used trading mechanism, especially during the opening and closing periods of financial markets. In this paper, we study a standard call auction problem where orders are submitted according to Poisson processes, with random prices distributed according to a general distribution, and may be c…
We propose a model for price formation in financial markets based on clearing of a standard call auction with random orders, and verify its validity for prediction of the daily closing price distribution statistically. The model considers random buy and sell orders, placed following demand- and supply-side valuation di…
Study optimizes rebate design in auction markets to enhance efficiency.
problem Designing optimal rebate policies in auction markets to improve efficiency.
method Formulated as a principal-agent problem, solved using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations and Deep BSDE method.
result Optimal transaction fees and rebates narrow the price spread, improving market efficiency.