We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.
problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.
Model shows government incentives boost green bond investment.
problem Increasing green investments through government incentives.
method Optimal incentives indexed on bond prices and covariation, applied to a portfolio of bonds.
result Method outperforms current tax-incentives systems in green investments.
Proposes a contextual bandit method for demand side management.
problem Managing demand response through price incentives.
method Contextual bandit approach with quadratic loss measurement.
result Upper bounds on regret with fast rates under stronger assumptions.
New pricing framework allocates costs of operating reserves and transmission.
problem Allocating costs of operating reserves and transmission efficiently.
method Causation-based framework using contingency-constrained scheduling models.
result More comprehensive and efficient cost-reflective market operations.
Optimizes fund manager's wealth with partial information on market risk.
problem Maximizing wealth with incomplete information about market risk.
method Formulated as optimization under partial information, solved via martingale method and concavification.
result Shows how learning about market risk affects optimal investment strategy.
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…
We consider models of financial markets in which all parties involved find incentives to participate. Strategies are evaluated directly by their virtual wealths. By tuning the price sensitivity and market impact, a phase diagram with several attractor behaviors resembling those of real markets emerge, reflecting the ro…
Exchange uses incentives to optimize limit order book dynamics.
problem Optimizing market liquidity in fragmented electronic markets.
method Modeling limit order book as SPDE and using control theory to design incentives.
result Exchange can design incentives to modify order book shape and increase liquidity.
New mortgage contracts reduce underwater default by adjusting loan balances, but must balance prepayment incentives.
problem Underwater default incentives in mortgages.
method Analyzes automatic balance adjustment and prepayment penalties in mortgage contracts.
result Automatic balance adjustments are preferable to traditional contracts at certain spreads, reducing underwater default.
Game-theoretic flow allocation models network dynamics.
problem Maximizing flow through a network with strategic node allocations.
method Game-theoretic analysis of flow allocation strategies in a network.
result Existence and computational complexity of Nash and strong equilibria.
Low redispatch prices boost green hydrogen production cost, encouraging electrolyzer siting.
problem Uncertainty in redispatch power availability and its impact on green hydrogen production cost.
method Historic redispatch time series analysis and power purchase scenarios evaluation.
result Low price levels can lead to notable production cost reductions, incentivizing electrolyzer siting.
This study examines how DMMs affect market liquidity and competition.
problem The impact of DMMs on market liquidity and competition.
method Agent-based simulations to explore the effects of varying competition levels and incentive structures among DMMs.
result Optimal competition among DMMs maximizes liquidity benefits without negatively impacting price discovery.
COAD maximizes online auction revenue by quantifying uncertainty without known distributions.
problem Designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for online auctions with unknown bidder values and uncertain future participants.
method COAD uses distribution-free uncertainty quantification techniques and integrates machine learning methods to predict bidder values while ensuring revenue guarantees.
result COAD maximizes revenue in online auctions through bidder-specific reserve prices based on lower confidence bounds of valuations.
This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated…
Model shows phase transitions in asset pricing with market maker incentives.
problem Analyzing asset pricing with market maker profit incentives.
method Stochastic game theory, neural networks.
result Equilibrium experiences three phases: linear pricing, mid-price with spread, and metastable state.
Forward hedging reshapes incentive provision in firms.
problem How does forward hedging affect incentive provision in firms?
method We consider a CARA framework to jointly characterize optimal production, compensation, and static hedging in equilibrium.
result Delegation and external hedging are partial substitutes, and delegation can increase firm value even when the agent is more risk averse.
A new mechanism optimizes data marketplace pricing efficiently.
problem Designing fair and efficient pricing mechanisms for data marketplaces.
method Two-stage approach: auctions to estimate value distributions, then optimal posted prices.
result MAPP achieves optimal revenue with minimal price discrimination.
Study on time-zero efficiency of European power derivatives markets using statistical tests and trading rules.
problem Assessing time-zero efficiency in European power derivatives markets.
method Statistical tests based on the law of one price and trading rules based on price differentials and no-arbitrage violations applied to daily data of three European power markets.
result Definite conclusions on time-zero efficiency are not possible for French and Spanish markets due to liquidity and representativeness challenges.
Paper tackles online learning for DR management with incentives.
problem Estimating baseline consumption in DR programs with consumer incentives.
method Online learning scheme using least-squares with perturbed reward prices.
result Achieves low regret of $\mathcal{O}\left((\log{T})^2
ight)$ compared to optimal.
DaringFed incentivizes clients in OFL with dynamic rewards under TII.
problem Designing incentives for OFL clients under dynamic, incomplete information.
method Formulated as a dynamic signaling and pricing allocation problem in a Bayesian persuasion game.
result Optimal design of DaringFed improves accuracy and convergence speed by 16.99%.
Ad exchanges use CORP to set reserve prices against strategic buyers.
problem Setting optimal reserve prices in ad exchanges with strategic buyers.
method Proposes CORP policy to learn and set reserve prices robustly.
result Achieves sublinear regret in unknown noise distribution.
Triangle fees adjust fees based on trade size and price movement, improving price accuracy and revenue.
problem Price staleness and low fee revenue in AMMs.
method Decreasing marginal fees proportional to price movement, creating incentives for price accuracy.
result Triangle fees strictly improve the Pareto frontier of price accuracy versus losses.
Short-term incentives lead to riskier trading strategies.
problem Optimal execution with performance barriers.
method Analyzes the impact of short-term performance incentives on trading behavior.
result Short-term incentives result in more aggressive but less risky trading strategies in the short term, but poorer performance over long periods.
Unihedge uses HTAX to create unlimited liquidity in prediction markets.
problem Limited liquidity and information incorporation issues in prediction markets.
method Introduces HTAX prediction markets with DPM derivatives and new incentive mechanisms.
result Unlimited liquidity and improved information incorporation in prediction markets.
Proposes a Carbon Equivalence Principle for financial products to align incentives and drive sustainability.
problem Align financial market incentives with carbon emissions to limit global warming.
method Introduces a Carbon Equivalence Principle requiring financial products to describe equivalent carbon flows alongside cash flows.
result Transparency of carbon flows in financial products can align incentives and reduce future costs, necessitating project re-structuring and financial net-zero designs.
Mobile payment incentives optimized using merchant transaction networks.
problem Optimizing marketing campaigns with limited budgets.
method Graph representation learning on transaction networks.
result Effective modeling of merchant sensitivity to incentives.
Proposes hedging strategies for mortgage prepayment risk.
problem Mortgage prepayment risk and its impact on financial institutions.
method Develops a model incorporating non-linear financial instruments for hedging.
result Shows non-linear risk in prepayment options and validates a functional form of prepayments.
Insurance contracts for autonomous AI agents must be actuarially sound and resistant to gaming.
problem Designing insurance contracts for autonomous AI agents that are actuarially sound and resistant to gaming.
method Characterizing a five-attack space and proving the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant.
result An incentive-compatible layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.
This paper optimizes liquidity provision in automated market makers using auction theory.
problem Optimizing profit for a monopolist liquidity provider in automated market makers.
method Introduces a Bayesian-like belief inference framework to model AMMs, characterizes profit-maximizing strategies using Myerson's optimal auction theory.
result Characterizes the optimal demand curve and payments for an IC AMM, revealing a bid-ask spread caused by asymmetry and monopoly pricing.
Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.
problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.
Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.
problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.
Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.
problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.
AI task delegation faces incentive collapse with unbounded payments as AI accuracy rises.
problem Incentive collapse in AI-assisted task delegation schemes.
method General impossibility result and sentinel-auditing payment mechanism.
result Sentinel-auditing mechanism enforces positive human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy.
No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.
problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.
Optimizes e-commerce traffic sales by incorporating hidden costs into auction mechanisms.
problem Hidden costs from unexpected advertising items in search results.
method Dynamic reserve price design with distributed solving algorithm.
result Ensures a balanced relationship between revenue and user experience.
Uniswap V3 struggles with price accuracy during sudden market drops.
problem Price inaccuracies on Uniswap V3 during abrupt price drops.
method Empirical study of Uniswap V3's performance during market shocks.
result Liquidity providers lack agility and incentives in volatile conditions.
A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.
problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.
The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.
problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.
Contingent Convertible bonds (CoCos) are debt instruments that convert into equity or are written down in times of distress. Existing pricing models assume conversion triggers based on market prices and on the assumption that markets can always observe all relevant firm information. But all Cocos issued so far have tri…
Incentive-aware recommender system for online platforms.
problem Myopic agents exploit optimal arms, not exploring alternatives.
method Model as multi-agent bandit problem, incentivizes exploration.
result Asymptotically optimal performance with ex-post fairness.
Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.
problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
The paper analyzes regret in bilateral trade mechanisms without prior valuations.
problem Designing efficient trade mechanisms without prior knowledge of valuations.
method Regret minimization framework over rounds of interactions with no prior knowledge of valuations.
result Characterization of regret bounds for different feedback models and valuations.
How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…
Model shows incentives in shared order book can lead to free-rider problem.
problem Incentives in shared order books can lead to free-rider problem.
method Developed a Principal-Agent model with CARA utility functions.
result Equilibrium analysis shows incentives can lead to reduced competition.
The paper analyzes CFMMs to ensure accurate price reporting.
problem Ensuring accurate price reporting for CFMMs.
method Analyzes CFMMs under general assumptions to incentivize correct price reporting.
result Agents are incentivized to correctly report asset prices in a computationally efficient way.
In an economy with asymmetric information, the smart contract in the blockchain protocol mitigates uncertainty. Since, as a new trading platform, the blockchain triggers segmentation of market and differentiation of agents in both the sell and buy sides of the market, it recomposes the asymmetric information and genera…