A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.
problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.
Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.
problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.
The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.
problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.
Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.
problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.
Paper proposes FMore to incentivize edge nodes in federated learning with MEC.
problem Incentivizing edge nodes in federated learning with MEC resources.
method Multi-dimensional procurement auction with K winners.
result FMore improves model accuracy and reduces training rounds for AI tasks.
Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.
problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.
Permutation-equivariant neural networks improve auction mechanisms by reducing regret and sample complexity.
problem Designing optimal auction mechanisms that balance revenue and bidders' regret.
method Introduced permutation-equivariant neural networks to auction mechanisms.
result Permutation-equivariant neural networks decrease expected ex-post regret and improve model generalizability.
This research simplifies lending pools in decentralized finance for better understanding and security.
problem Complexity and lack of executable models make lending pools hard to understand and predict.
method Developed a formal model to reflect common features of lending pools and proved general properties.
result Proved correct handling of funds and described vulnerabilities and attacks.
Forward hedging reshapes incentive provision in firms.
problem How does forward hedging affect incentive provision in firms?
method We consider a CARA framework to jointly characterize optimal production, compensation, and static hedging in equilibrium.
result Delegation and external hedging are partial substitutes, and delegation can increase firm value even when the agent is more risk averse.
We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold. First, we want the learning algorithm to be no-regret with respect to the best fixed …
Unihedge uses HTAX to create unlimited liquidity in prediction markets.
problem Limited liquidity and information incorporation issues in prediction markets.
method Introduces HTAX prediction markets with DPM derivatives and new incentive mechanisms.
result Unlimited liquidity and improved information incorporation in prediction markets.
AI task delegation faces incentive collapse with unbounded payments as AI accuracy rises.
problem Incentive collapse in AI-assisted task delegation schemes.
method General impossibility result and sentinel-auditing payment mechanism.
result Sentinel-auditing mechanism enforces positive human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy.
dYdX updates liquidity provider incentives to enhance trading efficiency.
problem Incentivizing liquidity providers to maintain efficient market structures.
method Analyzed various metrics (makerVolume, depths, spreads) and used historical trades to update the LP Incentives Programme.
result Updated the LP Incentives Programme to encourage more active and efficient liquidity.
Study optimizes health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
problem Designing health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
method Inverse behavioral optimization framework integrating QALY-based incentives and adaptive learning.
result Modern health systems operate near an efficiency-saturated frontier, with small fairness adjustments yielding diminishing returns.
DICE estimates data influence cascade in decentralized learning networks.
problem Lack of fair incentives discourages participation in decentralized learning.
method Designs DICE to estimate influence cascade in decentralized networks.
result Influence cascade is influenced by data, topology, and loss landscape curvature.
COAD maximizes online auction revenue by quantifying uncertainty without known distributions.
problem Designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for online auctions with unknown bidder values and uncertain future participants.
method COAD uses distribution-free uncertainty quantification techniques and integrates machine learning methods to predict bidder values while ensuring revenue guarantees.
result COAD maximizes revenue in online auctions through bidder-specific reserve prices based on lower confidence bounds of valuations.
Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.
problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves i l d e O ( T ) ilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) i l d e O ( T ) social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment. We consider models of financial markets in which all parties involved find incentives to participate. Strategies are evaluated directly by their virtual wealths. By tuning the price sensitivity and market impact, a phase diagram with several attractor behaviors resembling those of real markets emerge, reflecting the ro…
Study shows visual feedback and monetary incentives reduce plugload energy consumption in commercial buildings.
problem Mitigating energy consumption in commercial buildings through occupant plugload control.
method Field experiments with visual feedback and monetary incentives in government and university buildings.
result Mean energy reduction of ~9.52% in office environments and ~21.61% in university environments with visual feedback.
Paper tackles online learning for DR management with incentives.
problem Estimating baseline consumption in DR programs with consumer incentives.
method Online learning scheme using least-squares with perturbed reward prices.
result Achieves low regret of $\mathcal{O}\left((\log{T})^2
ight)$ compared to optimal.
Improved ε ε ε -greedy handles strategic bidding in PPC auctions.
problem Strategic bidding in PPC auctions with personalization and corruptions.
method Extended ε ε ε -greedy to handle strategic arms in contextual multi-arm bandit. result ε ε ε -greedy is robust to adversarial corruptions and degrades linearly with corruption. New pricing framework allocates costs of operating reserves and transmission.
problem Allocating costs of operating reserves and transmission efficiently.
method Causation-based framework using contingency-constrained scheduling models.
result More comprehensive and efficient cost-reflective market operations.
Game theory models incentivizes honesty in collaborative learning among competitors.
problem Incentivizing honest updates among competitors in collaborative learning schemes.
method Formulated a game to model interactions, studied two learning tasks, proposed mechanisms to incentivize honest communication.
result Rational clients are incentivized to manipulate their updates, preventing learning; proposed mechanisms ensure comparable learning quality to full cooperation.
A new mechanism optimizes data marketplace pricing efficiently.
problem Designing fair and efficient pricing mechanisms for data marketplaces.
method Two-stage approach: auctions to estimate value distributions, then optimal posted prices.
result MAPP achieves optimal revenue with minimal price discrimination.
A study on how a principal can incentivize an agent to make better decisions in a repeated game.
problem Optimizing a principal's utility in a misaligned principal-agent bandit game.
method Developed nearly optimal learning algorithms for the principal's regret in multi-armed and linear contextual settings.
result The principal can iteratively learn an incentive policy to maximize her total utility.
Energy game-theoretic frameworks have emerged to be a successful strategy to encourage energy efficient behavior in large scale by leveraging human-in-the-loop strategy. A number of such frameworks have been introduced over the years which formulate the energy saving process as a competitive game with appropriate incen…
Model for open, decentralized network with task load balancing.
problem Complex computational tasks in open, decentralized networks.
method Incentive-based load balancing using economic mechanisms.
result Optimized resource allocation and enhanced system resilience.
We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad range of estimators, in…
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a model for how strategic agents can invest effort in order to change the outcome…
The paper analyzes regret in bilateral trade mechanisms without prior valuations.
problem Designing efficient trade mechanisms without prior knowledge of valuations.
method Regret minimization framework over rounds of interactions with no prior knowledge of valuations.
result Characterization of regret bounds for different feedback models and valuations.
PoEL protocol aims to efficiently create and secure liquidity for blockchain networks.
problem Lack of sustainable liquidity and network security in Proof of Stake blockchains.
method PoEL uses staking rewards to attract risk capital, structuring incentives for capital efficiency and security.
result PoEL protocol enhances blockchain network security and liquidity sustainability.
Insurance contracts for autonomous AI agents must be actuarially sound and resistant to gaming.
problem Designing insurance contracts for autonomous AI agents that are actuarially sound and resistant to gaming.
method Characterizing a five-attack space and proving the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant.
result An incentive-compatible layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.
Mobile payment incentives optimized using merchant transaction networks.
problem Optimizing marketing campaigns with limited budgets.
method Graph representation learning on transaction networks.
result Effective modeling of merchant sensitivity to incentives.
We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.
problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.
New study shows FTRL mechanism works with correlated events.
problem Forecasting competitions with correlated events.
method Introduces block correlation and uses FTRL mechanism.
result FTRL mechanism retains ε ε ε -optimal guarantee with O ( b 2 log ( n ) / ε 2 ) O(b^2 \log(n)/ε^2) O ( b 2 log ( n ) / ε 2 ) events for correlated events. Model shows government incentives boost green bond investment.
problem Increasing green investments through government incentives.
method Optimal incentives indexed on bond prices and covariation, applied to a portfolio of bonds.
result Method outperforms current tax-incentives systems in green investments.
This study examines liquidation risks in DeFi lending markets.
problem Liquidity risks in decentralized finance lending protocols.
method Quantitative analysis of liquidation data from four major DeFi platforms.
result Current liquidation mechanisms incentivize liquidators but lead to excessive collateral sales.
Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.
problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.
Exchange uses incentives to optimize limit order book dynamics.
problem Optimizing market liquidity in fragmented electronic markets.
method Modeling limit order book as SPDE and using control theory to design incentives.
result Exchange can design incentives to modify order book shape and increase liquidity.
This paper tackles resource allocation in the Lightning Network using DRL.
problem Complex combinatorial problem of node selection and resource allocation in the Lightning Network.
method Attention-based Deep Reinforcement Learning framework.
result Improved resource allocation leads to better performance and decentralization in the LN.
Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.
problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.
We consider the problem of Probably Approximate Correct (PAC) learning of a binary classifier from noisy labeled examples acquired from multiple annotators (each characterized by a respective classification noise rate). First, we consider the complete information scenario, where the learner knows the noise rates of all…
Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.
problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.
DaringFed incentivizes clients in OFL with dynamic rewards under TII.
problem Designing incentives for OFL clients under dynamic, incomplete information.
method Formulated as a dynamic signaling and pricing allocation problem in a Bayesian persuasion game.
result Optimal design of DaringFed improves accuracy and convergence speed by 16.99%.
Incentive-aware recommender system for online platforms.
problem Myopic agents exploit optimal arms, not exploring alternatives.
method Model as multi-agent bandit problem, incentivizes exploration.
result Asymptotically optimal performance with ex-post fairness.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
Banks in the interbank network can not assess the true risks associated with lending to other banks in the network, unless they have full information on the riskiness of all the other banks. These risks can be estimated by using network metrics (for example DebtRank) of the interbank liability network which is availabl…
How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…