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arXiv research

A locally-built, LLM-digested index of recent arXiv papers in quant finance, geometry/topology, and statistical ML — keyword search served straight from SQLite on this machine.

168,657 papers · 148 categories

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55111166221 · Jun 202019922001200920172026
48 results for Adversarial opponents

This work tackles learning Markov games with adversarial opponents and achieves both average reward and exploitation.

problem Achieving both average reward and exploiting adaptive opponents in Markov games.
method Develops efficient algorithms and proves hardness results for learning Markov games with adversarial opponents.
result Achieves K\sqrt{K}-regret bounds for certain conditions on opponent policies, complemented by an exponential lower bound.

Algorithm learns to play against unknown opponents in sequential games.

problem Designing strategies for a learner to interact with an unknown opponent in repeated sequential games.
method Kernel-based regularity assumptions and a novel algorithm combining bilevel optimization and online learning.
result Algorithm achieves sublinear regret guarantees and is effective in specific game settings.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) policies are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations to their observations, similar to adversarial examples for classifiers. However, an attacker is not usually able to directly modify another agent's observations. This might lead one to wonder: is it possible to attack an R…

2019-05-25abs ↗pdf ↗

We introduce Threatened Markov Decision Processes (TMDPs) as an extension of the classical Markov Decision Process framework for Reinforcement Learning (RL). TMDPs allow suporting a decision maker against potential opponents in a RL context. We also propose a level-k thinking scheme resulting in a novel learning approa…

2019-08-22abs ↗pdf ↗

DORIS algorithm achieves no-regret learning in Markov games with adversarial opponents.

problem Decentralized policy learning in Markov games with nonstationary opponents.
method DORIS algorithm using optimistic hyperpolicy mirror descent.
result Achieves K\sqrt{K}-regret in general function approximation.

Study optimal policy regret in partially observable Markov games with adaptive opponents.

problem Optimal sequential decision-making in partially observable environments against strategic, adaptive opponents.
method An epoch-based optimistic maximum-likelihood algorithm that selects one policy per epoch using confidence sets built cumulatively from past data.
result Achieves ildeO(T) ilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) policy regret for fixed problem parameters, with explicit dependence on horizon, adversary memory, confidence radius, and aggregate Eluder dimension.

Study on learning strategies in adaptive Markov games with policy regret as metric.

problem Learning in dynamic Markov games with adaptive opponents is challenging.
method Introduced policy regret as a new learning metric and developed algorithms for consistent adaptive adversaries.
result Achieved T\sqrt{T} policy regret against certain adaptive adversaries.

Novel approach models opponent learning dynamics in multi-agent reinforcement learning.

problem Adaptation and learning of other agents in multi-agent settings cause non-stationarity, challenging existing algorithms.
method Develops a novel approach called Learning to Model Opponent Learning (LeMOL) to accurately model opponent learning dynamics.
result Structured opponent model is more accurate and stable than naive baselines.

The Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have demonstrated impressive performance for data synthesis, and are now used in a wide range of computer vision tasks. In spite of this success, they gained a reputation for being difficult to train, what results in a time-consuming and human-involved development process to u…

2017-12-06abs ↗pdf ↗

Multi-agent systems exhibit complex behaviors that emanate from the interactions of multiple agents in a shared environment. In this work, we are interested in controlling one agent in a multi-agent system and successfully learn to interact with the other agents that have fixed policies. Modeling the behavior of other …

2020-01-29abs ↗pdf ↗

LAFF algorithm balances adaptability and non-exploitability in repeated games.

problem Low regret in repeated games against unknown opponent classes.
method LAFF algorithm searches within sub-algorithms optimal for each opponent class and uses a punishment policy for exploitation.
result LAFF guarantees sublinear regret uniformly over possible opponents, except exploitative ones, for which it guarantees linear regret.

New algorithm improves self-play reinforcement learning for competitive games.

problem Inefficient opponent selection in self-play reinforcement learning.
method Intelligently selects opponents based on adversarial rules derived from saddle point optimization.
result Algorithm converges to approximate equilibrium with high probability in convex-concave games.

New adversarial training method improves robustness of power system controllers.

problem Designing robust controllers for complex cyber-physical power systems.
method Adversarial training approach with fixed opponent policy.
result Adversarial trained controllers show useful preventive behaviors in the N-1 problem.

Algorithm improves RL model selection for repeated games with utility maximization.

problem Optimal policy learning in repeated games with unknown opponent strategy.
method Proposes MRBEAR for average reward RL, applying to utility maximization in repeated games.
result Regret bound shows linear dependence on number of model classes in average reward RL.

New algorithm reduces online learning regret in uninformed Markov games.

problem Achieving no external regret in uninformed Markov games is impossible.
method Empirical Nash-value regret, parameter-free algorithm, adaptive restart.
result Achieves O(min{K+(CK)1/3,LK})O(\min \{\sqrt{K} + (CK)^{1/3},\sqrt{LK}\}) regret bound.

The paper develops algorithms for competitive RL in partially observable MGs.

problem Challenges in reinforcement learning with function approximation and partial observability.
method Proposes posterior sampling methods for self-play and adversarial learning in zero-sum MGs.
result Developed algorithms achieve low regret bounds scaling sublinearly with GEC and episode number.

A new method uses counterfactual learning to improve recommendation system evaluation.

problem Inconsistent results in recommender systems due to exposure mechanisms.
method Proposes a minimax empirical risk formulation with an adversarial game to account for exposure.
result Shows improved learning bounds and effectiveness over various recommendation settings.

Colour vision has long fascinated scientists, who have sought to understand both the physiology of the mechanics of colour vision and the psychophysics of colour perception. We consider representations of colour in anatomically constrained convolutional deep neural networks. Following ideas from neuroscience, we classi…

2019-10-14abs ↗pdf ↗

The dynamics of financial markets are driven by the interactions between participants, as well as the trading mechanisms and regulatory frameworks that govern these interactions. Decision-makers would rather not ignore the impact of other participants on these dynamics and should employ tools and models that take this …

2019-11-28abs ↗pdf ↗

This work improves autonomous racing by creating diverse opponents and adapting risk.

problem Balancing performance and safety in autonomous racing environments.
method Developed a self-play method using replica-exchange Markov chain Monte Carlo for diverse opponents and a distributionally robust bandit optimization for adaptive risk adjustment.
result Demonstrated real-time motion-planning methods achieving speeds comparable to Formula One racecars.

A new method simulates large, diverse populations of learning agents evolving in games.

problem Limited scalability and efficiency of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.
method Parallelizable implementation of Policy Gradient and Opponent-Learning Awareness for evolutionary simulations.
result Simulated large, diverse populations of learning agents evolve under various strategies.

Study best-response learning dynamics in zero-sum polymatrix games under full and minimal information settings.

problem Learning dynamics in zero-sum polymatrix games under different information settings.
method Two-timescale learning dynamics combining smoothed best-response updates and TD-learning for estimating local payoff functions.
result Polynomial-time finite-sample guarantees for convergence to an ε-Nash equilibrium in the minimal information case.

The study classifies and imitates trading agents in financial markets.

problem Classifying and imitating trading agents in continuous double auctions.
method Developed an agent-based model for trading, applied opponent modeling for classification, and used behavioral cloning for imitation.
result Techniques for classification and imitation were experimentally compared and evaluated.

Improved learning algorithm for first-price auctions reduces regret significantly.

problem Challenges in learning optimal bidding strategies for first-price auctions.
method Introduced novel ideas to achieve lower regret in sequential learning.
result Achieved log2(T)log^2(T) regret when opponents' bid distribution is known, and T1/3+εT^{1/3+ ε} regret in learning case.

Fictitious play with reinforcement learning is a general and effective framework for zero-sum games. However, using the current deep neural network models, the implementation of fictitious play faces crucial challenges. Neural network model training employs gradient descent approaches to update all connection weights, …

2019-11-27abs ↗pdf ↗

Algorithm converges to Nash equilibria in competitive games.

problem Finding Nash equilibria in decentralized, competitive Markov games.
method Decentralized Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent with a critic.
result Converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play.

It is now well known that decentralised optimisation can be formulated as a potential game, and game-theoretical learning algorithms can be used to find an optimum. One of the most common learning techniques in game theory is fictitious play. However fictitious play is founded on an implicit assumption that opponents' …

2011-12-11abs ↗pdf ↗

Algorithm minimizes regret and converges to equilibria in Markov games.

problem Regret minimization and convergence to equilibria in general-sum Markov games under adversarial opponents.
method Decentralized algorithm that uses policy optimization and controls path length to achieve sublinear regret.
result Sublinear regret guarantees for convergence to correlated equilibrium in Markov games.

Optimistic Mirror Descent framework improves bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.

problem Optimizing bidding strategies in non-stationary first-price auctions.
method Introducing Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) framework with novel optimism configuration.
result Minimax-optimal dynamic regret rates achieved for non-stationary first-price auctions.

Deep RL drone trained to compete against classical path planning in drone racing.

problem Optimizing long-term drone racing strategies using reinforcement learning.
method Used PPO algorithm on a simulated quadrotor in a racing environment created with AirSim.
result Deep RL agent outperformed classical path planning in drone racing competitions.

Automatically finds effective security strategies through reinforcement learning and self-play.

problem Finding effective security strategies for intrusion prevention.
method Modeling interaction as a Markov game, evolving attack and defense strategies through reinforcement learning and self-play.
result Effective security strategies emerge from self-play, reflecting common-sense knowledge.

This paper tackles sample-efficient reinforcement learning for partially observable Markov games.

problem Learning in partially observable Markov games with incomplete information.
method A simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for self-play, and a variant of optimistic MLE for adversarial opponents.
result The proposed algorithms achieve approximate Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria in polynomial samples for weakly revealing POMGs.

Self-play, where the algorithm learns by playing against itself without requiring any direct supervision, has become the new weapon in modern Reinforcement Learning (RL) for achieving superhuman performance in practice. However, the majority of exisiting theory in reinforcement learning only applies to the setting wher…

2020-02-10abs ↗pdf ↗

We present the quantum model of Bertrand duopoly and study the entanglement behavior on the profit functions of the firms. Using the concept of optimal response of each firm to the price of the opponent, we found only one Nash equilibirum point for maximally entangled initial state. The very presence of quantum entangl…

2010-01-16abs ↗pdf ↗

Calibrated strategies can be obtained by performing strategies that have no internal regret in some auxiliary game. Such strategies can be constructed explicitly with the use of Blackwell's approachability theorem, in an other auxiliary game. We establish the converse: a strategy that approaches a convex BB-set can be…

2010-06-09abs ↗pdf ↗

In this paper, we perform a minimalistic quantization of the classical game of tic-tac-toe, by allowing superpositions of classical moves. In order for the quantum game to reduce properly to the classical game, we require legal quantum moves to be orthogonal to all previous moves. We also admit interference effects, by…

2010-07-21abs ↗pdf ↗

First-best climate policy is a uniform carbon tax which gradually rises over time. Civil servants have complicated climate policy to expand bureaucracies, politicians to create rents. Environmentalists have exaggerated climate change to gain influence, other activists have joined the climate bandwagon. Opponents to cli…

2016-08-19abs ↗pdf ↗

We consider Blackwell approachability, a very powerful and geometric tool in game theory, used for example to design strategies of the uninformed player in repeated games with incomplete information. We extend this theory to "generalized quitting games" , a class of repeated stochastic games in which each player may ha…

2016-09-28abs ↗pdf ↗