A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
Energy game-theoretic frameworks have emerged to be a successful strategy to encourage energy efficient behavior in large scale by leveraging human-in-the-loop strategy. A number of such frameworks have been introduced over the years which formulate the energy saving process as a competitive game with appropriate incen…
Traditional centralized energy systems have the disadvantages of difficult management and insufficient incentives. Blockchain is an emerging technology, which can be utilized in energy systems to enhance their management and control. Integrating token economy and blockchain technology, token economic systems in energy …
Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.
problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.
We study platforms in the sharing economy and discuss the need for incentivizing users to explore options that otherwise would not be chosen. For instance, rental platforms such as Airbnb typically rely on customer reviews to provide users with relevant information about different options. Yet, often a large fraction o…
Study on time-zero efficiency of European power derivatives markets using statistical tests and trading rules.
problem Assessing time-zero efficiency in European power derivatives markets.
method Statistical tests based on the law of one price and trading rules based on price differentials and no-arbitrage violations applied to daily data of three European power markets.
result Definite conclusions on time-zero efficiency are not possible for French and Spanish markets due to liquidity and representativeness challenges.
No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.
problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.
This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.
problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.
How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…
When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…
A generalized gamification framework is introduced as a form of smart infrastructure with potential to improve sustainability and energy efficiency by leveraging humans-in-the-loop strategy. The proposed framework enables a Human-Centric Cyber-Physical System using an interface to allow building managers to interact wi…
We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fees policy to attract transactions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic control problem of the market maker without the intervention of the exchange. T…
Game theory models incentivizes honesty in collaborative learning among competitors.
problem Incentivizing honest updates among competitors in collaborative learning schemes.
method Formulated a game to model interactions, studied two learning tasks, proposed mechanisms to incentivize honest communication.
result Rational clients are incentivized to manipulate their updates, preventing learning; proposed mechanisms ensure comparable learning quality to full cooperation.