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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,695 papers · 148 categories

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11233445 · Apr 202619922001200920172026
48 results for Economic Incentives

Study shows ethanol blends and incentives can significantly reduce transportation carbon emissions.

problem Rapid growth in electric vehicles requires complementary strategies to decarbonize transportation.
method Analysis of ethanol blending, regulatory incentives, and economic assessments.
result Ethanol blending, especially E15 and E85, can substantially reduce carbon emissions and provide economic benefits.

The paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning in markets.

problem Learning dynamics in markets with strategic externalities.
method A two-phase incentive mechanism that estimates and uses implementable transfers to steer long-run dynamics.
result The mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and asymptotically optimal welfare under mild rationality and exploration conditions.

A novel incentive mechanism improves fairness and participation in federated learning.

problem Low-quality clients and lack of fairness in federated learning.
method Client selection process and money transfer mechanism to ensure fairness and participation.
result The proposed incentive mechanism improves the duration and fairness of federated learning.

The paper analyzes how mutable blockchain protocols affect miner behavior and strategic stability.

problem The mutability of blockchain protocols undermines long-term planning and cooperative equilibria.
method Integrates Austrian capital theory with repeated game theory to examine miner behavior under different institutional conditions.
result Effective time preference increases when protocol rules are mutable, leading to political rent-seeking and undermining strategic coherence.

Game theory helps analyze ESOs/EBIs in production and service sectors.

problem Economic incentives affect traditional production/service functions and create intangible capital.
method Uses game theory to analyze interactions in ESO/EBI transactions.
result No perfect Nash Equilibria for two-stage games involving many participants.

Economies are complex man-made systems where organisms and markets interact according to motivations and principles not entirely understood yet. The increasing dissatisfaction with the postulates of traditional economics i.e. perfectly rational agents, interacting through efficient markets in the search of equilibrium,…

2012-05-14abs ↗pdf ↗

Permutation-equivariant neural networks improve auction mechanisms by reducing regret and sample complexity.

problem Designing optimal auction mechanisms that balance revenue and bidders' regret.
method Introduced permutation-equivariant neural networks to auction mechanisms.
result Permutation-equivariant neural networks decrease expected ex-post regret and improve model generalizability.

Neural networks improve VaR estimation accuracy and robustness.

problem Estimating Value at Risk (VaR) in financial markets.
method Generative regime switching framework with Monte-Carlo simulations, neural networks initialized via best model, balanced incentive function, reduced training data.
result Neural networks outperform traditional methods in VaR estimation, especially with less data.

Study designs incentives for adapting multi-agent systems without knowing their learning dynamics.

problem Designing incentives for an adapting population in multi-agent systems without prior knowledge of their learning dynamics.
method Introduces a model-based non-episodic Reinforcement Learning (RL) formulation for steering Markovian agents towards desired policies, focusing on history-dependent strategies to handle model uncertainty.
result Identifies conditions for the existence of steering strategies to guide agents to desired policies and provides empirical algorithms to approximately solve the objective.

Study shows how business cycle affects dividend payout based on managerial stock incentives.

problem Impact of managerial stock incentives on dividend payout policy during business cycles.
method Using S&P 1500 companies data from 2000-2018, analyzing full sample and recession periods.
result Negative relationship between managerial stock options and dividend payouts, significant for medium-sized companies.

The AIBC is an Artificial Intelligence and blockchain technology based large-scale decentralized ecosystem that allows system-wide low-cost sharing of computing and storage resources. The AIBC consists of four layers: a fundamental layer, a resource layer, an application layer, and an ecosystem layer. The AIBC implemen…

2019-09-26abs ↗pdf ↗

New pricing framework allocates costs of operating reserves and transmission.

problem Allocating costs of operating reserves and transmission efficiently.
method Causation-based framework using contingency-constrained scheduling models.
result More comprehensive and efficient cost-reflective market operations.

We refine toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives in CP-AMM systems.

problem Ensuring stability in dynamic liquidation incentives in automated market makers.
method Derived state-dependent toxicity bounds for dynamic liquidation incentives, reconciling them with CP-AMM price dynamics.
result State-dependent bounds and liquidity-depth-only condition for dynamic liquidation incentives.

PoEL protocol aims to efficiently create and secure liquidity for blockchain networks.

problem Lack of sustainable liquidity and network security in Proof of Stake blockchains.
method PoEL uses staking rewards to attract risk capital, structuring incentives for capital efficiency and security.
result PoEL protocol enhances blockchain network security and liquidity sustainability.

Study optimal incentives for cleaner energy production.

problem Accelerate transition to cleaner technologies in energy market.
method Stochastic control models for three scenarios: single firm, two firms, and two firms without incentives.
result Optimal strategies for investment and production emerge, highlighting firm interactions and incentive effects.

Two-stage mechanism designs reduce regret in recommender systems with stochastic covariates.

problem Designing effective recommender systems with user covariates sampled online.
method Two-stage algorithm integrating incentivized exploration with offline learning methods.
result Achieves sublinear regret while maintaining incentive compatibility.

Study assesses how much security restaking protocols need to pay for.

problem Determining the optimal security level for restaking protocols using token incentives.
method Expanding a model by Durvasula and Roughgarden to include strategic attackers and node operators, constructing an approximation algorithm for token-based incentives.
result Restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management, even against strategic adversaries.

Study on liquidity and market efficiency in auction games with imperfect information.

problem Generating liquidity in illiquid auction markets with imperfect information.
method Characterized Nash equilibria in a two-player game with imperfect information, linking market spreads to signal strength.
result Without incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to trades. Quadratic fees indexed on half spread can generate liquidity.

No-regret learning with strategic experts, incentivized.

problem Online learning with strategic experts who misreport beliefs.
method Building on wagering mechanisms, we provide algorithms for no-regret and incentive compatibility in both full and partial information settings.
result Our algorithms achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts, with comparable regret to classic no-regret algorithms and diminishing regret for forward-looking agents.

Method uses ANN to estimate incentive salience from large behavioral data.

problem Estimating incentive salience in naturalistic settings.
method Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) for latent state approximation.
result ANNs produce better representations for predicting future behaviour.

This paper addresses reward estimation and incentive design for agents with hidden rewards.

problem Estimating and incentivizing agents with unknown rewards in a learning setting.
method Repeated adverse selection game with a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. Introduces an estimator for consistent reward estimation and a data-driven incentive policy.
result Finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal.

How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source…

2018-06-04abs ↗pdf ↗

In an economy with asymmetric information, the smart contract in the blockchain protocol mitigates uncertainty. Since, as a new trading platform, the blockchain triggers segmentation of market and differentiation of agents in both the sell and buy sides of the market, it recomposes the asymmetric information and genera…

2018-02-27abs ↗pdf ↗

Study optimizes health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.

problem Designing health incentives to balance efficiency and fairness.
method Inverse behavioral optimization framework integrating QALY-based incentives and adaptive learning.
result Modern health systems operate near an efficiency-saturated frontier, with small fairness adjustments yielding diminishing returns.

Paper proposes incentive mechanism to encourage participation in federated learning.

problem Users are reluctant to participate in federated learning due to privacy concerns.
method Formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, designed an incentive mechanism to select and compensate users.
result Demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism through simulations.

Modeling tech transfer to explain convergence in Central and Eastern Europe.

problem Understanding mechanisms of technological diffusion in developing economies.
method Introducing a herding-based mechanism to model technological adoption and productivity growth.
result Explicit analytical solution showing nonlinear convergence to a moving frontier.

When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, op…

2013-06-12abs ↗pdf ↗

Study shows visual feedback and monetary incentives reduce plugload energy consumption in commercial buildings.

problem Mitigating energy consumption in commercial buildings through occupant plugload control.
method Field experiments with visual feedback and monetary incentives in government and university buildings.
result Mean energy reduction of ~9.52% in office environments and ~21.61% in university environments with visual feedback.

dYdX updates liquidity provider incentives to enhance trading efficiency.

problem Incentivizing liquidity providers to maintain efficient market structures.
method Analyzed various metrics (makerVolume, depths, spreads) and used historical trades to update the LP Incentives Programme.
result Updated the LP Incentives Programme to encourage more active and efficient liquidity.

The study compares M6 competitors' performance to industry benchmarks and discusses incentives for investment managers.

problem Investors seek to understand the performance and skill of M6 competitors beyond the competition's metrics.
method Comparative analysis using financial metrics, factor models, and new strategies.
result Most competitors do not generate significant out-performance compared to industry benchmarks, but some show skill in recent performance.

COBRA addresses strategic behavior in online platforms by ensuring truthful reporting without monetary incentives.

problem Ensuring truthful reporting from strategic agents in online platforms.
method Proposes COBRA, an algorithm for contextual bandits involving strategic agents that disincentivizes strategic behavior.
result COBRA achieves sub-linear regret guarantee and incentive compatibility without monetary incentives.

Study allocates resources to strategic agents while balancing cost and incentives.

problem Dynamic allocation of reusable resources to strategic agents with private valuations under long-term cost constraints.
method Incentive-aware framework combining epoch-based lazy updates and randomized exploration rounds.
result Achieves ildeO(T) ilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}) social welfare regret, satisfies all cost constraints, and ensures incentive alignment.

Study incentive efficiency in monopoly insurance markets with hidden information.

problem Maximizing social welfare in a monopoly insurance market with hidden agent types.
method Maximizes social welfare function subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
result Optimal menus of contracts depend on the level of social welfare weight and agent risk attitudes.