A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.
This paper examines three independent explanatory variables and their relation with cost overrun in order to decide whether this is different for Dutch infrastructure projects compared to worldwide findings. The three independent variables are project type (road, rail, and fixed link projects), project size (measured i…
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for k- price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
West Frisian lemmatizer, POS tagger, and parser created.
problem Creating accurate lemmatization, POS tagging, and dependency parsing for West Frisian.
method Using a corpus of 44,714 words annotated according to Universal Dependency version 2. Applying Dutch POS tags and morphological/syntactic annotations to create Frisian translations.
result Significant improvement in lemma accuracy compared to default parameters.
Contemporary debates on filter bubbles and polarization in public and social media raise the question to what extent news media of the past exhibited biases. This paper specifically examines bias related to gender in six Dutch national newspapers between 1950 and 1990. We measure bias related to gender by comparing loc…
We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction price reacts to a single auction order placement or can…
AHEAD improves financial market efficiency through ad-hoc auctions.
problem Improving financial market efficiency and reducing transaction costs.
method Introducing a new matching design (AHEAD) for electronic markets where participants can trade at a fixed price and trigger auctions when unsatisfied.
result A Nash equilibrium is achieved in the market, and ad-hoc auctions are more relevant and efficient than periodic auctions and continuous limit order books.
In the last three decades, we have seen a significant increase in trading goods and services through online auctions. However, this business created an attractive environment for malicious moneymakers who can commit different types of fraud activities, such as Shill Bidding (SB). The latter is predominant across many a…
The paper examines how builders in Ethereum auctions can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities, affecting searchers' bidding strategies.
problem Commitment problem in Ethereum auctions where builders can defect and replicate winning MEV opportunities.
method Modeling and analysis of searchers' bidding strategies and the resulting equilibrium, using libMEV dataset.
result The equilibrium is piecewise, with the cost of imperfect commitment depending on replicability and competition. There is sharp heterogeneity across MEV types.
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets…
Optimizes reserve prices for first-price auctions to maximize revenue.
problem Optimizing reserve prices for first-price auctions in display advertising.
method Gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on bidder responsiveness to experimental shocks.
result Revenue optimization in first-price auctions can be decomposed into demand and bidding components, and techniques are introduced to reduce variance of each.
We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios. 1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative. 2. We formulat…
We report statistical regularities of the opening and closing auctions of French equities, focusing on the diffusive properties of the indicative auction price. Two mechanisms are at play as the auction end time nears: the typical price change magnitude decreases, favoring underdiffusion, while the rate of these events…
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior …
Sponsored search in E-commerce platforms such as Amazon, Taobao and Tmall provides sellers an effective way to reach potential buyers with most relevant purpose. In this paper, we study the auction mechanism optimization problem in sponsored search on Alibaba's mobile E-commerce platform. Besides generating revenue, we…